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 i 
Abstract 
In recent years, public sector reforms with its New Public Management (NPM) 
doctrine have attracted the attention of policy makers, practitioners and academics 
around the world. In the developing countries, these reforms are usually engineered 
and imposed by the international financial community such as the World Bank and 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF). One of the main components of NPM is 
changes in management control systems (MCS) as it is believed that by adopting new 
MCS better transparency and accountability will ensue. This has resulted in the 
introduction of private sector accounting practices into the public sectors in order to 
enhance efficiency, effectiveness and transparency, and also to change the orientation 
of public sector managers towards managerialism. Using a large state enterprise in 
Nigeria, hypothetical called Nigeria State Company (NSC) as a case study, this thesis 
seeks to explore and understand the Nigerian public sector reforms and how these 
reforms impacts on the MCS of the organisation. The thesis explores the various MCS 
introduced, the processes of their implementation and how these systems function in 
the day-to-day decision making of the organisation.  
 
Data were collected using a triangulated approach. Interviews were the main sources 
of evidence and were conducted with various members of staff of the NSC from 
different hierarchical levels. Interviews were also conducted with policy makers, 
consultants, Nigerian privatisation agency staff, and oil industry regulators. The 
interview evidence was supplemented with informal discussions and document 
analysis. Various documents on NSC reforms, NSC publications and newspaper 
articles were analysed. Furthermore, during the case study, various observations were 
made and recorded. The case findings were analysed and interpreted using actor 
network theory as a theoretical lens. 
 
Based on the analysis, the thesis found that the public sector reforms in Nigeria and in 
NSC in particular are as a result of the actions of the network of the heterogeneous 
group of global/local and human/non-human actors. These actors contributed to 
shaping and re-shaping the reforms and the MCS. Furthermore, while various MCS 
were introduced as part of the reforms, the study found that very often these MCS 
have become subordinated to political control. Thus politics rather than economic 
criteria dominated decision making in the organisation thereby questioning the 
relevance of introducing these systems in the first place. Another interesting finding 
of the thesis is that there was lack of local ownership of the reforms and the MCS as 
these concepts and ideas were perceived as imported from the west and implemented 
largely by global consulting firms. There was minimal attempt to adapt them to suit 
the local context. This in effect resulted in these systems decoupled from day-to-day 
decision making. 
 
Overall, the findings of the thesis have implications for the design of public sector 
reforms (including associated accounting systems) in developing countries. The 
findings of the thesis raise several issues which can assist policy makers and 
practitioners in making better informed reform decisions.  Finally, some theoretical 
issues are raised which will contribute to future developments in actor-network 
theory. 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 The Thesis Background 
 
In the last twenty years, public sector reforms have attracted the interest and attention 
of policy makers, practitioners and academics around the world. These reforms have 
emanated from developed countries such as the United States of America, the United 
Kingdom, New Zealand and Australia. The governments of these countries have 
embarked on reforming their public organisations in an attempt to improve economic 
growth through reduction of operating costs, while maintaining or improving the 
efficiency and effectiveness of services provided to citizens (Ogden, 1995; 1998; 
Dorsch and Yasin, 1998). These reforms involve changes in structures, culture, 
functions and processes of the public organisations - changes such as reducing 
government funding to public organisations, corporatisation, commercialisation, 
privatisation, performance contracts, improved financial management, private-sector 
styles of management, contracting and decentralisation (Boston et al., 1996; Awio et 
al., 2007; Parker and Gould, 1999; Green-Pedersen, 2002; Larbi, 1999), and are 
labelled “New Public Management” (Hood, 1991). Thus, New Public Management 
(hereafter, NPM) reforms were viewed as solutions to the endemic problems affecting 
the public sector in developed countries (Awio et al., 2007; Humphrey et al., 1993).  
 
The NPM reforms were introduced to developing countries through international 
organisations such as the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (hereafter, 
IMF) and international aid agencies. These institutions, together with donor agencies, 
have encouraged and directed NPM reforms in developing countries through loan 
conditions, Structural Adjustment Programmes policies (hereafter, SAP), and in some 
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cases had imposed the changes on developing countries (Toye, 1994; Cook and 
Kirkpatrick, 1995; Olowu, 2002; Uddin and Hopper, 2003; Uddin and Tsamenyi, 
2005; Asaolu et al., 2005; Hopper et al., 2009). These international organisations 
assume that better controls, improved efficiency and effectiveness, and economic 
development will emerge through the adoption of NPM reforms (Rees, 1985; Uddin 
and Hopper, 2003; Wickramasinghe et al., 2004). However, earlier studies, such as 
those of Uddin and Hopper (2003) and Uddin and Tsamenyi (2005) have presented a 
contrary finding.  
 
Nigeria was an agricultural country at the time of independence. However, oil was 
discovered in commercial quantity in 1956 (Uche, 1992; Ihonvbere, 1998; Bezanis et 
al., 2000) and, in the 1970s, it became the main source of revenue for the state. The 
increase in the international oil price in the 1970s saw the Nigerian government 
engaging in various expansion projects. Public sector expansion was one of these 
programmes (Lewis, 2006; Olukoshi, 1995, Abulraheem et al., 1986; Adedipe, 2004; 
Bangura and Beckman, 1993). In the 1980s, Nigeria experienced a severe economic 
crisis as a result of a fall in international oil price and the government’s inability to 
secure external loans. The Nigerian government approached the World Bank and IMF 
for a loan (Bangura, 1987; Olukoshi, 1995). However the loan came with a condition 
that the government adopts SAP, with public sector reforms as one of its main 
measure (Umoren, 2001; Obadan and Edo, 2004; Iyoha, 2004; Jega, 2000). These 
international organisations attributed the crisis to structural distortion as a result of 
overvalued exchange rates, massive public sector spending, overextension of 
unproductive and inefficient public enterprises, poor investment management, low 
productivity of workers and a high wage structure, among other problems (Adesina, 
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1991). NPM reforms were presented by the World Bank and IMF as a way forward to 
solve the public sector crisis which would subsequently induce economic 
development. The reforms were adopted as means for improving the efficiency and 
effectiveness of the Nigerian public enterprises. Using a case study of a large public 
sector institution, this thesis investigates the implications of the Nigerian public sector 
reform for Management Control Systems (hereafter, MCS). 
 
1.2 Aims and Objectives of the Thesis 
 
This study aims to gain an in-depth understanding of the Nigerian public sector 
reforms, using the Nigeria State Company (hereafter, NSC) as a case study. The NSC 
is one of the biggest state enterprise in Nigeria. The NSC is charged with overseeing 
the government’s participation in several areas. The study aims, through the 
examination of the public sector reforms that took place and are still taking place, to 
provide an in-depth understanding of how the Nigerian public sector reforms impacts 
on the NSC’s structure and processes (including its MCS). The NPM reforms 
advocate the introduction of private sector MCS into the public sector (Hoque, 2005; 
Parker and Gould, 1999; Hood, 1991, 1995), and this research seeks to examine the 
roles these techniques play in reforming the NSC. Thus, in summary, the main aim of 
the research is to provide an in-depth understanding of the NSC reforms and the effect 
of these reforms on the MCS in the case site. The objectives are summarised below.  
• Identify and investigate the role of various actors in the Nigerian public sector 
reforms. 
• Explore and understand the process of public sector reforms in the NSC 
• Examine the role of MCS in NSC reforms and how this was shaped and 
reshaped in the network 
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1.3 Statement of the Problem and Research Question 
 
The set of doctrines and financial management techniques encapsulated in the NPM 
reforms of developed nations appears to developing countries as promising solutions 
to imitate in the search for efficiency, effectiveness and accountability of their public 
sectors (Awio et al., 2007). The Nigerian government, through the influence of the 
World Bank and IMF, adopted SAP with NPM reforms as one of its main elements. 
The NSC, in its search for efficiency and politics embarked on various 
transformations. These reforms were implemented mainly with the help of external 
consultants.  
 
It is undeniable that the World Bank and IMF led economic reforms have become 
common phenomena in developing countries. However, the outcomes of these 
reforms are not clear. Some studies have suggested positive impacts of these reforms 
(World Bank 2000; Prizzia, 2001; Tsamenyi et al., 2008a; Uddin and Hopper, 2003; 
Wickramasinghe et al., 2004) while others have suggested negative impacts (Uddin 
and Hopper, 2001, 2003; Uddin and Tsamenyi, 2005). There is therefore a need for 
further country specific and micro level studies to examine the outcome of the public 
sector reforms in developing countries. In particular the area of how the public sector 
reforms impact on the internal accounting systems of organisations has not received 
much research attention.  
 
This research addresses this gap by focusing on understanding the various public 
sector reforms that took place in Nigeria and how these reforms have been translated 
in the case organisation (NSC). The study focuses on the NSC reforms processes and 
within this how MCS are shaped and reshaped. Various MCS have been introduced in 
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the NSC as part of the reforms. The study attempts to understand the processes and 
outcome of these MCS. This is in line with the recent call for research on MCS in 
developing countries (Hopper et al., 2003, 2009; Uddin and Hopper, 2001; Hopper 
and Hoque, 2004). To aid the research, a main research question was put forward as: 
how are public sector reform networks are built in Nigeria with particular reference to 
the NSC and how do these networks produce and re-produce MCS? From the main 
research question, the following sub-questions were designed: 
 What is the role of various actors in Nigeria Public Sector Reforms?  
 How have the reforms been translated in NSC? 
 How has MCS been produced and reproduced in the reforms network? 
 
1.4 Structure of the Thesis  
 
The thesis is divided into nine chapters. Chapter one presents the introduction of the 
thesis. The chapter is divided into four sections. The first section presents the thesis 
background. The section is followed by the study aims and objectives. The next part 
presents the statement of the problem and the research questions, and the final part 
presents the structure of the thesis. 
 
Chapter two presents the literature review on MCS. The chapter is divided into six 
sections, beginning with an introduction. The next section conceptualises MCS. The 
MCS definitions, relevance to organisations and dimensions are all discussed. The 
following section discusses the elements of MCS, and section four examines MCS 
change. The literature on MCS in developing countries is analysed in section five, and 
section six provides a chapter summary and also situates the current thesis within the 
literature.  
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Chapter three presents the theoretical framework adopted for the thesis. The chapter is 
structured into six sections. Following the introduction, the next section examines the 
origins and foundations of ANT. This section is subsequently followed by a critical 
evaluation of ANT as a concept. The following section discusses the creation of actor 
networks as a process of translation and the role of intermediaries in creating 
networks. Following this, prior management accounting studies on ANT are reviewed 
in order to provide the justification for the use of ANT in this study. The proposed 
framework for the study is then presented, followed by the chapter summary.  
 
Chapter four presents the context of the Nigerian environment. The chapter is divided 
into five sections, beginning with the introduction. The next section analyses the 
Nigerian social and political context, pre- and post-independence. Section three 
discusses the Nigerian economy prior to and after the discovery of oil. The economic 
crises that hit Nigeria and reform attempts were also analysed. The Nigerian public 
sector and its reforms are examined in section four, and the final section summarises 
the chapter.  
 
Chapter five presents the methodology and methods adopted for the research. The 
chapter is divided into seven sections. The first section is the introduction; this is 
followed by the methodology section which presents the philosophical assumptions 
underpinning the thesis and the study methodology. The next section presents the case 
study strategy as the research method adopted in the study. The following section 
details the process of gathering the empirical evidence for the study. The section after 
this details how the data collected was analysed; this is followed by a section which 
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attempts to link the research approach to the theoretical framework adopted for the 
study, and the final section presents the chapter summary. 
 
Chapter six presents the background of the NSC. The chapter is structured into five 
sections beginning with the introduction. The second section provides an overview of 
the NSC. The origin of the NSC and the legislation that brought the NSC and the 
operations of the NSC are also discussed.  The subsequent section analysed the 
various reforms implemented in the NSC; these reforms were introduced in order for 
the NSC to be more efficient and effective. Section 6.4 discusses the NSC labour 
process, and the last section presents the chapter summary.  
 
Chapter seven analyses the NSC accounting systems and changes in MCS. The 
chapter is organised into five sections. The first section presents the chapter 
introduction. Section 7.2 analyses the NSC external accounting process. The legal 
requirement for the NSC to produce financial accounts, and the actual practice are 
examined. The following section examines the NSC internal accounting processes. 
The various MCS employed in the NSC and how they are put in use are all discussed. 
Section 7.4 examines the NSC MCS change initiatives and implementation, and the 
final section presents the chapter summary.  
 
Chapter eight presents the discussion and analysis. The chapter is divided into five 
sections, beginning with the introduction. The second section presents the definition 
and the relationships between the various human and non-human actors identified in 
the study. The third section analyses the translation of public sector reforms in 
Nigeria. Two major reforms are identified and analysed in this section. The next part 
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presents an ANT analysis and discussion on MCS change in the NSC, and the final 
part summarises the chapter. 
 
Chapter nine provides the conclusion to the thesis. The chapter is structured into six 
sections. The first section presents the chapter introduction, followed by a section 
which reflects on the methodology adopted for the thesis. The subsequent two 
sections provide a summary of the main findings and the research contribution to 
knowledge. The next part presents the study’s limitation, and the final section presents 
areas for future research. The structure of the thesis is presented in Figure 1.1. below. 
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Figure 1.1: The thesis structure 
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2 CHAPTER TWO: MANAGEMENT CONTROL SYSTEMS: 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter provides a critical review of the literature on Management Control 
Systems (hereafter, MCS). The review examines among other things the meaning, 
significance, dimensions, elements and MCS change. The review also provides a 
synthesis of the literature on MCS in developing countries. The main aims of the 
review are to understand what MCS are, why MCS change and how MCS function in 
organisations in developing countries. The review is important in order to provide the 
foundation for exploring and analysing the role of MCS in the Nigeria State Company 
(hereafter, NSC), the case organisation. Understanding previous work conducted 
regarding change in MCS, and the role of MCS (especially in developing countries) is 
thus important in developing and locating the research area to which the thesis will 
contribute.  
 
The chapter is divided into six sections. After the introduction to the chapter, the next 
section conceptualises MCS. Its definitions, relevance to organisations and 
dimensions are all discussed. Section three discusses the elements of MCS while 
section four examines MCS change. The literature on MCS in developing countries is 
synthesised in section five. This section is divided into three sub-sections. The first 
deals with issues on the relevance of accounting systems (including MCS) in 
developing countries. The second examines the nature and role of MCS in the 
enterprises of developing countries and the third focuses on MCS change in 
developing countries. Section six provides a chapter summary and also situates the 
current thesis within the literature.  
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2.2 Conceptualising Management Control Systems (MCS) 
 
To begin to explore the definition of MCS, it is essential to first examine the different 
terminologies used to describe MCS. Terminologies such as management accounting 
(MA), management accounting systems (MAS), and organisational controls (OC) 
have all been used interchangeably with MCS (see for example, Emmanuel et al., 
1997; Berry et al., 1998; Harrison and McKinnon, 1999; Chenhall, 2003; Merchant 
and Van der Stede, 2003; Bhimani and Langfield-Smith, 2007). However, strictly 
speaking MCS is broader than MA, MAS or OC. MA refers to the collection of 
practices such as budgeting or product costing, MAS refers to the systematic use of 
MA to achieve some organisational goals, while OC refers to the controls built into 
activities and processes such as statistical quality control and just-in-time 
management. MCS as mentioned above is a broader term that includes MAS and also 
encompasses other controls such as personal or clan controls (Harrison and 
McKinnon, 1999; Chenhall, 2003; Anthony and Govindarajan, 2004). This thesis 
examines the broader roles of MCS in the case study organisation.  
 
The definition of MCS has developed over time (Chenhall, 2003) and these 
definitions are influenced by the ontological and epistemological assumptions of 
researchers (see for example, Burchell et al., 1980; Hopper and Powell, 1985; Chua, 
1986 for a similar argument). For example, researchers operating within the 
functionalist or positivistic paradigm have emphasised the rational decision making 
role of MCS (Emmanuel et al., 1997; Chenhall, 2003) while those operating from the 
non-positivistic paradigm such as the interpretive perspective have emphasised its 
social and political roles (Chua, 1986). The extent to which the philosophical 
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assumptions of researchers influenced their conceptualisation of MCS is discussed 
below. 
 
2.2.1 Functionalist Explanations of Management Control Systems 
 
Anthony’s (1965) seminal work provided the basis of the functionalist 
conceptualisation of MCS. Anthony defined MCS as: “the process by which managers 
assures that resources are obtained and used effectively and efficiently in the 
accomplishment of organisation’s objectives” (Anthony, 1965, p. 17). Ryan et al., 
(2002) argued that this efficiency role of MCS is never questioned under the 
functionalist perspective as the general belief is that accounting systems are designed 
to provide information which enable users make economic decisions. Anthony 
identified three different levels of controls, namely, strategic, management and 
operational. Strategic control is concerned with setting organisational goals and 
objectives over a long period, while operational control is concerned with the activity 
of ensuring that immediate tasks are carried out and management control is the 
process that links the two (Anthony, 1965; Otley et al., 1995). 
 
That Anthony’s seminal work has contributed immensely to the understanding of 
management accounting has not been disputed. However, some of the assumptions in 
his work has been criticised by researchers (Otley, et al., 1995; Lowe and Puxty, 
1989; Otley, 1994; 1995; Langfield-Smith, 1997). Otley (1995) for instance argued 
that one of the problems of Anthony’s framework is its separation of management 
control from strategic and operational controls. For example, to have effective 
management controls requires changing plans and objectives suggesting that the two 
are intertwined. Similarly, operational controls cannot be divorced from management 
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control since the technological complexities of operations impacts directly on the 
management control process. 
 
In addition, Anthony's work has been criticised for its lack of inclusion of social-
psychological and behavioural issues (see for instance, Otley et al., 1995). Similarly, 
Lowe and Puxty (1989) and Otley et al, (1995) argued that Anthony’s definition has 
narrowed down the scope of MCS. Langfield-Smith (1997) argued that it is ironic to 
assume that MCS is surrounded by largely accounting-base controls of planning, 
activities monitoring, performance measurement and integrative mechanism.  
 
Over the years, the conceptualisation of MCS even from functionalist perspective has 
been broadened. For example Lowe (1971, p.5) defined MCS as:  
A system of organisational information seeking and gathering, accountability 
and feedback designed to ensure that the enterprise adapts to changes in its 
substantive environment and that the work behaviour of its employees is 
measured by reference to a set of operational sub-goals (which conform with 
the overall objectives) so that the discrepancy between the two can be 
reconciled and corrected for. 
 
Though also from a functionalist perspective, Lowe’s definition is broader than that 
provided by Anthony and according to Otley et al. (1995), this has extended the role 
of MCS to a broad set of control mechanisms designed to assist enterprises to regulate 
themselves. In particular, Lowe’s definition recognises the behavioural aspects of 
MCS which has also been emphasised by Anthony and Govindarajan (2007) who 
construed MCS as the process through which managers influence other people to 
implement the organisation’s strategies. Another extended definition from a 
functionalist perspective has been provided by Ansari and Bell (1991) who viewed 
MCS as the entire organisational arrangement, having both formal and informal 
design to achieve organisational objectives, and they include formal structures, 
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operational controls, budgeting, rewards, planning and other related activities. Formal 
and informal controls are explained in the next section. 
 
In effect the functionalist definitions provided above all emphasise how MCS are 
designed to assist organisations in making effective and congruent decisions. As 
contended by Flamholtz (1996, p. 598) MCS is:  
a set of mechanisms - both processes and techniques - which are designed to 
increase the probability that people will behave in ways that lead to the 
attainment of organisational objectives. The ultimate objective of a control 
system is not to control the specific behaviour of people per se, but, rather, to 
influence people to take actions and make decisions which in their judgement 
are consistent with organisational goals. 
 
According to Otley (1994), Merchant and Van der Stede (2003) and Anthony and 
Govindarajan (2007), MCS are a crucial activity for every business organisation. 
Barnard (1962) asserted that the fundamental task of any large organisation is to 
coordinate the effort of those working in it. Indeed, MCS provide the means for such 
coordination. Otley (1994) argued that the main essence of MCS is to provide the 
focus for all those activities designed to help ensure that the overall operating 
coherence of an organisation is maintained, and that its capability for survival is 
retained. For example, through monitoring performance and identifying deviation 
from agreed objectives, MCS can provide a signal that will trigger top management 
intervention (Goold and Quinn, 1990). Moreover, MCS provide information which 
assist organisations when adopting and implementing plans in response to their 
competitive environment (Mia and Clarke, 1999).  
 
Merchant and Van der Stede (2003) and Anthony and Govindarajan (2007) also 
argued that the primary function of MCS is to influence behaviour in a desirable way, 
since organisations are made up of different people with different perspectives, tasks 
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and job functions. These people may act or take decisions in a way that fulfil their 
own personal goals and needs to the detriment of those of the organisation
1
; MCS 
serve as a means to overcome such behaviour, by creating a satisfactory degree of 
goal congruence between the employees' goals and those of the organisation 
(Flamholtz, 1996). For instance, MCS provide personal incentives which align 
employees and organisational goals and motivate managers towards achieving those 
goals (Goold and Quinn, 1990).  
 
In addition, MCS provide information, which is intended to be useful to managers in 
performing their jobs (Otley, 1999), and which will assist them move their 
organisation toward achieving its strategic objectives. Such controls also act as a basis 
for formulating new strategies (Anthony and Govindarajan, 2007). Chow et al. (1999) 
stressed that the probability of organisation employees making a decision and taking 
actions that are in line with the best interests of their organisation is increased with the 
help of MCS. According to Euske and Riccaboni (1999), MCS are employed to 
control internal interdependencies (for example, relationships between management 
and workers and between different units in the organisation) and external 
interdependencies (for example, relationships with the state, suppliers, customers and 
society). Burns and Scapens (2000a) depicted MCS as a constituent of an 
organisation’s relative stable rules and routines. By rules, Burns and Scapens mean 
formal ways in which things should be done in order to coordinate the efforts and 
actions of individuals or groups, whereas routines are the actual MCS in use.  
 
                                                 
1
 This kind of action is referred to as agency cost in agency theory, (see Jensen and Meckling, (1976) 
for further discussion on agency theory).  
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2.2.2 Alternative Explanations of Management Control Systems 
 
From a non-positivistic or non-functionalist perspective, the role and nature of MCS 
in organisations and society is open to question (Ryan et al., 2002). This argument 
started to surface in the early 1980s when researchers began to explore alternative 
definitions of MCS. These non-functionalist researchers argued that MCS is 
embedded in wider social and political relations and as such should be studied within 
this context (Hopper and Powell, 1985; Chua, 1986; Uddin and Hopper, 2001). 
Burchell et al., (1980, p. 22-23) observed that:  
A case can be made for the study of accounting as a social and organisational 
phenomenon to complement the more prevalent analyses which operate within 
the accounting context…Consideration would need to be given to the roles 
which information and accounting play in the political processes which 
characterised organisational and social life, to those forces which have 
constituted the organisation as we know it and to the ways in which the social 
and the organisation in accounting intertwine with each other. 
 
This argument was recently reiterated by Hopper et al. (2009) who contended that 
narrow and technical definitions of MCS deflect attention from the historic, social, 
political and economic factors and their consequences. They stressed that, in 
studying MCS, especially in developing countries, rigid boundaries are 
treacherous because development issues need open, imaginative, problem-based 
approaches that transgress disciplinary forms of accounting. Hopper et al. 
provided a broader definition of MCS that “embraces processes, structures and 
information for organisational decisions, governance, control and accountability” 
(P. 470). For the sake of this thesis, the definition provided by Hopper et al. is 
adopted, in order to understand the processes of NSC reforms, in particular the 
nature and consequence of MCS change. The need for a broader definition is 
justified, given that MCS can be formal, informal or a combination of both. Data 
from the case showed that both formal and informal MCS were employed in NSC 
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and moreover MCS was implicated in internal politics and power struggle, hence 
justifying a broader conceptualisation in order to tease out the tensions and the 
complexities of the MCS. 
 
Thus the argument is that MCS do not exist outside the conceptualisation of 
individuals. In an attempt to derive meaning from the world, people develop and 
impose their own ideologies and structures, including MCS (Burchell, et al., 1980; 
Hopper and Powell, 1985; Chua, 1986). MCS thus creates a social relation among 
people within an organisation. The individual is important in understanding MCS as 
he/she is an active agent involved in constructing and interpreting the MCS (Preston 
1991). The active nature of agents has been stressed by Chua (1986, p.619), as “The 
individual possesses historically constituted potentials that are unfulfilled.” This is 
based on the argument that people are not passive objects but instead are active agents 
capable of influencing and shaping their own environments, including the MCS 
(Macintosh, 1994). This emphasises the abilities of individuals to construct and 
interpret MCS in use in their organisation. 
 
An argument could therefore be made that to understand MCS it is important for 
researchers to study how this has been socially and historically constituted (Chua, 
1986). As noted by Laughlin (1987, p.482):  
Historical analysis....supplies not only the insights into the past but also the 
methodological tools for change in the future. ...Historical analysis is not some 
value free activity, but is undertaken with a particular purpose in mind: to 
analyse points of progress, to discern the mechanisms leading to their 
emergence, and to allow these to be used again to encourage societal 
development to a truer, free and more just life for all. 
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From this non-functionalist perspective, MCS could be perceived as performing non-
rational decision roles including being an organisational language system that 
provides meaning and understanding, a political tool that provides the means of 
power, and a legitimating device that people use to justify their actions (Burchell, et 
al., 1980, Hopper and Powell, 1985; Chua, 1986; Boland, 1993; Macintosh and 
Scapens, 1990). As argued by Laughlin (1987, p.481), MCS “are, as language 
systems, human artefacts which model certain aspects of organisational life whose 
‘terms’ and ‘sentences’ (the more technical aspects of their design) find meanings in 
the historical, organisational and societal context in which they are 
‘uttered’...meanings need to be discovered and defined by human actors, and this is to 
be achieved through that distinctly human attribute, namely language.” Covaleski and 
Dirsmith (1988, p1) also noted that MCS is “A socially constructed phenomenon 
rather than a technically rational function driven by and serving the internal 
operations of organisations.” 
 
2.3 Classifications of Management Control Systems  
 
MCS have been classified differently in the literature. For example some researchers 
have distinguished between formal and informal controls while others have focused 
on the individual elements of MCS such as budgeting, performance measurement, etc. 
These different classifications are examined in this section. 
 
2.3.1 Formal versus Informal Management Control Systems 
 
Several researchers have examined the formal and informal dimensions of MCS 
(Berry et al., 1985; Neimark and Tinker, 1986; Arnold and Hammond, 1994; Hoque 
and Hopper, 1994; Joshi, 2001; Sulaiman et al., 2004; Tsamenyi et al., 2008). Formal 
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controls consist of a high level of process and output controls, while informal controls 
consist of a high level of social and cultural controls. Formal controls are generally 
written and comprise rules, standards operation procedures, budgeting systems, 
performance measurement systems and rewards systems, whereas informal controls 
are generally initiated by workers; they are not designed deliberately, and include 
unwritten policies. They are often derived from the organisation’s culture or its 
artefacts (Jaworski, 1988; Langfield-Smith, 1997). 
 
It has been argued that formal and informal controls are not to be seen as mutually 
exclusive as an organisation’s control systems can consist of a combination of both 
types of controls (Jaworski et al., 1993). In fact, Anthony (1952) suggested that MCS 
are most effective when formal and informal techniques are blended together 
skilfully. In other words, effective MCS depend on both formal and informal control. 
Formal controls can legitimatise the organisational existence while allowing an 
informal routine to remain intact and informal controls can also act as a protecting 
device, legitimating the existing formal control systems and shielding them from 
pressures for change (Lukka, 2007). 
 
Jaworski et al. (1993), Cravens et al. (2004) showed that organisational control can be 
achieved through formal or informal controls or a combination of both. For instance, 
Joshi (2001), in a study of 60 large and medium companies in India, found that all the 
enterprises studied used budgeting for planning their day-to-day operations and cash 
flow. In addition, 93 percent of the companies used budgeting to control costs, and 91 
percent reported that they use budgeting for planning their financial position. A 
similar finding was reported by Sulaiman et al. (2004). The authors found that the use 
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of budgets for planning, control, and performance evaluation remains high in India, 
Malaysia and Singapore. The above evidence suggests that formal controls are used in 
organisations. 
 
However, there is also evidence that controls can be formal or informal. Hoque and 
Hopper (1994) found that in their study of a large nationalised jute mill in 
Bangladesh, that the managers employ different sorts of social/informal control to 
deal with the complexity and uncertainty surrounding their activities. Formal controls 
such as budgets were employed for the purpose of legitimacy but informal controls in 
the form of relationships and politics enable the managers to cope with the daily 
pressures of working in the mill. Similarly, in a study of an Indonesian family 
organisation, Tsamenyi et al. (2008) reported that culture and social control were 
employed by the managers instead of the formal rational decision making MCS such 
as budgets. 
 
Efferin and Hopper (2007) also extended the debate on formal and informal controls 
by examining how cultures, ethnicity, history and commercial consideration shape 
MCS in a Chinese-Indonesian manufacturing company using a combination of 
ethnographic and grounded theory methods. The authors reported that the preference 
of the Chinese owners resided in controlling behaviour through personnel and 
behavioural controls, low budget participation, centralisation, subjective rather than 
objective controls, few rewards tied to results and the use of group rewards.  
 
Marginson (1999), in a case study of a British organisation also found that social 
control rather than formal MCS was involved in channelling effort towards the 
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achievement of the organisation’s strategy. Jaworski et al. (1993), in a study of 
marketing managers, proposed a conceptual framework for a combination of controls. 
They identified four alternative systems or a combination of controls based on 
different levels of output, process, professional and cultural control; the four 
alternatives were; 1. a traditional bureaucratic management control system with 
formal controls as a main emphasis; 2. a clan system with a main emphasis on 
informal controls; 3. a low control system with low emphasis on both formal and 
informal systems and 4. a high control system with main emphasis on both formal and 
informal systems. They concluded that high control systems are associated with high 
levels of job satisfaction, followed by clan control systems, bureaucratic and low 
control systems. The work of Jaworski et al. was extended by Cravens et al. (2004) 
who found that the sales managers they studied who work under a more visible 
control system - that is high control - perform better and are more satisfied. These 
managers displayed lower burnout and role stress than those working under 
bureaucratic, clan, and low control combinations. 
 
2.3.2 Elements of Management Control Systems 
 
Different elements of MCS ranging from budgeting, performance measurement, 
standard costing, cost management, to strategic planning have been identified in the 
literature (Chenhall, 2003; Merchant and Van der Stede 2003; Bhimani and 
Langfield-Smith, 2007). The purpose of this section is to review the literature on the 
main elements of MCS that are relevant to this study. The elements of MCS identified 
in NSC and therefore relevant for this study are budgeting, performance 
measurement; activity based costing; strategic planning; and enterprise resource 
planning system.  
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2.3.2.1 Budgeting to Strategic Planning 
 
The importance of budgeting has been highlighted in the literature and has been the 
most widely discussed element of MCS (see for instance, Argyris 1952; Otley, 1999; 
Anthony and Govindarajan, 2007). According to Otley (1999), budgeting is a central 
plank of most organisations’ control mechanisms, because it is among the few 
techniques that have the capability of integrating various organisations’ activities into 
a single coherent summary. Budgetary control can ensure that the overall aims and 
objectives of the organisation are efficiently and effectively achieved (Anthony and 
Govindarajan, 2004). 
 
Anthony and Govindarajan (2007) argued that budgeting has four principal purposes: 
fine-tuning the strategic plan, coordinating the organisation activities, assigning 
responsibilities to managers and forming the basis of evaluating managers’ 
performance. Chenhall and Langfield-Smith (2007) contended that budgeting has 
provided the basis for examining the effectiveness of an organisation in meeting 
standard costs and overall financial targets.  
 
The adoption of budgeting in organisation has been widely investigated by 
researchers. Evidence from these studies shows that budgeting has remained a 
dominant and a very important part of MCS in many organisations (Joshi, 2001; 
Abdel-Kader and Luther, 2006). Joshi (2001), in a study of 60 Indian firms, found that 
budgeting is adopted in all the companies in planning their day-to-day operations. A 
similar result was presented by Abdel-Kader and Luther (2006) in a study of 
management accounting practices in the British food and drink industry, using a 
survey of 122 companies. The authors found that budgeting was often or very often 
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used for planning and controlling costs by 84% and 73% of companies studied. In 
addition, more than 90% of the respondents considered budgeting as important or 
moderately important for planning and control. Similarly, Ahmad et al. (2003) found 
that companies in Malaysia used budgets in planning and controlling their activities. 
 
Budgeting has also been linked to culture. For example, Tsui (2001) conducted a 
survey to investigate whether the behaviour and attitudes of Chinese and Western 
managers towards budgetary participation will be different, because of cultural 
differences. 51 Chinese sub-unit managers in mainland China and 38 western 
expatriate sub-unit managers in Hong Kong were requested to respond to a 
questionnaire which was designed to measure the availability of broad scope and 
timely MAS, budgetary participation and managerial performance. The author 
reported a different attitude and behaviour. For Chinese managers, the relationship 
between MAS information and their managerial performance was negative for high 
levels of participation, while in the case of Western managers the relationship was 
positive. 
 
Budgeting is also known to be implicated in the social and political processes of 
organisations. For example, Cooper et al., (1981) argued that budgeting facilitates the 
negotiation of shared reality by providing the various actors with a common language 
and framework for such negotiations. The existence of budgetary systems in 
organisations thus aids the negotiation process. The social and political role of 
budgets has also been stressed by Wildavsky (1975) who argued that: “[Budgeting] 
exists. The people involved in it care about what they do....The bonds between 
budgeting and “politicking” are intimate. Realistic budgets are an expression of 
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practical politics. The allocation of resources necessarily reflects the distribution of 
power. Budgeting is so basic it must reveal the norms by which men live in a 
particular political culture-for it is through the choices inherent in limited resources 
that consensus is established and conflict is generated” (p.xii). In Wildavsky’s view 
therefore budgeting can be defined as attempts to allocate financial resources through 
political processes to serve diverse human purposes (Wildavsky, 1992). This 
observation is not far from those of Covaleski and Dirsmith (1986) that budgeting 
systems are complicit in representing vested interests in political bargaining process 
and maintaining existing power relations. 
 
Traditional budgeting systems have however been widely criticised by a number of 
researchers (Otley, 1994; Jensen, 2001; Anthony and Govindarajan, 2007). For 
example, Jensen (2001) argued that the use of a budget target to determine 
performance of managers causes managers to set a budget, which is not in the 
organisation’s best interest. Others such as Hope and Fraser (2003a, 2003b) have also 
criticised budgets for lagging behind developments in the business environment. For 
example, they argue that changes in organisational forms from multi-division (M-
form) to network (N-form) and also the increasing role of intellectual capital (e.g. 
Coca Cola, Microsoft) have resulted in the incompatibility of traditional budgets (2
nd
 
wave approach) with the new forms of organisations (3
rd
 wave). Traditional budgets 
are too internal, top-down; unable to incorporate uncertainties in the external 
environment, outdated/unrealistic, too mechanistic, create dysfunctional behaviour, 
etc (see also Kaplan and Norton, 1992). 
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To make budgets more useful, it has been argued that they have to be integrated into 
the strategic planning process (see for instance, Anderson and Lanen 1999). Anthony 
and Govidarajan (2007) provided a distinction between strategy formulation and 
strategic planning; they described strategic formulation as a process of deciding on 
new strategies. During strategic formulation, management decides on the 
organisational goals and the main strategies for achieving those goals, while strategic 
planning is the process of deciding how to implement those strategies. Strategic 
planning takes up the goals and strategies given by management, and a programme is 
developed that will accomplish the strategies and achieve the goals efficiently and 
effectively. Accordingly, strategic planning is the process in which an organisation 
decides the programme it will undertake and the approximate resources which will be 
allocated to each programme in the future (Anthony and Govindarajan, 2007). 
Strategic planning provides a framework for developing an effective annual budget 
and serves as a powerful action control which forces managers to think about the 
future, make decisions in advance and align their interest with the organisational long 
term strategies (Merchant and Van der Stede, 2003; Anthony and Govindarajan, 
2007).  
 
According to Merchant and Van der Stede (2003) strategic planning processes which 
is linked to the newly evolving role of the budget involve six main steps and normally 
take place in an iterative environment. The steps are: developing the corporate vision, 
mission, and objectives; understanding the organisation’s standing, its strengths, 
weaknesses, opportunities and risks; deciding the organisation’s diversification 
strategy, deciding on each of the business unit strategies; preparation of the strategic 
 26 
plan and monitoring of performance and updating the strategies if necessary. The 
budget is particularly useful in all these stage. 
 
The adoption and benefits of strategic planning were investigated by researchers 
(Thune and House, 1970; Herold, 1972; Bonn and Christodoulou, 1996). For instance, 
Thune and House (1970) conducted a survey of thirty-six enterprises from different 
industries to determine how the adoption of strategic planning procedure affects 
economic performance. They reported that organisations which employ formal 
strategic planning performed better than those which do not. In addition, the 
organisations which adopted strategic planning recorded a better result after the 
adoption of strategic planning. A similar finding was reported by Herold (1972). 
Herold crossed-validated the studies of Thune and House and found that the 
organisations that employed strategic planning outperform those that did not. 
Similarly, Bonn and Christodoulou (1996) reported that 72% of the largest 
manufacturing companies in Australia used strategic planning systems. Chenhall and 
Langfield-Smith (1998) in a survey of 78 manufacturing firms in Australia found that 
traditional planning techniques were highly adopted and high benefits were derived 
from them.  
 
The relationship between the participation of managers in strategic planning and job 
satisfaction was examined by researchers (Kim, 2002). For instance, Kim (2002) 
examined the relationship between perspective management in the contexts of 
strategic planning and job satisfaction in local government agencies in Nevada, USA. 
The author reported that the use of a participative management style and employees’ 
perceptions of participative strategic planning processes were positively associated 
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with high levels of job satisfaction. In addition, Kim reported that effective 
supervisory communications in the context of the strategic planning process were 
positively associated with high levels of job satisfaction. In the context of the public 
sector, strategic planning is implemented in order to improve performance and 
accountability (Kim, 2002).  
 
2.3.2.2 Performance Measurement Systems 
 
According to Chenhall and Langfield-Smith (2007) the primary function of MCS is to 
develop performance measures which will assist managers in planning and controlling 
their activities. It was also reported that organisations with formal performance 
measurement outperformed those without it (Fitzgerald, 2007).  
 
Otley (1999) suggested five issues that need to be considered when developing a 
framework for an organisation’s performance.  
i. Identification of the key objectives that are central to the organisation’s overall 
future success, and how the achievements of each of these objectives are  
evaluated 
ii. Identification of the strategies and plans that the organisation has adopted and 
the processes and activities that it has decided will be required for it to 
successfully implement these. How the organisation assesses and measures the 
performance of these activities should also be considered 
iii. Assessment of the level of performance that the organisation needs to achieve 
in each of the areas defined in the above two steps, and how it goes about 
setting appropriate performance targets for them. 
iv. Ascertainment of what rewards managers (and other employees) will gain by 
achieving these performance targets (or, conversely, what penalties will they 
suffer by failing to achieve them). 
v. Finally, it is important to determine what information flows (feedback and 
feed-forward loops) that are necessary to enable the organisation to learn from 
its experience and to adapt its current behaviour in the light of that experience. 
 
The performance measures adopted therefore are likely to be influenced by the 
consideration given to each of the above issues. Traditionally, organisations have 
measured their performance using historical measures such as Return on Investment 
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(ROI). For example, Merchant and Riccaboni (1990) examined the performance 
measurement and incentive systems used in Fiat group and reported that rewards were 
based on short-term accounting performance measures; actually performance was 
measured against highly achievable budget targets, and few adjustments were made 
with regard to the effect of uncontrollable factors.  
 
Despite the fact that traditional financial based performance measures have dominated 
organisations for years, a number of researchers have began to question the relevance 
of these traditional performance measurement systems (Kaplan and Norton 1992; 
Fitzgerald, 2007). The basis of this criticism according to Chenhall and Langfield-
Smith (2007) is that new manufacturing approaches such as just-in-time (JIT) 
systems, flexible management systems (FMS), material aided requirement and others 
have brought new challenges to performance measurement, hence rendering 
traditional financial performance measures irrelevant to organisations adopting these 
new practices. In particular the increasing move towards non-financial based 
performance measurement systems has been discussed by the authors (see also, 
Kaplan and Norton, 2001). 
 
Researchers have also identified an association between performance measurement 
systems and culture. For instance, Henri (2004) conducted a survey of 383 Canadian 
manufacturing organisations to examine the association between organisational 
culture and performance measurement systems. Two attributes of PMS, namely the 
nature of use and the diversity of measurement, were tested. The author reported that 
the top managers of firms reflecting a flexibility-dominant type of culture were more 
likely to use performance measures (a broad set of financial and non-financial 
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measures) and performance measurement systems in focusing their organisations 
attention, and in supporting strategic decision-making and legitimating actions, than 
top managers of those organisations reflecting a control-dominant type.  
 
In extending our understanding of performance measurement systems, Otley (1999) 
proposed a framework for understanding how performance measurement systems are 
linked to other organisational decision processes. The framework was built around 
five issues which relate to objectives, strategies and plans for their attainment, target-
setting, incentive and reward structures and information feedback loops. Otley tested 
the framework against three main elements of MCS, Budgeting, Economic Value 
Added (EVA), and Balanced Scorecard, to show how the wider perspective of 
performance management and strategy implementation can be used to analyse the 
working of practical control systems. 
 
The performance measurement of public sector organisations has also been studied. 
For example, Modell (1996) studied the performance measurement in a public sector 
dental practice (using a case study of six dental clinics) under County Council 
governance in central Sweden. He found that the clinics have different control and 
performance measurement systems. For example, the clinics are evaluated on targets, 
reflecting the financial surplus or deficits they generate, and employees are evaluated 
based on budgets, established revenue and time utilisation to decide on financial 
reward. However, Modell reported that it was difficult to find any adequate measures 
reflecting the operations carried out by specialist clinics, as there were no established 
formal targets. In the specialist clinics, information sharing took place on a more 
informal basis and there was less concern with financial issues; hence, there were no 
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financial rewards at the specialist clinics. This argument can be linked back to the 
debate presented earlier in the chapter about the need to integrate formal and informal 
controls.  
 
The debate in the literature about the limitations of traditional performance measures 
has led to the quest to find a much more robust performance measurement system.  
One such development is the balanced scorecard which is a multidimensional 
measurement system that translates an organisation’s mission and strategy into 
performance measures (Kaplan and Norton, 1992, 1996a, 1996b 1996c). It has been 
argued that the balanced scorecard provides organisations with a set of performance 
targets and approach to performance measurement that stresses meeting all the 
organisation’s objectives (Atkinson et al., 1997). 
 
The idea behind the balanced scorecard is that it is a much comprehensive 
performance framework that offers managers a fast but comprehensive view of the 
business. By focusing on four broad areas in which businesses should aim to develop 
measures of what is important for their overall performance, the balanced scorecard is 
superior to the myopic traditional financial measures of performance. The four 
perspectives of the balanced scorecard are illustrated in figure 2.1 below.  
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Financial Perspective 
   To succeed financially, how should we 
   appear to our shareholders? 
 
 
 
 
Customer Perspective      Vision &  Internal Business Process 
To achieve our vision,       Strategy  To satisfy our shareholders 
how should we appear    and customers what business 
to our customers?        processes must we excel at? 
 
 
 
 
Learning and Growth    
To achieve our vision, how will we sustain our 
 ability to change and improve? 
 
 
 
Figure 2.1: The Perspectives of the Balanced Scorecard (Adapted from Kaplan and 
Norton, 1996b) 
 
The financial perspective measures how far the company has achieved its financial 
objectives. Thus the financial perspective identifies how the company wishes to be 
viewed by its shareholders. Key measures of the financial perspective include 
operating income, return on capital employed and economic value added. The 
customer perspective on the other hand measures how the organisation has performed 
in relations to customers. Key measures of the customer perspective include customer 
profitability, customer retention, customer satisfaction, and market share.  
 
The internal business process perspective focuses on assessing how the organisation 
has performed in creating value to customers and lower costs to achieve financial 
performance. These are the business processes at which the company has to excel in 
order to satisfy its shareholders and customers. Key measures of the internal business 
process include measures to improve customer satisfaction and financial performance. 
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The learning and growth perspective measures how the organisation has performed in 
terms of people, systems, and organisational procedures. Key measures include 
employee satisfaction and retention, training, accuracy and reliability of information 
about customers and business processes, and appropriate reward systems. Recent 
studies (Tsamenyi et al., 2008a) have extended this framework to privatised 
enterprises by including a fifth dimension, the community perspective. 
 
Despite being an innovation to address the limitations of traditional performance 
measures, the balanced scorecard has also received its fair share of criticisms. One 
such criticism is that the adoption of the balanced scorecard is labour intensive 
because it is a consensus-driven approach (Jon, 2000). There are also inconsistencies 
in the literature as to the relationships between the four perspectives. For example 
Kaplan and Norton argued that there is a causal relationship, between the perspectives 
whereby the learning and growth perspective drives the internal business process 
perspective; the internal business process perspective in turn drives the customer 
perspective; and all three measures then drive the financial perspective. This assertion 
has however been criticised. For example, Nørreklit (2000) argued that “the influence 
between measures is not unidirectional in the sense that learning and growth are the 
drivers of internal business processes, which are the drivers of customer satisfaction, 
which in turn is the driver of financial results” (p.75). The balanced scorecard has also 
been criticised in the sense that employees are likely to pay attention to measurable 
areas to the neglect of non-measurable areas (Nørreklit, 2000; Jon, 2000; Tsamenyi et 
al., 2008a).  
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2.3.2.3 Activity-Based Costing 
 
Johnson and Kaplan (1987, p.1) provided a damming critique of traditional management 
accounting systems as: “Today’s management accounting information, driven by the 
procedures and cycle of the organisation’s financial reporting system, is too late, too 
aggregated, and too distorted to be relevant for managers’ planning and control 
decisions.” Particularly, overhead costing developed since the early part of the 
nineteenth century has lost its relevance in today’s competitive and automated 
environment. Consequently, cost and management accounting systems which, were 
intended to provide information for managerial decision-making have rather tended to be 
influenced by the demands of external financial reporting (Johnson and Kaplan, 1987). 
Consequently, many have come to view traditional cost and management accounting 
system of cost allocation as a failure because of its inability to contribute meaningfully to 
strategic decision making, performance measurement, investment management, pricing 
decisions as well as cost management.  
 
This failure led to Activity-Based-Costing (hereafter, ABC) being proposed as an 
alternative overhead costing technique (Cooper and Kaplan, 1987, 1988; Anderson, 
1995; Cotton et al., 2003). Since then, significant interest has been shown in ABC 
(Johnson and Kaplan, 1987; Cooper ad Kaplan 1987, 1988). ABC can be construed as 
one of the most important contemporary MCS innovations over the last two decades. 
It was proposed by Cooper and Kaplan (see Cooper and Kaplan, 1988; Cooper, 
1988a; 1988b; Jones and Dugdale, 2002). The initial idea was to introduce new 
allocation bases for the distribution of indirect costs, including bases not directly 
proportional to volume (Ax and BjØrnenak, 1991). It was promoted as a costing 
system which would reduce the level of random cost allocation associated with the 
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traditional systems and results in more accurate product costs (Baird et al., 2004). The 
concept was further developed into a form of multidimensional profitability analysis, 
with more descriptive objects such as customers, market segments and distributional 
channels added to it; its later development was the initiative to separate unused 
capacity from activities. ABC enables organisations to measure products and services 
costs with more accuracy (Cooper, 1988a, 1988b; Cooper and Kaplan, 1987). 
 
Proponents of ABC claimed that it provides more accurate product costs, cost 
reduction by waste elimination and improved operation management through better 
performance measures; later ABC was claimed to have helped managers understand 
cost hierarchies, identify relevant costs and revenues, hence help them make better 
decisions (Major and Hopper, 2005; Hopper and Major, 2007). Thus ABC provides 
several benefits including accurate prediction of future costs, enhancing product or 
service quality (Anderson, 1995), the elimination of non-value added activities, the 
provision of a more relevant management information (Soin et al., 2002), understanding 
the underlying causes of cost (Cagwin and Bouwman, 2002), the identification of 
duplicated functions, and the ability of management to focus better on critical activities 
(Cotton et al., 2003). 
 
The adoption and of ABC has been studied by various researchers in different 
countries (Innes and Mitchell, 1995; Shim and Udit, 1995; Lukka and Granlund, 
1996; Bjørnenak, 1997; Baird et al., 2004). In spite of the numerous articulated benefits 
of ABC, these researchers have found a minimal adoption rate. Innes and Mitchell 
(1995) surveyed 1000 largest UK companies. They reported that 20% of respondent 
companies had adopted ABC. Similarly, Lukka and Granlund (1996) found that 5% of 
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the 134 Finish manufacturing firms studied had implemented ABC, while 25 % were 
considering implementing it. Ask et al. (1996), in a Swedish study, reported that 25% 
of their sample companies were planning to introduce an ABC system. Shim and 
Sudit (1995), in a study of US companies, reported that 27% of their respondents’ 
companies had adopted ABC, and 38% intend to adopt it. Chenhall and Langfield-
Smith (1998) reported a 56% adoption rate in Australia. Joshi (2001), in a study of 60 
large and medium manufacturing companies in India, reported a 20% ABC adoption 
rate. A similar finding was reported by Gosselin (1997) in a survey of 161 Canadian 
Strategic Business Units (SBUs). The author reported that 47.8 percent of the SBU 
had adopted ABC. However, only 30.4% had actually implemented its methodology. 
 
The usage of ABC has also been investigated. For instance, Innes and Mitchell (1995) 
conducted a survey of 1000 of the largest UK companies to determine the rate of 
adoption and specific use of ABC. Innes and Mitchell reported that, although ABC 
was used by many companies, its impact was often limited in scope, and it has also 
been rejected by a sizable number of companies. Furthermore, researchers found that 
perception regarding ABC differs among organisations and even among employees 
within the same organisations.  
 
The study of Major and Hopper (2005) examined the implementation and usage of 
ABC in a Portuguese telecommunication firm. The study found that ABC was 
perceived differently in the organisation. Production engineers resisted ABC; they 
were sceptical about its accuracy and usefulness. Workers also resisted it by inputting 
inaccurate data late. This late imputation of inaccurate data was tolerated by 
production managers who had difficulty understanding ABC and relating it to their 
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job. This finding is consistent with those reported in other studies relating to managers 
resistance to the introduction of management accounting innovations (Burns and 
Scapens, 2000; Tsamenyi, et al., 2006).  
 
Despite the resistance, a section of the managers, mainly senior managers and 
commercial managers responsible for pricing and investment were satisfied with 
ABC; they used its data for decision making despite all the problems. They believed 
ABC provides more accurate data than their previous system had done, it had met the 
requirement of regulators and financial markets, and had made consolidation of 
accounts much easier. This suggests that ABC could indeed provide useful data for 
decision making as claimed by its proponents. The study of Soin et al., (2002) 
conducted into the implementation of ABC in the Clearing Department of a UK-based 
multinational bank found that the managers perceived the ABC system as contributing 
to cost cutting within the Clearing Department and throughout the whole bank. The 
authors noted that the bank was able to reduce 30% of its cheque processing cost by 
breaking down the costs into the activities that drive costs. This cost reduction did not 
affect the quality of service to the customer. 
 
The success or failure of ABC systems has been discussed. The general view is that 
various factors influence ABC success. For instance, Gosselin (1997), in a survey of 
161 Canadian strategic business units, reported that strategic position and 
organisational structure influence ABC adoption. Shield (1995) in a study of 143 
firms found that top management support, linkage to competitive strategies, linkage to 
performance evaluations and compensation, training on ABC, ownership of non-
accountants and adequate resources are all significantly associated with ABC success. 
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Similarly, Norris (2002) reported that the introduction of internal transfer charges, 
support from top management, communication, education were vital for ABC 
implementation success and continued use in two UK banks they studied. Innes et al. 
(2000) and Liu and Pan (2007) also reported that top management support and the 
active involvement of a high proportion of dedicated professionals are significantly 
associated with ABC success. 
 
Researchers reported that ABC is complex and costly to implement (Innes and 
Mitchell, 1991; Cobb et al., 1992; Innes et al., 2000; Major and Hopper, 2005). Innes 
et al. (2000), in a study of 1000 of the largest UK companies, found that those using 
ABC were of the opinion that its benefits outweigh it costs, while those companies 
that had considered using ABC and rejected it and those that were still considering it, 
see its complexity and cost as major hindrances to its adoption. Major and Hopper 
(2005) reported that employees in their case study organisation had problems 
understanding ABC categorisation, allocating resources to them and interpreting the 
results.  
 
In all the findings reported from ABC studies are mixed. Thus while some success 
have been reported, there is also overwhelming evidence that ABC has been 
unsuccessful in several organisations. 
 
2.3.2.4 Enterprise Resource Planning Systems (ERP) 
 
Enterprise Resource Planning (hereafter, ERP) systems are important organisational 
innovations that are increasingly being adopted by firms to enhance their planning and 
control process. According to Baxendale and Jama (2003, p.55) the popularity of ERP 
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systems stems from the fact that “They typically integrate financial accounting, 
managerial accounting, cost accounting, production planning, materials management, 
sales and distribution, human-resource management, quality management, and 
customer service using a relational database.” 
 
A number of studies have investigated the benefits of ERP systems to organisations. 
Overall, it has been argued that ERP systems will contribute to increasing financial 
performance and enhancing the competitive position of organisations (Curran et al., 
1988; Hayes et al., 2001). ERP systems are important because they help organisations 
to capture, edit and process accounting and other related transactions. They enable 
firms to undertake comprehensive audit trail, automated inventory management 
system, automated billing systems, and integrated payroll systems (McCausland, 
2004). As argued by Hayes et al. (2001) the efficiency gains from ERP 
implementation can be recognise from consolidating multiple data entry points, 
delegating decision-making authority to subordinates, reengineering operational 
processes, and automating business processes. 
 
ERP systems can also impact on an organisation’s accounting and finance system by 
enabling the firm to undertake a better cost analysis. One area that has been suggested 
is the use of ERP in activity-based costing analysis. ERP significantly increases the 
availability and reliability of activity cost-driver information (Baxendale and Jama, 
2003). By integrating production planning, materials management, and cost and 
management, ERP systems are able to provide reliable activity cost-driver 
information.  
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Very limited academic accounting research has focused on ERP systems. Some of the 
few studies on ERP include Scapens and Jazayeri (2003), Granlund and Mouritsen 
(2003), Caglio (2003), Lodh and Gaffikin (2003), and Hyvönen (2003). These studies 
have focused on diverse issues including the process and the outcome of ERP 
implementation and the implications of the adoption of ERP systems for the 
accounting function. The study of Scapens and Jazayeri (2003) is one of the detailed 
accounting studies on the topic. The authors investigated changes in management 
accounting in response to ERP implementation and identified the main characteristics 
of ERP as integration, standardisation, routinisation, and centralisation. Scapens and 
Jazayeri found that ERP introduced key changes into the organisation they studied. 
These changes include the elimination of routine jobs, creating line managers with 
accounting knowledge, more forward-looking information, and a wider role for the 
management accountant.  
 
The general consensus in the above studies is that the adoption of an ERP system has 
implications for the wider role of the management accountant (Scapens and Jazayeri, 
2003) and specifically for how the roles and expertise of accountants are perceived 
within organisations (Caglio, 2003). However more research is needed for us to fully 
understand the role and the full impacts of ERP systems on organisations. Scapens 
and Jazayeri (2003, p.201-202) recognised the need to study ERP systems when they 
argue “For further longitudinal case studies of the implementation of ERP systems to 
study how these characteristics facilitate and reinforce processes of management 
accounting change in other companies.” 
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2.4 Management Control Systems Change 
 
In recent years, researchers have focused on explaining MCS change. Some 
researchers have focused on explaining changes in the MCS technique, while others 
have investigated the drivers and processes of change. These studies have broadly 
provided understanding of how and why MCS change, the consequences of these 
changes, the resistance to these changes and the stability in MCS (Scapens and 
Roberts, 1993; Cobb et al., 1995; Burns, 1999; Malmi, 1999; Broadbent et al., 2001; 
Waweru et al., 2004; Tsamenyi et al., 2006; Yazdifar et al., 2008). The aim of this 
section is to review the literature on MCS change. The review is necessary in order to 
provide the basis for examining MCS change in the case organisation.  
 
Aspects of the literature on MCS change have discussed ‘what’ has changed and 
‘why’ these changes are taking place. The former issue relates to the techniques while 
the latter relates to the drivers of change. These studies are useful in that they provide 
us with the understanding of what is changing and why these changes are occurring. 
In relation to the techniques, studies have argued that MCS have changed from 
traditional to much more strategic. The basis of this argument can be traced to the 
relevance lost debate by Johnson and Kaplan (1987). The authors asserted that MCS 
has not changed since the beginning of the twentieth century, despite changes in 
production, information technologies and organisational environment. They argued 
that MCS has lost its relevance for providing information required by managers. 
Johnson and Kaplan called for a total overhaul and revision of MCS techniques and 
accounting systems in line with modern management, hence ensuring that the 
relevance of these systems is regained. 
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Advancement of new MCS techniques and systems called ‘strategic management 
accounting’ have been largely proposed in response to Johnson and Kaplan’s call. 
Such innovations include the following: activity based costing (Cooper and Kaplan, 
1988; Cooper, 1988a, 1988b); balanced scorecard (Kaplan and Norton, 1992, 1996a, 
1996b, 1996c) activity-cost management (Shank and Govindarajan, 1993); and target 
costing (Ansari and Bell, 1997). Some researchers believed that these innovations 
were promoted to organisations by management consultants (Abrahamson, 1991, 
1996; Malmi, 1999; Jones and Dugdale, 2002).  
 
The extent to which these various innovations dubbed ‘strategic management 
accounting’ have been diffused in organisations has been the subject of prior studies 
(Innes and Mitchell, 1995; Shields, 1995; Bjørnenak, 1997; Gosselin, 1997; Chenhall 
and Langfield-Smith, 1998; Malmi, 1999; Innes et al., 2000). Chenhall and Langfied-
Smith (1998) surveyed 78 manufacturing firms in Australia to find out the extent of 
adoption of the traditional and the new MCS practices. The authors reported overall a 
higher adoption of traditional practices than the recently developed techniques. 
However, they reported that newer techniques, such as ABC adoption in Australia, 
were higher than reported in previous studies.  
 
Other studies have focused on explaining the drivers of MCS change. Factors 
discussed include global competition, advancement in information technology and 
production, new public management, economic grouping and international 
organisations and changing organisational forms (Cobb et al., 1995; Libby and 
Waterhouse, 1996; Granlund, 2001). 
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Cobb et al. (1995), in a longitudinal study of a bank changing its management 
accounting systems, reported that pressures such as new competitors, development in 
information technology, introduction of new products, financial pressure from the 
bank and senior management instigated the change in MCS. Similarly, Libby and 
Waterhouse (1996) examined the effects of intensity of competition, decentralisation, 
size and organisational capacity to learn about change in MCS. The authors reported 
that change in MCS was positively associated with highly competitive environments 
and organisational capacity to learn. Granlund (2001) conducted a case study of a 
large Finnish manufacturing company and found that severe financial problems, 
intense competition, market reforms together with human and institutional factors 
were the main drivers of MCS change in the organisation.  
 
Burns et al. (1999) and Burns and Scapens (2000) studied MCS change in different 
UK companies. They found that factors such as global competition, technological 
changes in information systems (e.g. the advent of the PC) and methods of 
production, change in organisations following increase emphasis on core 
competencies, downsizing, outsourcing and also change in management structure 
including delayering and team working have all influenced change in MCS. 
According to Burns and Vaivio (2001), advancement in information technology has 
promoted innovation and changes in the collection, measurement, analysis and 
communication of information within and between organisations. MCS change is 
facilitated by technologies such as enterprise resource planning systems, e-commerce, 
the internet, electronic data interchange and  electronic meetings (Burns and Vaivio, 
2001). 
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Waweru et al. (2004) investigated change in MCS in the retail service industry in 
South Africa, using a case study of four firms. They found a considerable change in 
the use of contemporary management accounting, especially activity-based cost 
allocation and the balanced scorecard approach to performance measurement. They 
attributed the changes to the recent environmental changes in the South African 
economy arising from government reform/deregulation policy and globalisation. 
 
However, in the context of public sector organisations
2
 (the case site of this 
study ‘NSC’ is a public organisation), New Public Management (hereafter NPM) was 
identified by scholars as one of the main drivers of change in MCS. During the late 
1980s, the governments of developed and developing countries embarked on 
reforming their public sector. These reforms are labelled under the umbrella term 
“New Public Management” (Hood, 1991). NPM reforms were viewed as solutions to 
the endemic problems affecting the public sector (Humphrey et al., 1993; Olson et al., 
1998; Guthrie et al., 2005; Awio et al., 2007).  
 
Initially, the focus of MCS in public organisations was on probity, compliance and 
control; however, the advent of NPM shifted the MCS focus to promoting efficiency, 
effectiveness, cost saving and streamlining organisations (Broadbent and Guthrie, 
1992). MCS change (private sector method) was widely accepted as a way of 
executing of NPM reforms towards making public organisations managers more 
accountable for results (Humphrey et al., 1993; Hood, 1991; 1995; Olsen et al., 
2001). Consequently, new MCS were introduced into various public sector 
organisations. Likierman, (1994, p. 109) noted this as: 
                                                 
2
 Public sectors are part of government national economic activity traditionally owned and control by 
the government; they provides utilities and services to the general public and are traditionally being 
seen as an essential fabric of our societies (Broadbent and Guthrie, 1992). 
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…the influence of management accounting techniques in central government 
has developed dramatically in the past ten years. From being at the fringes of 
administrative practice, such as techniques are increasingly an essential part of 
key managerial developments. There can be no doubt that initiatives have 
required management accounting, sometimes implicitly, sometimes 
explicitly…and that without them the implementation of the key reforms 
would not have been possible. 
 
Researchers have investigated MCS change in the context of NPM. Studies have been 
conducted in different countries (see, for example, Preston et al., 1992; Lapsley and 
Pallot, 2000;  Lowe, 2000; Broadbent et al., 2001; Modell, 2001; Caccia and 
Steccolini, 2006). For instance, Lapsley and Pallot (2000) examined change in MCS 
using a case study of four local governments, two in Scotland and two in New 
Zealand. The changes in both countries were brought about by government reforms. 
The authors reported MCS change in all the organisations. However, in Scotland, 
MCS change was adopted for isomorphism, whereas in New Zealand MCS change 
became an integral part of the organisations’ activities. Isomorphic change would 
suggest that new MCS were largely adopted for legitimating purposes and therefore 
likely to be loosely coupled with organisational activities (Collier, 2001; Tsamenyi et 
al., 2006). This explanation stems largely from the New Institutional Sociological 
theory of DiMaggio and Powell (1983) that argued that when confronted with diverse 
institutional isomorphism, organisations will tend to adopt similar structures that will 
make them look alike though these systems may not necessarily be coupled with day-
to-day decision making.  
 
Collier (2001), using an ethnographic study, investigated MCS change in a police 
force, the West Mercia Constabulary, in which MCS change was forced by reforms in 
policing. Collier reported that accounting acts as a discourse between operational 
policing and the external demand of accountability. Similarly, Hassan (2005) found 
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that, in the Egyptian health sector, reform management accounting systems were 
acted upon to reform the sector; however, the systems were resisted in the hospitals 
being reformed. In a study of a Spanish Electricity company, Tsamenyi et al., (2006) 
found that MCS change was precipitated by the deregulation of the Spanish electricity 
sector as a result of European Union directives. The authors found resistance to the 
implementation of the new MCS.  
 
In the case of developing countries, MCS change is influenced mostly by the World 
Bank and IMF (Uddin and Hopper, 2001; Uddin and Tsamenyi, 2005). The World 
Bank and IMF have often put pressure on developing country governments to embark 
on Structural Adjustment Programmes; public sector reform is an integral part of 
these reforms (Hopper et al., 2009; Uddin and Hopper, 2003). Researchers have 
investigated change in MCS in developing countries following public sector reform 
(see the next section for a discussion on this).  
 
In sum, MCS change results from both broader external factors - social, economic and 
political factors and factors internal to the organisation (Cobb et al., 1995; Burns and 
Scapens, 2000a). 
 
Another aspect of MCS change examined is the process of change (see Burns, 1999; 
Scapens and Roberts, 1993; Siti-Nabiha and Scapens, 2005; Nor-Aziah and Scapens, 
2007). These studies were in a way in response to Hopwood’s (1987 p. 207) plea that. 
Unfortunately, however, very little is known of the processes of accounting 
change. As of now we have only limited understanding of the conditions which 
provide the possibility for particular conceptions of the accounting craft, the 
forces that put accounting into motion, the processes accompanying accounting 
elaboration and diffusion, and the varied human, organisational and social 
consequences that can stem from changing accounting regimes. 
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The studies that have examined the process of MCS change have explored issues such 
as the type of change, for example evolutionary versus revolutionary (Burns and 
Scapens, 2000a; Coad and Cullen, 2006) and the resistance to the change (Cobb et al., 
1995; Collier, 2001; Tsamenyi et al., 2006). In terms of the type of change, Caccia 
and Steccolini, (2006) conducted a case study of an Italian medium-sized municipality 
that had changed its accounting system following Italian local government reforms. 
They reported that MCS change was proceeding in both revolutionary and 
incremental ways.  
 
2.5 Management Control Systems in Developing Countries 
 
The term ‘developing countries’; the term ‘less developed countries’ (hereafter, 
LDCs) or ‘third world countries’ are all used interchangeably. Hopper et al. (2009) 
noted that the task of defining developing countries is problematic and fraught. 
Wallace (1990) described developing countries as countries found mainly in Africa, 
Asia, Latin America, Oceania and the Middle East, most of them having gained 
independence from colonial authorities from the 1950s and onward. Developing 
countries are characterised as having low rates of per capita income, capital formation 
and value added (Hopper et al., 2009). Other criteria are also used in categorising 
developing countries. For instance, the World Bank has classified
3
 developing 
countries as those countries whose Gross National Income (GNI) is $11,905 or less.
4
  
 
                                                 
3
 The World Bank classified economies into four categories based on their GNI as follows: high 
income (GNI $11,906 or more), upper middle-income (GNI $3856 to 11,905), lower middle-income 
(GNI $976 to 3,855) and low-income (GNI $975 or less) (World Bank, 2008, see, 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/DATASTATISTICS/0,contentMDK:20420458~men
uPK:64133156~pagePK:64133150~piPK:64133175~theSitePK:239419,00.html). 
4
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/DATASTATISTICS/0,,contentMDK:20420458~me
nuPK:64133156~pagePK:64133150~piPK:64133175~theSitePK:239419,00.html 
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Wallace (1990) argued that developing countries are entirely different from developed 
countries and need different methods to develop. They are a heterogeneous group, 
with poverty as their common characteristic. Developing countries have all 
experienced or are experiencing a different level and rate of development, and have a 
varied level of economic and political development, population size, literacy level, 
natural resources and different social, political and economic systems (Wallace, 
1990).  
 
There is little MCS research on developing countries, and these studies are mainly on 
financial accounting; management accounting is sparsely researched though the trend 
is now changing
5
 (Hopper et al., 2003, 2009). Attempts to review the literature on 
accounting in developing countries have been made by Jaggi, (1973), Samuel (1990), 
Wallace (1990), Needles (1994, 1997) and Rahaman et al. (1997). However, the 
reviews have concentrated more on financial accounting, with minimal attention to 
issues regarding management accounting research. This lack of research is not 
surprising, when compared with the findings of Enthoven (1977). Enthoven examined 
accounting in sixteen developing countries, and found that the role of accounting was 
reduced to a financial function to the neglect of management accounting. 
 
However, a review which concentrated on MCS was provided recently by Hopper et 
al (2009). Hopper et al categorised MCS literature in developing countries using a 
cultural political framework into five stages of transition: colonial despotism, state 
capitalism, politicised state capitalism, market capitalism and politicised market 
                                                 
5
 The change was attributed to an increase in the globalisation of capital market and competition, 
government adopting structural adjustment programmes, newer less Western-centric accounting 
journals, diaspora accounting scholars from developing countries to developed countries and 
developing countries, PhD programmes that encourage student to conduct indigenous research (Hopper 
et al., 2003, 2009).  
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capitalism. Their review which provides some useful insights into the state of 
management accounting in developing countries covered lower to upper middle 
income bands of World Bank categorisation. Although the review conducted by 
Hopper et al. (2009) is timely, it was, however, broad and did not concentrate on 
specific management accounting topics. Also, as the Hopper et al., paper is heavily 
theorised using Burrawoy’s labour process theory (see also Uddin and Hopper, 2001) 
hence some issues that did not fit into the theory were not given much attention. For 
example, issues such as the relevance of western accounting systems and management 
accounting did not receive much attention in their study.  
 
This section aims at reviewing the literature on MCS in developing countries, looking 
at some specific issues in much greater depth in order to provide the rationale for the 
thesis. This review divides the main issues identified in the literature on MCS in 
developing countries into three categories. The first category analyses issues on the 
relevance of accounting systems (MCS included) in developing countries. The second 
category examines the nature and role of MCS in the enterprises of developing 
countries. This category includes studies on budgets, budgetary controls, performance 
measurements systems and informal control. The third category reviews the literature 
on MCS change; issues such as the factors that influence MCS change and the role of 
MCS in such change are all examined. However, some of the studies correspond to 
more than one category, and, in order to reflect this correspondence, these studies are 
dealt with under more than one category in the review.  
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2.5.1 Relevance of Accounting Systems in Developing Countries 
Accounting systems and practices found in many developing countries were originally 
imported from developed countries. Many developing countries had adopted 
accounting systems from Europe and North America (Briston, 1978). These systems 
and practices were imposed by developed countries through colonialism (Hove, 1986; 
Perera, 1989; Wallace, 1990). Other factors that aided their spread were the 
operations of multinational corporations, professional accounting organisations and 
the special conditions of economic aid agreements (Hove, 1986).  
 
Researchers have argued that the western accounting systems and practices were 
imported without consideration to the specific local environment features of 
developing countries (Perera, 1989; Ansari and Bell, 1991; Hopper et al., 2003). For 
example, the economies of developing countries are unstable and in rapid decline 
(Wallace, 1999). The imported systems and practices were not relevant to the needs of 
these countries (Briston, 1978; Hove, 1982; 1986; Samuels and Oliga, 1982; Wallace, 
1990). Hove (1986), Perera (1989), Ansari and Bell (1991) and Hopper et al. (2003) 
stress that the western accounting systems and practices were designed to deal with 
problems peculiar to Western countries, and some of them are not related to 
developing countries. These inappropriate systems have led to unreliable information 
for economic decisions and proper resources allocation for economic development. 
For instance, Samuels and Oliga (1982) argued that problems in developing countries 
come from their inability to stay away from foreign models; they believe that 
accounting that can contribute to the economic development of developing countries 
would not come from the western industrial accounting doctrines. Perera (1989) 
argued that the systems and practices were inapplicable owing to the differences in 
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business environments, ownership structures, users of accounting information, and 
disclosure altitude. For instance, Rahaman and Lawrence (2001), using a case study 
of the Volta River Authority Ghana (hereafter, VRA), examined the conventional 
view on the widespread deficiency of public sector accounting and financial 
management in developing countries. They found technically sound and well-operated 
systems in VRA. However, the systems masked a deeper deficiency, which was 
revealed through the appreciation of the socio-political context in which the VRA 
operates. Those deficiencies hinder the achievement of the original objective which 
VRA was aiming to achieve (the socio-economic development of Ghana). They 
argued that the accounting systems in VRA protect the interests of external parties 
against those of the Ghanaian public, who were meant to benefit from the project.  
 
While arguments could be made against the adoption of western accounting practices 
in developing countries few studies found that western accounting systems are in fact 
relevant to developing countries. For example, Abdeen (1980) found that Western 
MCS are applicable to Syrian context. A similar conclusion was reached by Chan and 
Lee (1997). Chan and Lee reported that western accounting systems are relevant in 
the Chinese companies they studied. According to Baydoun and Willett (1995) the 
literature on the relevance of Western accounting systems to developing countries is 
vague in its assessment of what aspect fails to meet the test of relevance to the needs 
of developing countries.  
 
These earlier works concentrate on the inappropriateness of western MCS to 
developing countries to the neglect of finding what is appropriate to these countries.  
It is undeniable that certain aspects of western accounting systems would not work in 
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developing countries. But researchers have failed to explain which aspects work and 
which ones do not. For example, in their studies on large commercial-oriented 
enterprises in developing countries, Hopper et al. (2003, 2009) stressed that the 
management accounting systems in operation in these enterprises are not substantially 
different from those in firms in advanced economies. However, how these systems 
operate in practice differ from those in the advanced countries. In particular, the 
authors identified the social and political constituted nature of management 
accounting in these developing economies.  
 
2.5.2  Nature and Role of Management Control Systems in Developing 
Countries 
 
Developing countries accounting are rooted in complex cultural-historical, financial-
economic, professional, legal and education and training variables (Enthoven, 1977); 
these, together with a turbulent environment, affect the operation of accounting 
systems. The nature and role of MCS in developing countries enterprise have been 
examined by various researchers (Alam, 1997; Hoque and Hopper, 1997; Sulaiman et 
al., 2004). Some studies found that management accounting such as budgeting plays a 
significant role in organisational activities. For instance, (Alam, 1997), using a case 
study of two state-owned enterprises in Bangladesh, examined how the budgetary 
process is used to manage the technical and institutional environment. Alam found 
that, in a condition of high uncertainty, budgeting is oriented more towards the 
management of external relationships with significant institutional actors than with 
the management of the organisation itself; also, in a more moderate uncertainty 
condition, budgeting appears to be more functional in the management of 
organisational tasks.  
 
 52 
Hoque and Hopper (1997) investigated how sets of environmental factors affect 
budgeting characteristics in the nationalised jute mill enterprises in Bangladesh. 
Deriving five external key factors from an intensive fieldwork (political climate, 
industrial relations, competition, aid agencies and government regulations) influence 
budgetary-related factors (participation, accountability for budget, budget evaluation, 
budget analysis, interactions among managers and budget flexibility). They 
established that managers placed a strong emphasis on budget control when they 
perceived their mill to be in highly competitive circumstances. They reported a 
significant association between the related behaviour of managers and environmental 
factors. Political and industrial relation uncertainties are negatively associated with 
managers using budgetary control for conventional purposes.  
 
Sulaiman et al. (2004) found that the use of budgeting in planning, control, and 
performance evaluation remains high in India, Malaysia and Singapore. A similar 
finding was also reported by El-Ebaishi et al. (2003). The authors established that 
traditional MCS are perceived to be important in Saudi Arabia; they are widely used 
in the enterprises they studied. Similarly, Joshi (2001) found, in a study of 60 large 
and medium companies in India, that all the enterprises studied used budgeting for 
planning day-to-day operations and cash flow. In addition, 93 percent of the 
companies used budgeting to control costs, and 91 percent reported that they used 
budgeting for planning their financial position.  
 
However, a different result was presented by Van Triest and Elshahat (2007). Van 
Triest and Elshahat surveyed forty Egyptian private enterprises; their result shows 
limited use of traditional and advanced MCS techniques. Advanced techniques such 
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as activity-based costing were not applied, and costing was used for pricing and not 
for performance measurement, process improvement or cost reduction.  
 
The above studies present MCS as playing a significant role in the enterprises of 
developing countries. However, whether MCS are the only means of control in those 
enterprises is not clearly stated. For instance, some studies found formal MCS to be 
ineffective in some developing countries (especially in public sector organisations) 
(Enthoven, 1973, 1977; Ouibrahim and Scapens, 1989; Uddin and Hopper, 2001). The 
state plays a significant role in developing country. Hopper et al. (2003, p. 17) stress 
this as follows: 
The role of the state is crucial to understanding management accounting in 
LDCs because it’s so central economically. In the absence of large capitalist 
class, the state is a major source of capital formation, controlling large 
proportion of gross domestic product and employment opportunities. Small, 
educated elites, politicians and senior civil servants can reap large benefits 
from office often illicitly. Government are often unstable, switching from 
multi-party democracies to military dictatorships.  
 
Enthoven (1973) found that budgeting was not used as a planning and control 
instrument. A similar conclusion was reached by Enthoven (1977) in a later study. 
The author reported that developing country enterprises make limited use of MCS in 
decision making. Using a case study of two enterprises in the construction industry, 
Ouibrahim and Scapens (1989) investigated the operation of MCS in the social, 
economic and political contexts of Algeria. They found that formal MCS did not play 
a significant role in the day-to-day activity of the enterprises; other than the senior 
managers and the financial officers at the head office, most participants in the study 
had little knowledge or interest in MCS. Managers use language of production at all 
levels to communicate with each other, not accounting language as was the case in 
capitalist organisations.  
 54 
Similarly, in another Algerian study, Jones and Sefiane (1992) found that MCS 
reports were prepared in their case organisations; however, the reports were not used 
for planning, operational decision making and control; instead they are prepared to 
fulfil the requirement of external agencies and the exercise of annual expenditure 
aggregation. The study conducted by Hoque and Hopper (1994) of Bangladesh jute 
mills offered similar findings: accounting systems was mainly a response to external 
legitimacy, and budgeting was not a dominant mode of controls.  
 
Uddin and Tsamenyi (2005) also established that, the Ghana Food Distribution 
Corporation (hereafter, GFDC) they studied, budgeting was directionless, delayed and 
ineffective. Likewise, Tsamenyi et al. (2002) examined the participation of managers 
in budget decisions and the use of budget as a planning and control device in four 
enterprises in Ghana, using interview and questionnaire methods. They found that 
senior managers made minimal attempts to collect information from the departments 
and branch managers during the budget development, while there is also a lack of 
requisite skills among the management accountants to develop financial aspects of the 
budget on their own. They noted that the acute shortage of fully trained accountants 
and management accountants has affected the utilisation of accounting information 
for internal management purposes. In addition, they reported that, in some enterprises, 
accounting information was either available in an improper form or not available at 
all.  
 
While studies found formal MCS were ineffective in developing countries, some 
studies reported that managers employed informal methods in controlling their 
organisations. For instance, Hoque and Hopper (1994) found that, in a large 
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nationalised jute mill in Bangladesh, managers employ different sorts of 
social/informal control, rather than the official MCS systems, to deal with complexity 
and uncertainty surrounding their activities. A similar finding was reported by 
Tsamenyi, et al, (2008). The authors found that culture and social control were 
employed in an Indonesian family-owned university; these rendered the 
organisation’s formal MCS to be less relevant. In addition, Ansari and Bell (1991) 
conducted a study of an enterprise run by three brothers in Pakistan. The authors 
found that control was initially based on trust. However, following a financial crisis, 
one of the brothers introduced a formal MCS which led to a family dispute. The 
managers disliked their reduced discretion and the other brothers wanted the 
traditional controls restored, despite knowing that they would hinder efficiency.  
 
Despite the fact that formal MCS are found to be ineffective in managing enterprises 
in developing countries, some researchers have established that they were employed 
to play a social and political role (Hoque and Hopper, 1994; Uddin and Tsamenyi, 
2005; Wickramasinghe et al., 2004; Uddin and Hopper, 2001). Hoque and Hopper 
(1994), using a case study, examined the actual operations of MCS in Bangladeshi 
jute mills. Hoque and Hopper found that the mill managers had little influence over 
their operational activity; planning and control were done by head office and their 
sponsoring ministry. Control was done by politicians who intervened in the mill 
affairs to exercise patronage and gain party advantage. The mill managers were 
subjected to unwarranted and inconsistent demands from the politicians and workers 
which have come to be reflected in the mill culture, its environment and its 
performance.  
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Uddin and Tsamenyi (2005) made a similar observation in their study of GFDC in 
Ghana in which World Bank sponsored reforms were imposed; they found that, 
despite the reform budgeting remaining politicised, subordinate managers relied on 
powerful politicians to maintain the status quo. A similar finding was reported by 
Wickramasinghe et al., (2004) in a longitudinal study of a Sri Lankan 
telecommunication company that had been privatised. The new owners (a Japanese 
company) eliminated the old MCS and implemented new systems. The new MCS 
worked for a time and commercial success was achieved. However, some employees 
who were unhappy with the changes allied with politicians and had the Japanese 
managers removed through the political control of regulatory systems.  
 
Wickramasinghe and Hopper (2005), using a longitudinal case study traced how MCS 
operates in Sri Lanka textile mill. They found that attempts to implement 
conventional MCS had failed as a result of the traditional rural culture based on 
kingship obligation. The idealised MCS repeatedly tried to reproduce capitalist Mode 
of Production, and was caught in complex and indeterminate processes of 
transformation involving the state, political ideologies, trade unions, ethnicity, culture, 
organisational dynamics, financiers and markets. 
The above findings show that culture, politics, social and economic factors play a 
significant role in shaping MCS in developing countries. Hopper et al. (2009) 
concluded that more needs to be known about the MCS in developing countries. They 
noted that, China apart, there is no intensive study in any developing country. They 
suggested that MCS research in developing countries needs to take into account the 
social, political, cultural and economic factors of the countries they study. This would 
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suggest the need to adopt social theories in order to understand how MCS operates in 
these environments.  
 
2.5.3 Change in Management Control Systems in Developing Countries 
 
In developing countries, most MCS change is instrumented by the World Bank and 
IMF through policies such as Structural Adjustment Programmes (hereafter, SAP) 
(Toye, 1994; Cook and Kirkpatrick, 1995). Public enterprises are the dominant 
ventures in developing countries. Following independence, many developing 
countries have sought development through the creation of public enterprises (Hopper 
et al., 2009) (see chapter four for a discussion of Nigerian public enterprises). 
However, the failure of such approaches has led international financial institutions, 
especially the World Bank and IMF, to put pressure on these to introduce SAP based 
on market policies; public sector reforms are among the policies, and MCS change is 
an integral part of the reforms. International organisations assume that private sector 
MCS are superior and can be established in reformed companies, and will result in 
more transparent MCS and improved performance. Overall, it is argued that the 
reforms will result in increased investment, a rise in Gross Domestic Product (GDP), 
as well as an increase in productivity and employment (Uddin and Tsamenyi, 2005; 
Uddin and Hopper, 2001).  
 
Researchers have investigated change in MCS in developing countries. For instance, 
Uddin and Tsamenyi (2005), using a longitudinal case study, examined the 
transformation of accounting and performance in a state-owned enterprise GFDC in 
Ghana. Their findings were that there was no substantial change in budgetary practice 
apart from reporting that budgeting remained directionless, politicised, delayed and 
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ineffective. Reporting to a monitoring agency introduced by the reform did not make 
any positive changes to accountability and performance. A similar finding was also 
reported by Mserembo and Hopper (2004). They examined the implementation and 
factors affecting the outcome of a Programme Planning Budgeting System (hereafter, 
PPBS) in Malawi, introduced as a part of the World Bank SAP loans condition using 
secondary data. Mserembo and Hopper established that, when viewed from the centre, 
PPBS may appear to result in a more co-ordinated style of planning. However, when 
viewed from the users and line ministries, the result appears to be different. The users 
participate less, and the data is often unreliable or absent. In addition, the analysis is 
cursory and the necessary resources and skills were in short supply. Factors such as 
nepotism and corruption, Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS), refugees 
from the Mozambique civil war, floods and drought and lack of trained adequately 
rewarded staff all had negatively impacted upon the PPBS.  
 
In another study, Uddin and Hopper (2003), examined the World Bank and 
development economics, claimed that privatisation facilitates development by 
improving controls within enterprises and the external regulation of financial markets 
by acting on external accounting reports. They analysed the post-privatisation 
performance of thirteen privatised enterprises, and compared their analysis with that 
conducted by the World Bank on the same enterprises. The World Bank presented a 
successful story. However, they found only one commercial success. Moreover, 
transparent reporting which was one of the arguments advanced by the World Bank 
did not materialise after the privatisation. A similar finding was reported by Sharma 
and Lawrence (2005) in their case study of Fiji Public Rental Board (hereafter, PRB) 
in which market-oriented practices were introduced as a result of pressures from aid 
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agencies. They examined the implementation of private business techniques such as 
economic rent, performance measurement in the form of Balanced Scorecard and sale 
of rental flats to the tenants and their consequence to the Fijian society. They found 
that there were problems and tensions between the PRB commercialisation and its 
mission and vision statements. The implementation of private business techniques 
shifted PRB orientation from that providing welfare services to the poor to that run 
like a business, hence denying rental accommodation to scores of citizens. Thus while 
there were changes in the MCS, these changes had negative rather than positive effect 
on the people that the system was intended to benefit.   
 
Wickramasinghe et al. (2004) also examined a partially privatised telecommunication 
company in Sri Lanka, to see whether partial privatisations involving Japanese 
management leadership created more effective management accounting systems and 
improved performance. They found that the Japanese owners had eliminated 
bureaucracy control and brought new management controls and reward systems, and 
had achieved some commercial success. However, some employees, who were allied 
with politicians frustrated with their exclusion from the organisational affair, had the 
manager removed and restored formal bureaucracy through a regulation system 
change. A similar finding was reported by Davie (2004) in a study of a state-owned 
forestry industry enterprise in Fiji that was corporatized; market-based accounting 
was introduced into the organisation as part of the reform. Davie found that the 
market-based accounting was resisted in the organisation. Thus the market based 
accounting system failed because of the resistance encountered with its 
implementation. 
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Similarly, Hassan (2005) found that in the Egyptian health sector reform, 
management accounting systems were acted upon to reform the sector; however, the 
systems were resisted in the hospitals being reformed. Uddin and Hopper (2001) 
investigated accounting changes in a privatised soap manufacturing company in 
Bangladesh that was nationalised following the country’s independence and privatised 
in 1993, in order to give a grounded account of controls that existed in the 
organisation. They found that control in the enterprise was secured by political 
interventions, often at the behest of trade unions, for party politics rather than 
commercial ends. The enterprise maintained detailed systems of accounting for 
control and accountability. However, the systems were marginal, ritualistic, and de-
coupled from operations.  
 
The above studies illustrate the failure of the reforms enforced by international 
organisations in developing countries. For example, privatisation has not resulted in 
the glowing picture anticipated.  
 
However, a contrary finding was presented by other studies. For instance, Tsamenyi 
et al. (2008a) conducted a case study of two privatised state enterprises in Ghana. 
They reported that the performance of the enterprise has improved. The improvement 
was accompanied by organisational changes, which included changes in MCS. A 
similar finding was reported by Hoque and Alam (2004) in a study of two privatised 
Bangladesh jute manufacturing enterprises. Hoque and Alam found that privatisation 
resulted in a positive MCS change. The enterprises studied had been transformed after 
privatisation from those making losses, with outdated model practices and driven by 
primary production to the top five profit earners in their sector, with a modern MCS 
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and accounting practices. Similarly, Anderson and Lanen (1999) reported that 
following Indian economic reform in 1991, enterprises perceived budgeting as being 
more meaningful, realistic and useful, especially when forming strategy. Also, 
O’Connor et al. (2004) reported that the main objectives of change in MCS in China 
were to improve decision making and performance accountability. The changes were 
found to be in response to an increase in the competitive environment, and had also 
influenced institutional factors such as joint venture experience and stock exchange 
listing 
 
Some studies have investigated the impacts of the political system of developing 
countries on organisations and hence MCS practices. For example, Olowo-Okere 
(1999) examined the impact of military rule on the changes in Nigeria’s government 
financial control systems and accountability. He found that each regime wants to do 
something different from the other regimes in order to be seen as accountable, but 
none of the changes had made any impact on accountability. Hence, most of the 
change had not materially influenced practices; rather, they had a negative impact on 
financial control and accountability practices. Moreover, the majority of the changes 
are formalistic because of the political instability created by the military which 
disallowed continuity and lack of genuine commitment to change.  
 
The implementation of contemporary MCS in developing countries was investigated 
by Ed-Ebaishi et al. (2003) who found that in Saudi Arabia recent developed MCS 
usage is limited, enterprises perceived traditional MCS as important, and they are 
predominantly used in the companies they studied. Kholeif et al. (2005) examined the 
failure of an ERP system in an Egyptian-based commercially state-owned enterprise 
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in which the system is imposed by its holding company and top management. They 
found that the implementation had failed owing to conflict between local practices 
and global EPR built-in practices. Accountants resisted the system through their 
control of resources required in the implementation process. ERP was perceived as a 
major threat to the survival of the organisation and its members. The implementation 
also faces context problems, which included its non compatibility with the established 
way of thinking and norms of behaviour embedded in the existing accounting routine, 
lack of expertise and insufficiency of resources. 
 
Waweru et al. (2004), using a case study of four firms, investigated the adoption of 
contemporary management accounting in the retail service industry in South Africa. 
They found a considerable change in the use of contemporary management 
accounting, especially activity-based cost allocation and the balanced scorecard 
approach to performance measurement. They attributed the changes to the recent 
environmental changes in South African economy arising from government 
reform/deregulation policies and global competition. Similarly, Luther and Longden 
(2001) investigated management accounting techniques and change in South Africa. 
They examine the extent to which benefits derived from using management 
accounting are independent of a country and its business environment. 139 
questionnaires were analysed, together with 77 from the UK that served as a 
benchmark for comparison. They found a significant change in the perceived benefits 
derived from management accounting techniques in South Africa over the period 
1996-2002, and also that the benefits differ from those in the UK.  
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2.6 Summary of the Chapter 
 
This chapter has reviewed literature pertinent to the issues under discussion in the 
thesis. The chapter began by conceptualising MCS: what MCS is and its relevance in 
organisations were discussed. The review identified that MCS is made up of various 
elements, and some of these elements were discussed. However, the conceptualisation 
and definition of MCS is influenced by researchers’ ontological and epistemological 
assumptions. Researchers operating from the positivistic paradigm tended to 
emphasise the rational decision making role of MCS while those operating from the 
non-positivistic paradigm tended to emphasise its social and political role.  
 
The review has also revealed that emphasis is now shifting to understanding 
management accounting change. This review identified the drivers of such change, 
from the relevance lost debate, which triggered the development of new MCS 
systems. Other factors such as NPM, and changes in the business environments 
contributed to MCS change. 
 
The review also concentrated on MCS in developing countries. The review suggested 
that MCS in developing countries though may be similar in form to those in 
developed countries are likely to operate differently because of differences in social, 
economic and political contexts. MCS are more likely to be loose coupled in 
organisations in developing countries because of the dominance of these social and 
political structures in enterprises in these countries. Part of the review therefore 
questioned the relevance of MCS imported from the west to developing countries. In 
general, a case could be made against such importation though few studies have found 
that these imported systems actually work in developing countries.  
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The above review has identified gaps that need to be filled. First, the review of the 
studies on MCS in developing countries has suggested conflicting results. For 
example, while some studies found that public sector reforms impact positively on 
MCS, others found that they do not. These conflicting results therefore warrant further 
country specific studies to examine the impacts of public sector reforms on MCS in 
developing countries. Specifically, it can be argued that the process, nature and 
consequence of these reforms cannot be generalised but need to be contextually 
understood, hence the need for this study.  
 
Another gap in the literature is the lack of management accounting research on the 
public sector in general. This has been recognised over a decade ago by Broadbent 
and Guthrie (1992) and Broadbent (1999) who called for more research in MCS in the 
public sector. Though few public sector studies have been conducted since, more 
research is needed in particular on the impact of new public management ethos on 
MCS. For example, what types of changes in MCS does the NPM ethos bring about? 
Are these changes revolutionary or incremental? Are the changes resisted or 
accepted? These are some of the empirical questions that require further studies. This 
study is in line with this call for research, as to date this thesis is the first study to have 
looked at MCS in the Nigerian public sector. By examining the nature of change in 
the MCS of the case organisation, the study will also contribute to Burns and Vaivio 
(2001) and Burns and Scapens (2000a) call for research in MCS that examine both 
formal and intentional change/stability processes and informal and unintentional 
change/stability; this thesis aims to examine change in both formal and informal MCS 
in NSC.  
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Having reviewed the pertinent literature for the study, the next chapter presents the 
theoretical framework for the study.  
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3 CHAPTER THREE: THEORITICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter presents the theoretical framework adopted for this research. A 
theoretical framework is important in any research, as it helps the researcher to 
understand things which s/he might have otherwise overlooked (Macintosh, 1994). 
According to Humphrey and Scapens (1996), a theoretical framework is an essential 
starting-point for any case study research; however, they warned that researchers 
should hold the framework loosely, so that it can be challenged and refined as a result 
of the research process. Actor Network Theory (hereafter, ANT) is adopted in this 
study as a sensitising device in order to understand the reform processes and their 
impact on Management Control System (hereafter, MCS) in the case site. The 
empirical evidence from the case site also lends support for ANT as an appropriate 
theoretical framework for the study. The empirical evidence shows that the public 
sector reform processes examined comprise of various internal and external actors 
who have shaped and were themselves shaped by the reform process.  
 
The chapter is structured into six sections. Following the introduction, the next section 
examines the origins and foundations of ANT. This is subsequently followed by a 
critical evaluation of ANT as concept. Section 3.4 discussed the creation of actor 
networks as a process of translation and the role of intermediaries in creating 
networks. Following this, the previous management accounting studies on ANT are 
briefly reviewed and the relevance of ANT to this study. The proposed framework for 
the study is then presented followed by a chapter summary.  
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3.2 The Origin and Foundations of ANT 
 
ANT originates from the discipline of science and technology studies. Its ideas were 
developed in the 1980s, primarily from the work of Bruno Latour, Michael Callon and 
John Law (see, for instance, Latour and Woolgar, 1979; Callon, 1986, 1987; 1991; 
Calon and Latour, 1981; Latour, 1987, 1993, 1996, 2005; Callon et al., 1986; Law, 
1991, 1994; Law and Callon, 1994).  
 
ANT was developed with the aim of defining social realities in the construction of 
scientific knowledge and technological innovation (Wickramasinghe and Alawattage, 
2007). ANT focuses on explaining how actor-networks get formed, are maintained or 
eventually breakdown. ANT has been widely adopted in other fields (Walsham, 1997; 
Lee and Hassard, 1999), such as sociology (Law, 1991, 1994), psychology (Michael, 
1996), anthropology (Strathern, 1996), politics (Moll, 1999), economics (Callon, 
1988). ANT has also been adopted in a number of accounting studies (Preston et al., 
1992; Robson, 1991, 1992; Chua, 1995; Lowe, 2000, 2001a; Chua and Mahama, 
2007).  
 
Vandenberghe (2006) summarised the main tenets of ANT into three, namely; science 
is social (Latour, 1988), society is natural (Latour, 1996), and nature and society are 
constructed through a social-technical network (Callon and Latour, 1981). To explain 
these issues further, Latour argues that the world view uses one dimensional language 
operating in the framework of opposite poles of nature and culture. Knowledge and 
artefacts are often explained by either society (social constructivists) or by nature 
(realism); to transcend this dualism, a second dimension is required; this dimension is 
the process of society/nature construction, which results in the stabilisation of a strong 
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network (Latour, 1992, 2005). Society and nature are construed as an outcome of a 
common practice (Latour, 1987, 2005). In other words, science/technology are 
theorised as a product of a process of ‘heterogeneous engineering’ in which the social, 
the technical, the conceptual and the textual are fitted together (or juxtaposed) and 
transformed (or ‘translated’)6 into a set of equally heterogeneous scientific products 
(Latour, 1987; Law, 1992).  
 
Latour (1992) argues that a scientific innovation is developed through a network as a 
consequence of the enrolment of human and non-human allies into that network. In 
other words, science and technology are the product of enrolling and controlling 
various human and non-human allies; the human allies may consist of academics, 
consultants, colleague and readers, while the non-human may include other inputs 
such as concepts, ideas, theories, instrument and models (Wickramasinghe and 
Alawattage, 2007). Thus, together these human and non-human allies (actors) 
contribute to the development of scientific and technological innovations. In his 
famous work Science in Action (Latour, 1987), Latour emphasises the importance of 
bringing both human and non-human actors together in the network as: 
Fact construction is so much a collective process that an isolated person builds 
only dreams, claims and feelings, not facts… One of the main problems to 
solve is to interest someone enough to be read at all; compared to this problem, 
that of being believed is, so to speak, a minor task (1987; p. 41) 
 
Thus, the production of facts and artefact involves the enrolment and negotiation of 
various actors into the network. 
 
The process of developing scientific and technological knowledge discussed above 
can also be extended to other analysis and can contribute to our understanding of how 
                                                 
6
 Translation is a very important concept of ANT, and is discussed in section 3.4.1 
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institutions or practices evolve. It can enable us have a better understanding of how 
society for example is constructed. Thus society can be theorised as being built of 
heterogeneous elements comprising people, objects and technology (see for instance, 
Latour, 2005). ANT argues that we would not have society if it were not for the 
heterogeneity of the social networks. Social life (family, organisation, computing 
systems, economy and technologies) is a collection of ordered networks of 
heterogeneous materials (Law, 1992, Latour, 2005). ANT treats the social world as a 
set of related bits and pieces with no defined social order but instead the social world 
evolves as a result of continuous attempts at ordering through the formation and 
stabilisation of networks (Stanforth, 2006). Thus, social order is an effect generated 
by heterogeneous means.  
 
As discussed above, a network is important because this is where both human and 
non-human actors interact to create social order. Actors operate within a network to 
create social order. ANT attributes agency not only to the humans but also to the non-
humans in the network. The term actor-network therefore refers to a heterogeneous 
network of aligned interests which includes people and objects (Walsham, 1997). The 
term ‘actor’ is described by Callon and Latour (1981, p. 286) as “Any element which 
bends sAlpha around itself, makes other elements dependent upon itself and translates 
their will into the language of its own.” In other words, an actor is “Something that 
acts or to which activity is granted by others,” and can thus be human or non-human 
and can be an entity or a collection of entities (Doolin and Lowe, 2002, p. 72).  
 
ANT is based on a loose definition of who an actor is; in other words, ANT it 
“assumes the radical indeterminacy of an actor. For example, an actor’s size, its 
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psychological make up and the motivations behind its actions – none of this is 
predetermined” (Callon, 1999, p. 183). Thus, actors gain their attribute as a 
consequence of the relationship in which they find themselves in. Actors are shaped 
by “the performative character of relations and the objects constituted in those 
relations” (Law, 1999, p. 7). Callon elaborates on this by arguing that “the actor 
network is reducible neither to an actor alone nor to a network… An actor network is 
simultaneously an actor whose activity is networking heterogeneous elements and a 
network that is able to redefine and transform what it is made of” (Callon, 1987, p. 
93) suggesting that an actor is always a network thus, while an actor is part of the 
network, that actor is itself an effect of the network of heterogeneous elements (Law, 
2003; Law, 2007). For example, a car is an actor, but once it breaks down the network 
it is made up of becomes visible. This is because when a network acts as a single 
block, the network disappears and is replaced by the action itself and the seemingly 
simple author of the action. At the time the way the effect is generated disappears, it is 
neither visible nor relevant. This effect is termed as ‘punctualisation’ (Law, 1992; 
Law, 2003). However, punctualisation ceases when actor networks break down. 
 
3.3  A Critical Evaluation of ANT 
 
The ANT approach is considered as a radical social theory. Vanderbenghe (2006, p. 
74) described ANT as “one of the most original, provocative and iconoclastic 
sociologies currently on offer.” ANT applies the semiotic insight of relationality, the 
notion that entities are produced in relation to all materials and not only those that are 
linguistics (Law, 1999); thus, it forbids the assumption that entities have pre-existence 
(Callon and Law, 1989). For instance, ANT resists any explanation that appeals to the 
essential characteristics of actors (such as technology or society), to the exploration of 
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how phenomena are produced through networks of artefacts, people and institutions. 
ANT aims at denaturalising phenomena by viewing them as continually being made 
and remade in contrast to existing ‘out there’ with inherent properties and 
characteristics (Whittle and Spicer, 2008). By taking a social constructivist approach, 
ANT avoids essentialist explanations of how events occur and instead attributes this 
to the result of unstable and dynamic networks of relations.  
 
Similarly, ANT does not subscribe to the dualism with regard to the separation of the 
human and non-human; instead ANT brings together human and non-human, social 
and technical factors into the same analytical view (Walsham, 1997; Hassard et al., 
1999). ANT thus rejects the reductionist
7
 accounts that the character of social stability 
or change is determined by either people or machines. According to ANT, social 
interactions might shape machines, or machine interactions might shape their social 
counterparts (Law, 1992). ANT therefore recognises that material-semiotic (concept) 
interact to work together to form networks. However, Law (1992, p. 3) stresses that it 
“is an empirical question and usually matters are more complex…artefacts may 
indeed have politics. But the character of those politics, how determinate they are and 
whether it is possible to tease people and machines apart in the first instance - are all 
contingent questions.”  
 
ANT analysis is also concerned with the production and exercising of power. From an 
ANT perspective, power can be construed as an outcome produced and reproduced 
through a network of heterogeneous actors rather than through a single social 
dominant group (Latour, 1986, 2005; Callon, 1986). In other words, ANT argues that 
                                                 
7
 The reductionist account suggests that either human or machine relations are determinate and that one 
drives the other (Law, 1992). 
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entities acquired their power through the number and stability of association routed 
through them; hence power is accomplished less through matter like leadership and 
hierarchy and much more through material distribution (Latour, 1986; Munro, 1999). 
Callon (1986, p. 224) stresses that “understanding what the sociologists generally call 
power relationships means describing the way in which actors are defined, associated 
and simultaneously obliged to remain faithful to their alliances.”  
 
In addition, empirical understanding is emphasised by ANT (Lee and Hassard, 1999; 
Stanforth, 2006). In fact, Latour suggests that we should study science/technology in 
action, not a ready made science/technology (Latour, 1987). This argument suggests 
that we should focus on processes rather than merely on outcomes. Law (2007) 
stresses further that even understanding the ANT approach itself requires 
understanding the empirical case studies on which it was grounded. This argument 
has methodological implications which are discussed in chapter 5.  
 
ANT is however not without criticisms (see, for instance,  Collins and Yearley, 1992; 
Pels, 1995; Bloomfield and Vurdubakis, 1999; Mclean and Hassard, 2004). The main 
focus of the criticism has been on ANT’s symmetrical treatment of the human and 
non-human (Hassard et al., 1999; Mclean and Hassard, 2004). In other words, ANT’s 
insistence on the agency of nonhumans has been widely considered as controversial. 
Munir and John (2004) argue that ANT symmetrical treatment has missed the 
important character of human action. Similarly, Collins and Yearly (1992) argue that 
the human ability to use language and other symbols in generating and interpreting 
meaning warrants a distinct ontological category. Moreover, Collins and Kusch 
(1988) distinguish between polymorphic actions (those that rely on social awareness) 
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and mimeomorphic actions (those that do not rely on social awareness); they argue 
that human are capable of both mimeomorphic and polymorphic action, whereas a 
machine is capable of mimeomorphic action only. Thus a machine could be a tool to 
help do things; it can act as a proxy to replace a human being, but it lacks intention 
and can only behave where people act. This argument suggests that machines or 
technology are incapable of acting or thinking as humans and therefore should not be 
accorded the same status in the construction of the social world. 
 
ANT has also been criticised for assuming that an actor has no fixed boundaries (see 
for instance, Whittle and Spicer, 2008). The authors argue that ANT relies on those 
assumptions when partitioning the world. Using the work of Latour (1991) they 
provide an example in which a hotel manager tried to remind his guests to return their 
keys before leaving the hotel. In that study, Latour partitioned the analysis into hotel 
managers and guests, weighty key fobs (material artefacts) and signs (texts).  
 
3.4 Some Concepts of ANT 
 
In this section, the ANT concepts of translation and intermediaries have been 
discussed. These concepts are very important, as they present a way of analysing how 
facts are constructed. The construction of MCS can be analysed through these 
concepts. The translation and intermediaries are discussed below.  
 
3.4.1 Network as a Process of Translation 
 
ANT is based on the concept of translation hence it is sometimes referred to as the 
sociology of translation. Translation explains the process of how actor-networks are 
built consequently its centrality to ANT analysis (Callon et al., 1986; Latour, 1987; 
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Brown and Capdevila, 1999). It is the process by which initiating actors enrol and 
interest other actors into the actor network they are building (Callon, 1986, Latour, 
1987). Stranforth (2006) described translation as the mechanism by which networks 
progressively take form, resulting in a situation where some entities control others. 
Translation is important to this thesis as the main objective of the study is to analyse 
the process of the public sector reforms in Nigeria using NSC as a case. The concept 
of translation will therefore enable the researcher to tease out how the reform actor 
networks were built and how these networks are maintained over time. 
 
In explaining the concept of translation, Callon (1991) suggests that the nature of 
interaction between actors and their networks is never final; thus, when two 
translations are linked together they generate a third translation which may bring 
together other actors that would otherwise have been separate (Callon, 1991), 
suggesting the instability of actor networks. However, the observer should not adopt a 
position of one of the actor-networks, since networks by their definition are formed 
out of collaboration and composition of all the relevant but more or less compatible 
actor-networks. Despite this heterogeneity, we are likely to find textualisations that 
are sometimes in agreement. Sometimes it is possible to make links – and it is in this 
process that we most seek commensurability rather than in the cogitative capacities of 
actors. However, the extent to which translation is accepted and performed varies. 
Sometimes there are conflicts and controversy, and the translation is rejected (Callon, 
1991).  
 
Translation has four main stages which Callon (1986) described as the four moments. 
These four moments explain the process of translation or how ideas come to be 
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formed and accepted in the actor network. These four moments are problematisation, 
interessement; enrolment and mobilisation. In his study, Callon (1986) examines the 
progressive development of new social relationships through the construction of 
scientific knowledge that occurred in the 1970s. He followed actors through their 
construction and deconstruction of nature and society. Callon presents how scientists 
and fishermen representative were assembled in order to examine the possibility of 
increasing the production of scallops in St Brieuc Bay in France through controlling 
the cultivation of scallops. During their trip to Japan, three scientists discovered that 
scallops were intensively cultivated there, thus increasing the level of scallops; this 
was the result of their successful domestication.
8
 
 
Upon their return, the three researchers ‘problematised’ (first moment) the issue by 
suggesting that the Japanese technique could be replicated in France. The researchers 
determined a set of actors and defined their identities in such a way as to establish 
themselves as an ‘obligatory point of passage’9 in the network of relationships they 
were developing. This double movement, which rendered the researchers 
indispensable in the network of relationship, is what Callon referred to as 
‘problematisation’. In other words, problematisation is the process by which the main 
actors (also referred to as focal actors)
10
 identify the problems that need to be solved 
and determine the set of actors and define their identities; thus problematisation 
describes the process of alliances/associations. 
                                                 
8
 “The larvae are anchored to collectors immersed in the sea where they are sheltered from predators as 
 they grow. When the shellfish attain a large enough size, they are ‘sown’ along the ocean bed where 
they can safely develop for two or three years before being harvested” (Callon, 1986, p. 202). 
9
 Obligatory passage point is a situation that has to occur in order for all the actors to satisfy the interest 
that has been attributed them by the focal actor.  
10
 A focal actor is a spokesperson, i.e. someone who speaks for others who, or which, do not speak. 
There is no distinction between the spokesman of people and things; they all represent those that 
cannot talk (Latour, 1987). In other words, a spokesperson is a representative of other actants, who act 
as their mouthpiece. 
 76 
In Callon’s study, the three researchers (focal actors) showed that the interests of 
other actors (the fishermen of St Breiuc, scientific colleagues and the scallops) lay in  
acknowledging their research programme: “if the scallops want to survive (no matter 
what mechanisms explain this impulse), if their scientific colleagues hope to advance 
knowledge on this subject (whatever their motivations may be), if the fishermen hope 
to preserve their long term economic interests (whatever their reasons) then they 
must: 1) know the answer to question: how do scallops anchor? and 2) recognise that 
their alliance around this question can benefit each of them” (Callon, 1986 p. 206). 
Callon assigned the role of actor to scallops (non-human). 
 
Furthermore, problematisation “indicates the movements and detours that must be 
accepted as well as the alliances that must be forged” (Callon, 1986, p. 206). The 
actors in the network are tied together and none can attain what they want by 
themselves; thus, one actor may accept a particular problem from the other actor, 
other than that the network will be dissolved, leading to none of the actors achieving 
their goals.  
 
The second process of translation is “interessement”, described by Callon as the 
group of actions by which an entity attempts to impose and stabilise the identity of the 
other actors it defines through its problematisation. Different devices are used to 
implement actions which bring actors into relationships with one another and also 
shield any possible competing relationships with other entities; thus social structures 
comprising both social and natural entities are shaped and consolidated. The 
fishermen, the scientific colleague and the scallop became looked up using the device 
of interessement. In Callon’s study, the researchers used physical towline immersed in 
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the St. Brieuc Bay water (this provides support for scallops’ larvae anchorage), that is 
the interessement of the scallops. The anchorage also confirmed the validity of the 
researchers’ problematisation. For the scientific colleagues and the representative(s) 
of the fishermen, meetings, debates and texts are the devices used.  
 
The third moment is enrolment, which is achieved when interessement is successful. 
Enrolment is described as: “The group of multilateral negotiations, trial of strength 
and tricks that accompany the interessement and enable them to succeed” (Callon, 
1986, p. 211). The fourth moment of translation is mobilisation which Lowe (2000) 
refers to as how the enrolling actors control the other actors enrolled to ensure that 
their representation of interests stays fixed. Here the notion of who represents and 
speaks in the name of whom was introduced. The mobilised scallops were represented 
by a few larvae that cooperate by successfully anchoring themselves. The scientific 
community was represented by three researchers who attended the conference and 
read the articles; the fishermen were represented by their professional delegates who 
supported and agreed to participate in the project. In all the cases, only a few actors 
were interested in the name of the masses they represented or claimed to represent. 
The three researchers displaced and transported the scallops into the conference room 
using a series of graphs and tables. This discussion committed an uncountable 
population of silent actors, the fishermen, the scallops and the research specialists, 
who were all represented by a few spokespersons. Thus, a diverse population was 
mobilised.  
 
Successful mobilisation results in actors speaking in the same voice that is the 
creation of a consensual network with limited margin for manoeuvre. However, this 
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consensus can be contested at any time: “Translation becomes treason (Callon, 1986, 
p. 219).” In Callon’s study, translation was betrayed (dissidence) as the scallops 
stopped anchoring, and one winter the fishermen (disregarding their spokesmen) 
invaded the protected areas and trawled the larval ground there by destroying the 
collectors. The betrayal by the scallops and the fishermen caused the three 
researchers’ strategy to wobble; is anchorage an obligatory passage point? The 
scientific colleague also became sceptic. Callon stresses that it is not only the state of 
belief that fluctuates with controversy, but also the identity and characteristics of the 
actors implicated change as well.  
 
Callon stresses that translation implies the continuity of displacement and 
transformation. However, “To translate is to express in one’s own language what 
others say and want, why they act in the way they do, and how they associate with 
each other: it is to establish oneself as a spokesman. At the end of the process, if it is 
successful, only voices speaking in unison will be heard (Callon, 1986, p. 223).” 
Callon also stresses that “Translation is a process before it is a result.” Translation is 
the mechanism through which the social and natural worlds gradually take form, and 
the result is a situation in which some entities control others.  
 
3.4.2 Network as a Product of Intermediaries and Actors 
 
According to Callon (1991), networks of relationships are built through 
intermediaries. Intermediaries are “Anything that passed between actors which define 
the relationship between them (Callon, 1991, p.134).” Callon (1991) identified four 
main types of intermediaries, which are, texts, human skills, technical artefacts and 
money. For instance, scientific text “May be seen as an object which makes 
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connections with other texts and literary inscriptions. The choice of journal, of 
language and of title - these are the methods by which the article seeks to define and 
build an interested audience. The list of the authors tells of collaboration and the 
relative importance of each contribution. Here then is the start of a network” (Callon, 
1991. p. 135). Callon explained further that the network is extended when the text is 
referenced or cited; the text is inserted into a new relationship with other new actors 
identified and brought together into a new work. Thus, within texts a population of 
human and non-human entities can be linked. Hence, action works through the 
circulation of intermediaries. Furthermore, intermediaries may also operate through 
complex associations, thereby creating mixture of intermediaries (hybrid or monsters) 
(Callon, 1991). 
 
However, Callon questions if action circulates through intermediaries; why then do 
we need the notion of an actor in the analysis, why not do with that of intermediaries. 
Callon presents the answer as it has to do with authorship, which is often inscribed in 
the intermediaries themselves. Thus, “An actor is an intermediary that puts other 
intermediaries into circulation (Callon, 1991, p. 141).” An actor is an author and 
“defined in this way an actor is an entity that takes the last generation of 
intermediaries and transforms (combines, mixes, concatenates, degrades, computes, 
anticipates) these to create the next generation (Callon, 1991, p. 141).” For instance, 
firms combine machine and human skills into products and consumers.  
 
Furthermore, Callon (1991) stresses that “All groups, actors and intermediaries 
described a network: they identify and define other groups, actors and intermediaries, 
together with relationship that bring these together… but the network of 
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intermediaries accepted by an actor after negotiation and transformation is in turn 
transformed by that actor. It is converted into a scenario, carrying the signature of its 
authors, looking for actors ready to play it roles (Callon, 1991, p.142).” However, 
Callon (1991) stresses that the distinction between an actor and an intermediary is 
purely a practical matter. 
 
As mentioned earlier, the concept of intermediaries is relevant for the analysis in this 
thesis. For example, text and money can be identified as the intermediaries that bring 
the reform actors into the relationship. Text in the form of economic reforms with 
public sector reforms as one of it key elements, together with the economic crisis that 
badly hit the Nigerian economy, brought various actors with different interest to form 
a network that comprises humans and nonhumans.  
 
3.5 ANT and Management Control Systems Research 
 
Various MCS scholars have drawn from ANT. This section reviews such studies; the 
relevance of ANT to the thesis has been discussed and a theoretical framework for the 
thesis has been proposed.  
 
3.5.1 Overview of MCS Studies that Draw from ANT 
 
ANT has been drawn on in MCS studies that seek to understand the nature of MCS 
change and practices. These studies seek to understand accounting technology in the 
context of networks of human and non-human actors (Baxter and Chua, 2003). The 
focus of ANT analysis in management accounting has been on the unpredictable 
interaction of the human and nonhuman in the construction of accounting facts 
(Alcouffe et al., 2008). The nonhuman actors, such as computers, operation manuals 
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and other documents significant in the construction of the MCS technology have all 
been studied in previous management accounting studies.  
 
The review of previous literature shows that the ANT approach has been employed in 
studying MCS change in both private and public sector organisations. For instance, 
Briers and Chua (2001) and Jones and Dugdale (2002) employed ANT to examine the 
diffusion and implementation of ABC. Similarly, Alcouffe et al. (2008) drew on ANT 
to examine the diffusion of the George Perrin Method (hereafter, GPM) and ABC in 
France.  
 
Briers and Chua (2001) in an ethnography study of an Australian manufacturing 
company, drew on ANT and boundary object concepts (Star and Griesemer, 1989) to 
examine how accounting change occurred, how the change was enacted, what the 
preconditions and processes of change were, and how the success or failure of 
accounting change can be characterised. The author followed heterogeneous actor-
network of global and local actors/actants and other allies.  
 
Briers and Chua reported that change was the outcome of many diverse 
interconnections between local and cosmopolitan networks of actors. They also found 
that boundary objects aided in the mediation and temporary stability of the diverse 
actor-worlds. Briers and Chua argue that the success or failure of accounting change 
is a fragile construction that turns on the strength of different ties tying jointly many 
heterogeneous elements, rather than that an accounting system that ‘fits’ the strategic 
imperative of dominant stakeholders succeeds.  
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Similarly, Alcouffe et al. (2008), drawing from ANT, examined the diffusion of two 
MCS innovations -the GPM and ABC in France. The authors viewed the diffusion as 
a process of actor-network building and translation, drawing from Callon’s four 
moments of translation. They reported that accounting change was not linear or 
foreseeable, as argued by Baxter and Chua (2003); rather they found that change was 
a drift of practice (Quattrone and Hopper, 2001).  
 
The above studies depict MCS change as non linear. MCS change is the outcome of a 
relationship between various human and non-human actors. Various actors - both 
human and non-human - need to be enrolled and mobilised before change is achieved. 
In addition, what constitutes a successful or failed implementation is frail. Different 
actors may have different views regarding the success of an MCS system. 
 
In public sector reforms studies, Preston et al. (1992) employ ANT in examining the 
introduction of management budgeting in the British National Health Service 
(hereafter, NHS). Similarly, Chua (1995) and Lowe (2000) employed ANT to study 
the introduction of the casemix cost accounting system in Australia and New Zealand. 
Preston et al. (1992) examined the introduction of a budgeting system drawing on 
ANT in a study of the production of a new budgeting system in the NHS; the authors 
examine the linkage between government statements and the introduction of 
accounting technology in a particular area. Preston et al. reported that MCS were not 
well-defined technologies that are designed and implemented (or face resistance). 
Rather MCS are fabricated and put together in a changing and fragile manner. 
Furthermore, emerging MCS were not “fixed technologies with a well-defined 
purpose, which reflects the pattern of responsibility but changing in constructions” 
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(Preston et al. 1992, p.561). The MCS initiatives emerged through the process of 
design and implementation.  
 
Similarly, Chua (1995) used an ethnography study of three hospitals in Australia to 
examine the introduction and development of a casemix accounting and costing 
system, drawing on ANT. She studied how the various reforms in the Australian 
public sector translated into the introduction of a new costing system in hospitals, and 
how four major groups of actors, comprising academics, hospital personnel, State 
Department Officials and commonwealth personnel, all with diverse interest, formed 
a network to support the new system. She reported that accounting transformed the 
existing health organisations’ representation and their activities, and that accounting 
change emerged following uncertain faith promoted by expert-generated inscriptions 
and rhetorical strategies, which were able to tie together shifting interests in an actor-
network. 
 
Furthermore, Lowe (2000) conducted a case in a large hospital in New Zealand 
drawing from ANT to examine the mobilisation of a casemix cost system and related 
information systems. The author examined the problems, the choice of accounting 
techniques and their implementation. Lowe reported that accounting techniques 
together with other devices were central to the process through which change was 
made in the hospital. Allies were enrolled into the change process by being exposed to 
accounting inscriptions, which were used in representing the cost and profit reality of 
their division and that of the entire organisation.  
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3.5.2 Relevance of ANT to the Study 
 
The objective of this study is to examine how public sector reform networks were 
formed in Nigeria and how this impacts on the role of MCS in NSC. The studies 
reviewed above variously demonstrated the power of ANT to explain the role of 
accounting systems as technologies of change. At the same time these ANT studies 
have drawn our attention to the fact that accounting systems are not stable but are 
socially constructed through the activities of the actor networks.  
 
The thesis will draw on ANT to examine how MCS technologies are constructed in 
the case organisation as part of the public sector reforms. ANT will for example 
enable us to uncover how accounting technologies were introduced as part of the 
public sector reforms in order to present a new reality of private sector mode of 
governance. ANT analysis is also useful in this thesis because of its power to explain 
how the diffusion or the construction of the accounting innovations in the case 
organisation is the result of the interaction of various humans and non-humans actors 
both with diverse interests. These actors need to be enrolled into the networks in order 
for the diffusion of the accounting innovation to be successful.  
 
Overall, this study aims to understand reforms in NSC, and how MCS technologies 
are shaped and reshaped in the process. This is similar to ANT’s central concern 
which is an understanding and theorisation of the role of technology and technological 
objects within society (Lowe, 2001). Thus, ANT can be beneficial in understanding 
the reform processes and MCS technology in NSC. 
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3.5.3 The Proposed Thesis Framework 
 
This section develops the framework based on ANT that will guide the researcher in 
the analysis and the interpretation of the public sector reform process and the role of 
MCS in NSC. ANT provides a rich analytical framework for understanding the 
construction of network of aligned interest (Mahring et al., 2004). In ANT, MCS 
technologies are products of the networks of human and non-human actors. In order to 
understand MCS, we need to study how these networks are built and how MCS are 
created (Wickramasinghe and Alawattage, 2007). ANT approach is employed in this 
study in order to bring together “human and non human, social and technical factors 
in the same analytical view” (Hassard et al., 1999, p.388) in understanding the reform 
process in NSC. Figure 3.1 presents the proposed theoretical framework for the study.  
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Moments of Translation    Intermediaries 
 
 
 
 
Problematisation   Reform network (human/non-human actors) 
 
 
 
 
Interessement 
     Global actors                   Local actors 
 
 
 
 
Enrolment  
 
 
      MCS/other technologies 
 
Mobilisation 
 
 
Figure 3.1: Proposed Theoretical Framework 
 
In Figure 3.1 above, it is argued that the public sector reform could be construed as a 
heterogeneous network of both human and nonhuman actors. These actors can further 
be subdivided into global, national and local. According to Wickramasinghe and 
Alawattage (2007), to understand how networks are built, we may be guided by 
global and local dichotomy. This categorisation was also adopted by Briers and Chua 
(2001). Briers and Chua described global actors as those who are rich in concepts, 
competence and connections; they also possess boundary objects which have certain 
specialities and abilities. In the construction of MCS, local actors follow the global 
actors through intermediaries. However, if the local actors are more powerful, the 
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influence of the global actors might be minimised (Wickramasinghe and Alawattage, 
2007).  
 
The global actors would include the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, 
and consultants. The local actors would include national actors (the Nigerian 
government and the Nigerian general public) and the local actors (NSC top 
management, senior, middle and junior staff). In additional there are MCS 
(accounting technology such as strategic planning, budgeting, performance 
management, Total Quality Management, SUN accounts) and other technologies 
(computers, electricity, and expertise) that form the network relationship.  
 
Though, Latour developed the concepts of ANT around science and technology, the 
terminology - science and technology can be broadly extended to include other 
systems, such as MCS (Jones and Dugdale, 2002; Wickramasinghe and Alawattage, 
2007). Preston et al. (1992, p. 563) conceptualises MCS as a technology as:  
Technology can be an artefact (a budget document), the processes or uses of 
the technology (e.g. producing and making use of a budget) and the knowledge 
of people in designing or operating the technology (e.g. the “know how” that 
specifies the relationship between predicted costs and specific activities). 
 
Conceptualising accounting as technologies, Chua (1995, p. 115) argues that: 
The making of “new” accounting numbers and the battle to secure their 
legitimacy may be seen as being similar in important respects to a scientific 
controversy. Like this controversies, the birth of an accounting may change the 
map of organisational reality, challenge existing work traditions, and unfold 
battle-like, with opposing supporters and detractors who are intent upon 
vanquishing each other.  
 
The framework recognises that the creation of the network which is a dynamic 
process is also shaped by the process of translation. Thus, the way the public sector 
reform network was created and continues to evolve is as a result of the moments of 
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problematisation, interresement, enrolment and mobilisation. This framework is 
drawn on later in the thesis to explain the reform process and the role of MCS in NSC.  
 
3.6 Summary of the Chapter 
 
This chapter has discussed ANT as a theoretical framework for this research. A 
theoretical framework is important for each study as it helps the researcher makes 
sense of the results of the study. ANT has been proposed as the main theoretical 
framework for this study.  
 
ANT developed by Latour and Callon attempts to bring human and non-human, social 
and technical factors together in the same analytical view (Vanderbenghe, 2006). 
ANT therefore rejects any sundering of human and non-human, social and technical 
elements” (Hassard et al., 1999, p. 388). It has also been argued in the chapter that 
ANT rejects any predetermination. The dualism between social and natural, an agent 
and structure, human and non-human and other forms of distinction is thus rejected by 
ANT. The creation of an actor-network is described by the process of translation, 
which can be divided into four stages - problematisation, interessement, enrolment 
and mobilisation (Callon, 1986). However, translation is not a secured process; it is 
susceptible to failure (Law, 2007) hence reiterating the dynamic nature of networks.  
 
Analytically, the ANT framework emphasises that the researcher investigates the 
process through which socio-technical networks are produced (Law, 1999; Hassard et 
al., 1999). Calas and Smircich (1999, p. 663) note that “The actor and the network are 
not things out there to be seen or apprehended by the researcher; rather actor-network 
is in itself a conceptual framework, a way of understanding social and technical 
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processes.” The emphasis is on neither technology nor society, but rather on actors 
and their attempts to secure their interest through formation, configuration, 
maintenance and strengthening alliance or network (Callon, 1986; Callon 1991). 
 
MCS are viewed in the ANT approach as technologies. MCS scholars have examined 
the introduction and implementation of such technology in both private and public 
sectors (Preston et al., 1992; Chua, 1995; Briers and Chua, 2001; Alcouffe et al., 
2008); this study presents the construction of MCS reality in a network of various 
human and non-human actors. These technologies are diffused in organisations 
because they translate the changing interest of diverse groups of actors that are 
looking to maintain their interest and position in the organisations and society 
(Alcouffe et al., 2008). The actors apply MCS technology to produce ‘inscriptions’ 
(figures and numbers) that become fact, and manipulate them to support their interests 
(Alcouffe et al., 2008). 
 
Having introduced the theoretical framework informing the study, the next chapter of 
the thesis presents the Nigerian environment, the context of the study.  
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4 CHAPTER FOUR: THE NIGERIAN ENVIRONMENT 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
The previous chapter presented the theoretical framework adopted for the thesis. This 
chapter provides an analysis of the Nigerian environment. Understanding the study 
context is necessary in order to elaborate on the important factors that instigated the 
developments and reforms of the public sector in Nigeria and changes in management 
control systems (hereafter, MCS) in the Nigeria State Company (hereafter, NSC), the 
case study of this thesis. In Actor Network Theory, context is considered as a 
constituent element of innovation rather than a source of explanation; it is inseparable 
from localised management action and interaction within the actor-networks, hence 
both have to be analysed simultaneously (Alcouffe et al., 2008). The economic, 
political and social system play a vital role in the creation and reforms of the public 
sector in Nigeria, and this chapter provides an overview of these systems in Nigeria.  
 
The chapter is divided into five sections, after the introduction. The subsequent 
section analyses the Nigerian social and political context. The Nigerian economy pre- 
and post-independence and the economic crisis that hit Nigeria and reform attempt 
were elaborated in the next part. Section four discusses the Nigerian public sector and 
its reforms, and the final section summarises the chapter. 
 
4.2 Nigerian Social and Political Context Pre-and Post-Independence 
 
The following section aims to discuss the Nigerian social and political environments 
in order to understand their influence on public sector reforms in Nigeria, and, more 
specifically, changes in MCS in the NSC.  
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4.2.1 An Overview of the Nigerian Society 
 
Nigeria is a heterogeneous society made up of various cultures and religions. The 
country is located in West Africa, with a total land area 923,768 square kilometres, 
which is more than four times the size of Britain (Burns, 1963). Nigeria’s land area is 
910,768 square kilometres and water area is 13,000 square kilometres.
11
 The country 
lies between longitudes 30 and 40 and latitudes 40 and 140, and it shares land borders 
to the West with the Republic of Benin, to the North with the Republic of Niger and 
Chad and to the East with the Republic of Cameroon and its coast line in the South 
with the Gulf of Guinea part of the Atlantic Ocean
12
 (see appendix 4.1 for the map of 
Nigeria).  
 
Nigeria has the highest population in Africa, with an estimated population of 148 
million. It is ranked eighth in the lists of countries with the highest population in the 
world.
13
 The population is made up of more than 250 ethnic groups
14
, who speak 
about 500 different indigenous languages.
15
 Among the ethnic groups, the most 
populous and politically influential are the Hausa-Fulani which represents 29 percent 
of the country’s population, the Igbo with 21 percent and the Yoruba 18 percent 
population.
16
 Other relatively smaller groups are the Ijaw, with a population of 10 
percent, Kanuri with 4 percent, Ibibio with 3.5 percent, and Tiv with 2.5 percent 
population.
17
 However, despite their ethnic diversity, the Nigerian people share a 
                                                 
11
 https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ni.html#Geo 
12
 http://nigeria.gov.ng/NR/exeres/05758900-C8A9-4055-87C1-9A6766C59879.htm 
13
 http://www.census.gov/cgi-bin/broker 
14
 https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ni.html 
15
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/AFRICAEXT/NIGERIAEXTN/0,,m
enuPK:368906~pagePK:141132~piPK:141107~theSitePK:368896,00.html 
16
 https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ni.html 
17
 https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ni.html 
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common custom when it comes to the demand to show respect for elders, loyalty to 
family, village and tribe (Okike, 1994).  
 
The official language in Nigeria is English. However, Hausa, Igbo and Yoruba are the 
most widely spoken languages in the country. Islam is the major religion in Nigeria, 
practised by about 50 percent of the population, followed by Christianity by 40 
percent and indigenous belief by about 10 percent of the population.
18
 According to a 
survey of people’s religious beliefs conducted in ten countries by the BBC in 2004, 
Nigeria was found to be the most religious nation in the world.
19
 
 
Nigeria has witnessed various social upheavals. In the years 1967-1970, a civil war 
was fought between Nigeria and a region called Biafra which broke from away from 
the country. Furthermore, there are religious tensions and crises between the Muslims 
and the Christians (see Mu'azzam and Ibrahim, 2000). There are also issues on 
communal crises, such as Niger Delta, Ogoni land and others. Since this case study is 
about the NSC, the issue of the Niger Delta crisis is touched upon.  
 
The Niger Delta is a region in Nigeria endowed with crude oil and gas reserve. 
Majority of Nigeria's crude oil is explored and produced in this region. However, 
despite the massive oil deposits and contribution to the Nigerian economy, the region 
has not been developed. The communities in the region blame the government and the 
multinational oil companies operating in the region for their underdevelopment and 
demands for a higher share of revenue generated from their region. These 
communities organise violent protest and disrupt Nigeria’s oil production; in some 
                                                 
18
 https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ni.html 
19
 http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/programmes/wtwtgod/3490490.stm 
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cases their disruption affects the international oil price. The communities are also 
engaged in the taking over of oil platforms, installation and equipment, kidnapping 
(especially of foreign oil workers), confrontation with the state security forces and 
militarisation of the region (Ikelegbe, 2001). The Nigerian government recently 
offered an amnesty to the militants in the region, and negotiation is on-going at the 
time of writing this thesis.  
 
Another social problem affecting Nigeria is corruption (see for instance, Bakri, 2008). 
The Transparency International Corruption Perception Index ranked Nigeria as 
number 121 among 180
20
 countries and number 22 out of 47 sub-Sahara countries in 
2008.
21
  
 
In the next section, the Nigerian political system is examined.  
 
4.2.2 An Overview of the Nigerian Political Entity 
 
In order to understand fully the current Nigerian political environment, the origin of 
what we now know as Nigeria needs to be traced. The origin of present day Nigeria 
can be traced back to different States and Kingdoms that existed before colonial 
intrusion (Omolewa, 1986; Olowo-Okere, 1999). The origins of some of these states 
and kingdoms
22
 date back to 1000 AD, have different history, culture, tribes, politics, 
religion, government and institutions, and are at various levels of economic and social 
development (Omolewa, 1986; Falola et al., 1989, 1991).  
 
                                                 
20
 http://chapterzone.transparency.org/news_room/in_focus/2008/cpi2008/cpi_2008_table 
ww.transparency.org/news_room/in_focus/2008/cpi2008/cpi_2008_table 
21
.http://chapterzone.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/2008/regional_highlights_fa
ctsheets 
22
 For history of the various States and Kingdoms see (Falola et al., 1989; 1991; Omolewa, 1986). 
 94 
Subsequent to the treaty of Berlin in 1885
23
, the territory of what is now known as 
Nigeria was allocated to Britain (Onuh, 1983; Omolewa, 1986). By 1899, the British 
authorities had acquired control of the territory by entering into treaties with the 
colonies chiefs and kings and in some cases using superior military forces and 
political manoeuvre (Albert, 1998; Kukah, 1999). By 1900, the British authorities had 
acquired political control over the States and Kingdoms of the territory (Babatope, 
1977). The British authorities administered the territory as three separate but related 
colonies, namely the Protectorate of the Northern Nigeria, the Protectorate of the 
Southern Nigeria and the Lagos Colony.  
 
The Lagos colony and the protectorate of the Southern Nigeria were amalgamated in 
1906 and became the colony and protectorate of Southern Nigeria (Tamuno, 1998). 
Nigeria come into being in 1914 when the British authorities amalgamated the Colony 
and Protectorate of Southern Nigeria with the Protectorate of Northern Nigeria 
(Omolewa, 1986; Tamuno, 1998; FCO, 2008). Several scholars have argued that the 
amalgamation was done not with the intention to unify the territory but for colonial 
authority administrative purposes (Omolewa, 1986; Olaitan, 1995; Osadolor, 1998; 
Tamuno, 1998; Irukwo, 2005). Olaitan (1995; p. 127) described the Nigerian entity 
as: “…a state lacking in natural legitimating ideals because it was not desired by the 
people internally, since it was an external imposition.” This imposition brings 
together heterogeneous societies that are quite different from each other and lack 
common goals.  
 
                                                 
23
 There was a dispute between the European countries regarding ownership of territories in Africa, to 
resolve the dispute they held a conference in Berlin in 1885. The conference resulted in Africa’s 
territories being partitioned between the countries.  
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Colonial authority imposition continued even during the search for independence. The 
aspiration for Nigeria’s independence from British authorities began after the First 
World War (Omolewa, 1986). However, nothing was achieved until 1947, after the 
Second World War, when a new constitution was introduced by Governor 
Richardson; this constitution established three regions in Nigeria, namely the North, 
East and West which in effect represent the major ethnic groups (Albert, 1998; 
Irukwo, 2005). The colonial authority claims that one of the objectives of the 
constitution was to unify Nigeria; however, scholars blame the constitution for the 
regionalism and tribalism found in Nigeria’s political affairs (Ezera, 1960; Wright, 
1986; Albert, 1998; Irukwo, 2005). Wright (1986) noted that by the 1950s the colonial 
authorities had succeeded in dividing the major ethnic groups, and that was reinforced 
by providing each region with a separate government representative system. It can be 
argued that, up to the present day, the loyalty of most Nigerians lay with their region 
first, followed by the nation. A second constitution was introduced in 1954 in which 
fully-fledged regional governments were created, and federal elections were held in 
1959 (FCO, 2008) (see Ezera, 1960) for a detailed analysis of the Nigerian pre-
independence constitution).  
 
Nigeria gained its independence from Britain on 1 October 1960. The independent 
Nigeria inherited a Westminster system type of democracy and many other rules and 
regulations left by the colonial authorities (Okike, 1994). The Westminster system 
inherited was described by Lewis (2006, p 89) thus: it “…suffered from institutional 
design that encouraged ethnic segmentation and invidious regional competition for 
power.” The governing structure consisted of a governor-general as the head of 
government and representing the Queen of England and a Prime Minister as the 
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effective head of government; there were also regional governors responsible for the 
regional governments and the regional premiers who were effective leaders of the 
state government (Ojo, 1998). Nigeria became a republic in 1963.  
 
On 15 January 1966, the first republic comes to an end following a bloody military 
coup that resulted in the assassination of some top government officials. The Prime 
Minister, Federal Minister, Northern and Western region Premiers and top northern 
army officers were assassinated, among others (Graf, 1988). This coup marked an era 
of military rule in Nigeria; the country was ruled by a military government for about 
twenty-nine years of its forty-nine years of independence, with the military justifying 
their takeover of power as a means of correcting the political system and restoring 
social and economic stability (see Collins et al., 1975; Okoye, 1991; Olukoshi and 
Abdulraheem, 1985).  
 
The first coup suffered a setback as it was a successful only in the northern region. 
The coup recorded limited success in the other regions. However, the acting 
President
24
 at that time, in a public announcement, voluntarily handed over power to 
the military. Major-General Johnson Aguiyi-Ironsi became the first Head of the 
National Military Government on 16 January 1966.  
 
Growing apprehension about the coup developed among Hausa-Fulani and Yoruba. 
The coup was viewed as a tribal conspiracy, as most of the high profile people killed 
were northerners (Kissa, 2008). Furthermore, the failure of Aguiyi-Ironsi to prosecute 
                                                 
24
 The president was at the time out of the country.  
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the coup plotters
25
 and include any none Igbo in his cycle, together with the 
promulgation of a unitary decree which abolished the Nigeria federal structure to a 
unitary structure compounded this concern (Graf, 1988). These problems lead to the 
overthrow of the Ironsi government six months after it was formed. Lieutenant-
Colonel Yakubu Gowon became the new Head of State and the Supreme Commander 
of the Armed forces. The Nigerian political crises continued, and on 30 May 1967 the 
eastern region declared itself an independent Republic of Biafra; this lead to a civil 
war which lasted for more than two years, from July 1967 to January 1970, when the 
Biafran army surrendered to the Nigerian army. It is estimated that more than a 
million people lost their lives during the war (Lewis, 2006).  
 
On July 29 1975, the Gowon administration was overthrown; the administration was 
accused of indecision and corruption. Brigadier Murtala Ramat Mohammed became 
the new head of state. The Mohammed administration established a unitary state. 
Mohammed was assassinated on 13 February 1976 in a failed coup, and General 
Olusegun Obasanjo became the next Head of State and. Obasanjo remained in power 
for more than three years. A new constitution for the second republic was drafted and 
the Westminster system of government was changed to the United States of America 
presidential system. On 1 October 1979, Obasanjo handed over power to the elected 
President Alhaji Shehu Shagari. Severe economic crises hit Nigeria during Shagari’s 
administration; these crises are discussed in the next section.  
The government of Shagari was overthrown on 31 December 1983, and General 
Mohammadu Buhari became the Head of State. The economic crisis continued; the 
Buhari government was overthrown and on 27 August 1985 General Ibrahim 
                                                 
25
 The coup plotters were mainly Igbos  
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Babangida became the next Head of State. Babangida is seen by many Nigerians as 
the main advocator of the International Monetary Funds (hereafter, IMF) and the 
World Bank Structural Adjustment Policies (hereafter, SAP). SAP adoption is 
examined in the next section. Apart from the economic crisis, the Babangida 
administration also faced political crises when he annulled the 12 June 1993 election 
(third republic), forcing him to step down on 27 August 1993; he installed an interim 
national government. The interim government was headed by Chief Ernest Shonekan.  
 
The interim government was replaced by General Abacha on 17 November 1993. 
Abacha remained in power for about five years until his sudden death on 8 November 
1998; consequent to his death, the Nigerian top military declared General 
Abdulsalami Abubakar as the next head of state on 9 November 1998. Abubakar 
handed over power to the elected government of Retired General Obasanjo on 29 May 
1999. Obasanjo served two terms in office,
26
 and on 29 May 2007 handed over power 
to Alhaji Umaru Musa Yar’adua. Yar’adua is the present president of Nigeria. Table 
4.1 presents a summary of the different government that ruled Nigeria from 
independence to date.  
                                                 
26
 Obasanjo was elected again at the expiry of his first term. 
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Table 4.1: Summary of the different governments that ruled Nigeria from 
independence to date 
 
s/n Period Type of government/Head 
of State 
Reason for cessation 
1. 1960-1963 
 
Civilian/Governor General 
Mr. Nnamdi Azikwe 
Change to a republic 
Prime Minister Alhaji 
Abubakar Tafawa Balewa 
1963-1966 Civilian/First Republic  
Ceremonial President 
Mr. Nnamdi Azikwe 
Unsuccessful bloody coup 
which forced the civilians to 
hand over power to the 
military Prime minister Alhaji 
Abubakar Tafawa Balewa 
2. Jan 1966-Jul 
1966 
Military/Major General 
Aguiyi Ironsi 
Killed in a successful coup 
3. 1966-1975 Military/General Yakubu 
Gowon 
Coup 
4. 1975-1976 Military/General Murtala 
Mohammed 
Assassinated in an abortive 
coup 
5. 1976-1979 Military/General Olusegun 
Obasanjo 
Handed over power to a 
democratic elected 
government. 
6. 1979-1983  Civilian/ Second republic/ 
Alhaji Shehu Shagari 
Overthrown by military.  
7. 1983-1985 Military/Major General 
Mohammed Buhari 
Coup 
 
8. 1985-1993 Military/ aborted third 
republic/ General Ibrahim 
Babangida 
Step down  
 
9. Aug 1993-Nov 
1993 
Interim government/Chief 
Ernest Shonekan 
Resignation 
 
10. 1993-1998 Military/General Sani 
Abacha 
Death in office 
 
11. 1998-1999 Military/General 
Abdulsalami Abubakar 
 
Hand over power to 
democratic elected 
government. 
12. 1999-2007 Civilian/Rtd General 
Olusegun Obasanjo 
Democratic transition 
 
13. 2007-date 
 
Civilian/ Fourth Republic/ 
Alhaji Umaru Musa 
Yar’adua 
In power 
 
The above table presents the various governments that have governed Nigeria from 
independence to the present day. Each of the administrations had a different style of 
governance and operated under different economic and political issues. Scholars such 
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as Lewis (1994) argued that the predicament of the Nigeria’s economy is essentially 
political in nature. We will come back to the various administrations when illustrating 
the nature of the Nigerian economy and reforms in the subsequent section and 
chapters six and eight of the thesis when presenting reforms in the NSC and the 
analysis and discussion of the thesis. 
 
4.3 An overview of the Nigeria’s Economy 
 
In order to understand the factors that led to the Nigerian economic reforms in general 
and public sector reforms in particular (the concern of this study), the history of the 
Nigerian economy prior to independence to date is examined. At present, Nigeria is 
the second largest economy in sub-Saharan Africa.
27
 Nigeria is an oil producing 
country. It produces about 2.1 million barrel of crude oil per day and has a proven oil 
reserve of 37.20 billion barrels. Nigeria’s natural gas reserve stands at 5.249 billion 
cu. m.
28
 
 
The Nigerian economy has experienced various transformations. For the purpose of 
this analysis, the Nigerian economic development is divided into four periods, taking 
in the major happenings in the country, namely the pre-independence and early 
independence period (1914-1970), the oil boom period to crisis (1971-1980), the 
economic reforms period (1981-1993) and the post reform period and the debt relief 
period to the present day (1994-present day).  
 
                                                 
27
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/AFRICAEXT/NIGERIAEXTN/0,,m
enuPK:368906~pagePK:141132~piPK:141107~theSitePK:368896,00.html 
28
 http://www.opec.org/aboutus/Member%20Countries/Nigeria.htm 
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4.3.1 The Nigerian Economy Prior and Early Independence (1914-1970) 
 
During the period 1914 to 1970, the Nigerian economy changed from being a poor 
agrarian economy to a cash crop economy and to an oil economy. Prior to 
colonialism, most of the people in the Nigerian territory were engaged in peasant 
farming, with surplus accumulating to the ruling class and a smaller scale to merchant 
capital (Freund, 1978; Olowo-Okere, 1999). Farming was transformed by the colonial 
authorities from subsistence to cash crops (Wright, 1986). The Nigerian economy 
grew moderately during the early independence period (Lewis, 2006): the per capita 
rose from $110 in 1962 to $780 in 1980.
29
 At the time of independence, Nigeria was 
an agricultural economy, deriving its revenues from cash crops (Iyoha, 2004; 
Helleiner, 1966, Onuh, 1983). However, in the 1970s, oil became the main source of 
revenue (see table 4.2 below). Oil was discovered in commercial quantities in 1956
30
 
by Shell-BP in Oloibiri in the Niger Delta area, and production began in 1957 (Uche, 
1992; Ihonvbere, 1998; Bezanis et al., 2000). The success of Shell, together with 
Nigeria’s independence from Britain, attracted the interest of other international oil 
companies which between 1960-1965 acquired oil prospecting and mining 
concessions (Frynas et al., 2000). The Nigerian dependence on oil leads to changes in 
the economy whenever the global oil market alters (Obi, 1997; Lewis, 2006).  
 
                                                 
29
 World Development Indicators; see, 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/DATASTATISTICS/0,,contentMDK:20535285~men
uPK:1192694~pagePK:64133150~piPK:64133175~theSitePK:239419,00.html 
30
 Oil prospecting was begun in 1908 by a German company, the Nigerian Bitumen Company, which 
obtained a licence to search for oil in Okitipupa area, now part of Ondo State (Uche, 1992). The 
company explored the entire coast of the region for Bitumen; however, the operation of the company 
ceased after the First World War (Uche, 1992; Ihonvbere, 1998). In 1937, Shell D’Arcy began 
exploration; the colonial authorities granted Shell D’Arcy an exclusive licence to explore the entire 
Nigerian territory. Shell D’Arcy operated under the Mineral Ordinance no 17 of 1914 and its 
amendments (Uche, 1992; Frynas et al., 2000), but the company effort was halted by the Second World 
War. The Shell D’Arcy resumed prospecting in 1946 under the name of Shell-BP Petroleum Company 
of Nigeria Limited, a company of equal partnership between the Royal Dutch Shell Group of 
Companies and the British Petroleum Group (Onuh, 1983; Ihonvbere, 1998; Bezanis et al., 2000).  
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Table 4.2: Presents a summary of Nigerian oil revenue in Naira (ngn)
31
 
Year Revenue received from 
Oil in Naira 
1958/59 0.2 
1959/60 3.4 
1960/61 2.4 
1961/62 17.0 
1962/63 17.0 
1963/64 10.0 
1964/65 16.0 
1965/66 29.2 
1966/67 45.0 
1967/68 41.8 
1968/69 29.6 
1969/70 75.4 
1970 176.4 
1971 603.0 
1972 735.0 
1973 1,368.6 
1974 4,104.0 
1975 4,568.0 
1976 4,834.0 
1977 6,299.2 
1978 5,183.7 
1979 10,433.1 
1980 13,123.4 
Source: Ihonvbere (1998, p. 14) 
 
The above table shows that the Nigerian oil revenue has increased significantly, 
especially during the early 1970s. This increase in the oil revenue led to expansion in 
other sectors of the economy. It promoted a centralised state-dominated economy in 
which allocation of oil revenue became the main source of growth (Lewis, 1999). 
This will be discussed in the next section. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
31
 Naira is the Nigerian currency and in the 1970s was exchanging almost at par to the US dollar. The 
exchange rate today stands at around ngn146 to a dollar. 
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4.3.2 Oil Boom Period (1971-1980) 
 
Throughout the world, the 1970s witnessed increases in oil prices. Nigeria being a 
producer country benefited tremendously with the increases in the prices (Olukoshi, 
1993a). The Nigerian oil revenue increased massively during those years, as presented 
in table 5.2 above. The Nigerian reserve in 1974 was so high that it was sufficient to 
cover the country’s twenty-four months of imports (Freund, 1978). As the revenue 
from oil increased, Nigeria became more dependent on it, and this subsequently 
affected other sectors of the economy: social class, state and society (Ihonvbere, 1998; 
Olaitan, 1995). For instance, the Nigerian government was engaging in various 
expansions projects, such as the rapid expansion in manufacturing activities through 
massive investment and protectionism measures, state-led industrialisation, increased 
external borrowing, increase in civil service salaries, increase in public spending on 
infrastructure development and social programmes (Lewis, 2006; Olukoshi, 1995, 
Abulraheem et al, 1986; Adedipe, 2004; Bangura and Beckman, 1993).  
 
Farmers abandoned their farms and relocated to the urban areas for higher paid jobs 
offered by construction and commerce; this led to the neglect of cash crop farming, 
and it subsequently collapsed (Adedipe, 2004; Olaitan, 1995; Iyoha, 2004). The 
Nigerian economy became dependent on food imports, capital, raw materials, and 
intermediary goods (Freund, 1978; Olukoshi, 1993). Freund (1978, p. 94) noted the 
following: 
The most dramatic feature of the oil boom was the growth in imports on such a 
scale as to transform the population of Nigeria into what appeared to be a huge 
host of cargo cult worshippers. By the spring of 1978, Lagos port was doing 
97% of its business in imports and only 3% in exports while airports actually 
received even more goods than the seaports. 
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Apart from the increase in consumption of imported goods, oil revenue became a 
significant factor in the Nigerian development plan.
32
 The third and fourth 
development plans were ambiguous and drawn significantly against oil revenue 
(Onuh, 1983; Uche, 1992; Obadan and Edo, 2004). The fluctuations of oil prices led 
to the government sourcing funds from external sources at higher charges and interest 
rates to fund the plan (Onuh, 1983; Umoren, 2001), thus leading to accumulation in 
external debt stock. Uche (1992) reported a positive correlation between the Nigeria’s 
annual budget and expected revenue from oil: from a budget of ngn1.41 billion in 
1973 to ngn38.5 billion in 1991. 
 
Nigerian oil revenue was not managed properly; the governments at that time spent 
money carelessly and miss-apportion funds (Forrest, 1995). Scholars argued that the 
Nigerian economy was not ready for such massive capital influx, and the people 
managing the revenue lacked the ability and experience to plan, in an orderly and 
judicious way, the use of such revenue (Nwabazor, 2005; Onuh, 1983; Adedipe, 
2004). It was reported that Nigerian president Gowon was quoted saying that “money 
was not Nigeria’s problem in 1971 but how to spend it” (Nwabuzor, 2005, p. 124). 
Gowon was reported to have paid off the entire annual civil service salary cost of a 
Caribbean country he was visiting (Aluko, 2004). Furthermore, scholars such as 
Nwabuzor (2005), Lewis (1996), Freund (1978) and Forrest (1986) identified the 
massive oil revenue as a factor responsible for the growth of corruption in Nigeria.  
 
                                                 
32
 In its search for development, Nigeria embarked on a development plan. The first plan was drawn in 
1962 and was intended to last until 1968, with trust to industrialise the economy through import 
substitution (Adedipe, 2004). However, this plan was not achieved, and a second development plan 
was instigated after the civil war (Obadan and Edo, 2004). 
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4.3.3 The Economic Crisis Period and Reforms (1981-1993)  
 
The international oil price fell in 1980s following the world oil market glut leading to 
a plunge in Nigerian oil export income (Bangura and Beckman, 1993; Olukoshi, 
1993). The Nigerian government oil revenue fell from $25billion in 1980 to $5 billion 
in 1981 (Irukwo, 2005). The decline in the revenue affected the Nigerian 
government’s financial obligations; commitments such as salaries were frozen or not 
paid on time, while some states were unable to pay their salaries thus leading to some 
civil servants refusing to go to work and in some cases social services breakdown 
(Ihonvbere, 1998; Irukwu, 2005). 
 
Furthermore, as noted in the above section, Nigeria had embarked on massive 
expenditure and change in general consumption habits following the increase in oil 
earning. This, together with the import substitution industrialisation policy
33
 
introduced by the colonial authorities, which was further promoted by the independent 
government, accelerated the crisis (Olukoshi, 1993, 1993a). The industries stagnated 
as a result of the government not being able to meet foreign exchange demands, 
leading to a rise in unemployment and shortage of consumer goods, which was also 
compounded by the lack of government importation of goods; the real incomes of 
workers and peasants were undermined as the prices of basic commodities escalated, 
inflation soared and the average Nigerian living standard fell; social services were 
withdrawn and development of the infrastructure was abandoned (Olukoshi and 
Abdulraheem, 1985; Fadahunsi, 1993; Olukoshi, 1993a; Irukwu, 2005).  
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 This was a policy whereby initially agricultural surpluses were used to finance the imported inputs 
needed for the growth and expansion of manufacturing activities; this policy was adopted further by the 
independent government to promote growth and diversify the economy; and when oil revenue become 
the major source of revenue, the foreign exchange earned from it became the major source of financing 
the importation of inputs needed by the manufacturing sector. Thus the manufacturing sector 
sustainability depended on the government earning sufficient foreign exchange (Olukoshi, 1993a; 
Egbon, 2004).  
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Furthermore, the external borrowing during the oil boom became due, and was 
aggravated further by short-term burrowing to meet current commitments (Lewis, 
1996). The reserve was depleted in 1982, and the external debt rose from ngn 3.3 
billion in 1978 to ngn 14.7 billion in 1982 (Forrest, 1986). Nigeria found itself in a 
serious internal and external economic crisis in 1982, with high inflation, increased 
fiscal deficits, soaring unemployment, continual current account and balance of 
payment deficits, increasing external debt and payment arrears burden (Lewis, 1994; 
1996; Iyoha, 2004). 
 
4.3.3.1 The Earlier Attempt at Economic Reform 
 
In 1982, the Shagari administration introduced the Economic Stabilisation Act, with 
the aim of reducing public spending and restraining imports (Forrest, 1986; Yahaya, 
1993; Olukoshi, 1995; Iyoha, 2004). However, the measure did not restore normalcy 
in the economy (Obadan and Edo, 2004). Despite widespread opposition from socio-
political groups, the Shagari administration invited the IMF to study the economy and 
suggest solutions (Callaghy, 1990; Olukoshi, 1995). According to the IMF, the crisis 
was caused by the structural distortion as a result of overvalued exchange rates, 
massive public sector spending, overextension of unproductive and inefficient public 
enterprises, poor investment management, low productivity of workers and high wage 
structure, among other problems (Adesina, 1991, Olukoshi, 1995). The government 
also applied to the IMF for an Extended Fund Facility (EFF) loan of between ngn1.9 
and ngn2.4 billion (Bangura, 1987; Yahaya, 1993). A structural loan application of 
between $300 and $500 was also sent to the World Bank (Olukoshi, 1995). The IMF 
insisted that the Nigeria adopt a Structural Adjustment Programme (hereafter, SAP) 
before the loan could be granted (Olukoshi and Abdulraheem, 1985; Yahaya, 1993). 
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The main measures of the SAP were currency devaluation and exchange deregulation, 
trade liberalisation, deregulation of financial sector, lifting price control on goods and 
services, commercialisation and privatisation of public enterprises, cut in public 
expenditure and appropriate pricing policy (Jega, 2000; Umoren, 2001; Obadan and 
Edo, 2004; Iyoha, 2004). Given that this research is concerned with public sector 
reforms, the aspects of commercialisation and privatisation are discussed in more 
detail in the next section. 
 
The Shagari administration was reluctant to accept the IMF conditions, especially 
currency devaluation, liberalisation and removal of petroleum subsidy, thus leading to 
a state of deadlock with the IMF (Callaghy, 1990; Olukoshi, 1995). The 
administration was overthrown by a military coup in December, 1983. Buhari became 
the next head of state, and his administration continued negotiations with the IMF and 
implemented some of the IMF policies. However, the administration was not able to 
resolve the dispute with the IMF; it too rejected some of the IMF conditions, thus 
leading to another stalemate with the IMF and the external creditors, as they insisted 
on Nigeria reaching agreement with IMF before conducting any further negotiations 
(Callaghy; 1990; Yahaya, 1993). Nigeria’s credit lines were also withdrawn and the 
financial boycott that started during the Shagari’s administration intensified, thus 
leading to more shortages in supply in consumable goods, inputs for industries, 
massive cuts in public expenditure and retrenchments of workers (Yahaya, 1993; 
Bangura and Beckman, 1993). The Buhari regime was not able in a secure deal with 
the IMF; the administration was overthrown in August, 1985 and General Babangida 
became the new Head of State. 
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4.3.3.2 Structural Adjustment Programme Adoption 
 
SAP was adopted during the Babangida administration. The Babangida administration 
opened a public debate on the acceptance of IMF loan and its conditions, and the 
majority of Nigerians opted for the loan not to be taken (Abdulraheem et al., 1986; 
Bangura and Beckman, 1993; Jega, 1993; Yahaya, 1993; Olukoshi, 1993a). At the 
time of the debate, the Babangida government continued a discreet negotiation with 
the World Bank on an adjustment package for the country, and declared a 15-month 
period of national economic emergency, beginning from 1 October 1985 (Olukoshi 
and Abdulraheem, 1985). SAP was adopted in 1986 without drawing from the IMF 
loan, and was presented to the Nigerians as a home developed package, uniquely 
designed for Nigeria (Callaghy, 1990; Zayyad, 1990; Olukoshi, 1993; Olukoshi, 1995; 
Jega, 2000a).  
 
The claim that Nigerian SAP was developed by Nigerians was disputed by many 
scholars; this group of scholars argued that the Nigerian SAP was the same as any 
other SAP sanction to other developing countries by the IMF and World Bank, and 
was drafted in consultation with World Bank staff (Yahaya, 1993; Olukoshi, 1995; 
Adeyemo and Salami, 2008; Umoren, 2001). The adoption of SAP led to an 
agreement with the IMF in 1987, paving the way for negotiations with the external 
creditors and debt rescheduling (Callaghy, 1990). 
 
Nigerian SAP recorded limited success (Lewis, 1999; Obadan and Edo, 2004; Jega, 
2000). At the beginning of its implementation, a modest stabilisation was recorded 
(Lewis, 1999). The SAP, together with the rise of oil prices during the Gulf War, led 
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to economic growth of an average of 6.6 percent between 1988 to 1992 (Lewis, 
2006), but that was short lived. 
 
Overall, scholars such as Obadan and Edo (2004), Umoren (2001), Jega (2000) and 
Irukwo (2005) reported that the remedy expected from SAP did not materialise, as 
market orientation was not achieved; this caused the naira to continue to depreciate, 
and increases in the interest rate; inflation and unemployment rose; fiscal deficit 
increased and so did the external debt. The economic growth remained low and the 
general decline in living standard of an average Nigerian continued. SAP did not 
succeed in revitalising other sectors of the economy (Lewis, 1994) (see appendix 4.2 
for Nigerian economic indicators). 
 
Some scholars argued that the SAP policy complicated the Nigerian economic 
problems (Olukoshi, 1993a; 1993; Jega, 1993, 2000a; Fadahunsi, 1993; Mustapha, 
1993). Scholars such as Adesina (1991), Obi (1991) and Bangura and Beckman 
(1993) argued that the policy resulted in deindustrialisation. Umoren (2001) argued 
further that SAP resulted in a dark secrecy in policy, processes and resources 
management, and aided corruption instead of creating transparency, to the extent that 
even the World Bank called for its review. 
 
SAP was supposed to provide short-term measures that would last for two years (from 
June 1986 to June 1988). However, SAP lasted for more than seven years and was 
abandoned in 1994 (Umoren, 2001; Bello-Imam and Obadan, 2004; Obadan and Edo, 
2004). 
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4.3.4 The Post Crisis Period and the Debt Relief Period to Present (1994-date) 
 
The Nigerian economy from 1992 stagnated for a decade (Lewis, 2006). For instance, 
during the Abacha regime (1994-1998) little was done about economic reforms. 
However, external debt continued to be a problem on the Nigerian economy. Annual 
debt service accounted for $3.7 billion, and the Nigerian government paid between 
$1.5 and $2 billion per annum, with the rest being rescheduled (Soludu, 2003).  
 
As discussed in the previous section, Obasanjo was elected as democratic president in 
1999. The Obasanjo administration vigorously sought debt cancellations.
34
 However, 
the World Bank and IMF insisted on progress on reforms before offering any debt 
relief. The administration made a reform arrangement with the IMF. However, the 
reforms were abandoned as the government missed some key targets (Lewis, 2006). 
Following the re-election of Obasanjo in 2003, an economic reform team was set up, 
headed by finance minister, Dr, Nkonjo-Iweala, who prior to her appointment was an 
employee of the World Bank; she had risen to the position of vice president of the 
bank. According to the minister, the reform aim was poverty reduction and wealth 
creation through relying on the private sector to grow the economy and provide jobs; 
the public sector would provide an enabling environment, with the sub aims of the 
reforms to redefine the role and size of the government in the economy, reduce 
corruption and improve transparency and accountability, create infrastructure, 
improve basic services and seek debt reduction; pubic sector reform was one of the 
key features of the reforms (NSC Transformation documents; EIU, April 2005). 
These reforms opened ways for debt relief negotiations. 
 
                                                 
34
 See http://allafrica.com/stories/200105170545.html and 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/1345508.stm 
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In the year 2000, the increase in oil prices and the policy of pegging the Nigerian 
budget projection on oil price lower than the market price enabled the Nigerian 
government tremendously to build its external reserves (Okonjo-Iweala, 2006). In 
2005, Nigeria reached a debt relief agreement with Paris Club debtors, which should 
have eliminated about $18 billion worth of Nigeria's total debt.
35
 By 2007, Nigeria 
settled it debt with the Paris and London Club creditors.
36
 At the time of writing this 
thesis, not much is progressing in economic reforms.  
 
4.4 The Nigerian Public Sector  
4.4.1 Role/overview 
 
In developing countries, public enterprises account for a significant share of national 
output and investments (Adhikari and Kirkpatrick, 1990). This is the case in Nigeria. 
The development of Nigerian public enterprises began during the time of colonial rule 
(Ugorji, 1995). During the period, the responsibility for providing infrastructure such 
as railways, road, water, bridges, port facilities and electricity lay on the colonial 
authorities (Iheme, 1997). After Nigeria gained its independence from the colonialists, 
public enterprises were developed further to drive socio-economic development and 
guard the economy from foreign domination and exploitation (Umoren, 2001; 
Adeyemo and Salami, 2008; Adhikari and Kirkpatrick, 1990). As presented in section 
4.3.2, the Nigerian government developed more public enterprises during the oil 
boom era. Furthermore, the indigenisation
37
 policies of 1972 and 1977 strengthened 
the growth and the role of public enterprises in the Nigerian economy (Ugorji, 1995).  
 
                                                 
35
 http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/4637395.stm 
36
 Newswatch Tuesday, 26 May 2009 
37
 Indigenisation policies put limits on foreign ownership in many sectors of the Nigerian economy.  
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In 1988, the total number of public enterprises in Nigeria was put as one thousand five 
hundred (1500), with about six hundred (600) operating at federal level and about 
nine hundred (900) smaller ones operating at state and local government level (TCPC, 
1993; Anya, 2000). The government makes about 5,000 appointments to these 
enterprise boards and management, thus serving as an influential source of political 
patronage (Anya, 2000). Anya (2000, p. 1) described the Nigerian public sector as 
follows: 
These companies take a sizeable portion of the Federal Budget…Transfers to 
these enterprises ran into billions of naira.  These transfers were in the form of 
subsidised foreign exchange, import duty waivers, tax exemptions and/or 
write-off of arrears, unremitted revenues, loans and guarantees and 
grants/subventions.  These companies were also infested with many problems 
which became an avoidable drag on the economy such as - abuse of monopoly 
power, defective capital structure, heavy dependence on treasury funding, rigid 
bureaucratic structures and bottlenecks, mismanagement, corruption and 
nepotism. 
 
It was estimated by Nweke (2007)
38
 that the successive Nigerian administrations have 
invested about ngn13 trillion in these enterprises in the period from1978 to 1998. The 
combined employment of these enterprises was placed at 500, 000 and when 
compared with the estimated population of Nigeria (about 148 million), the 
percentage of public sector employment stood at only 0.004 percent. 
 
4.4.2 Public Sector Reforms 
 
Various attempts were made to reform the public enterprises in Nigeria. The most 
significant reforms were carried out during the oil crisis in the 1980s. In 1981, a 
presidential commission on public sector enterprises was appointed by the Shagari 
administration to study the operations of all public enterprises, with the aim of 
determining a new funding system, capital structures and incentive measures that 
                                                 
38
 Nweke was Nigeria’s Minister of Communication and Information at that time. 
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would enhance productivity and efficiency (Yahaya, 1993). The commission 
submitted its reports, which revealed that the enterprises were facing bureaucratic 
problems, had misuse their monopoly powers, had defective capital structures, 
together with problems of corruption, nepotism and mismanagement; there was also 
the problem of low returns, low profits, lack of cost effectiveness and attention to 
financial records (TCPC, 1993; The Presidential Commission on Parastatals, 1981). 
The commission recommended an increase in the role of the private sector in the 
public enterprises (The Presidential Commission on Parastatals, 1981). However, the 
recommendation of the commission was not implemented (TCPC, 1993). In 1984, the 
Buhari administration ordered a similar exercise and the study group confirmed the 
earlier finding; however, the recommendations were not fully implemented before the 
administration was overthrown (TCPC, 1993; The Commission Report, 1984).  
 
As analysed in the above section, SAP was adopted in 1986 with privatisation and 
commercialisation among its important components. Privatisation and 
commercialisation commenced in 1988 when the privatisation and commercialisation 
decree no 25 was promulgated (Anya, 2000, Asaolu, et al., 2005). The aims of the 
decree were as follows: 
 To restructure and rationalise the public sector in order to lessen the 
dominance of unproductive investments in that sector; 
 To re-orientate the enterprise for privatisation and commercialisation 
towards a new horizon of performance improvement, viability and overall 
efficiency; 
 To ensure positive returns in public sector investment in commercialisation 
enterprises; 
 To check the present absolute reliance of commercially oriented parastatals 
on the treasury for funding, and to encourage their approach to the 
Nigerian capital market; 
 To initiate the process of gradual cession to the private sector of such 
public enterprises; those by the nature of their operations and other social-
economic factors are best performed by the private sector;  
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 To create a favourable investment climate for both local and foreign 
investors; 
 To reduce the level of internal and external debts via the use of the debt 
conversion programme in the privatisation of certain enterprises; 
 To provide institutional arrangements and operational guidelines that 
would ensure that the gains of privatisation and commercialisation are 
sustained in the future (Decree No. 25 of 1988). 
 
The decree established the Technical Committee on Privatisation and 
Commercialisation (hereafter, TCPC) as the implementation agency with powers to 
supervise and monitor the programme (Commercialisation Decree no 25).  
 
Privatisation and commercialisation were defined by TCPC (1993, p, 13 as follows: 
“privatisation is the transfer of government owned shareholding in designated 
enterprises to private shareholders, comprising individuals and corporate bodies” and 
commercialisation as “the re-organisation of enterprises wholly or partially owned by 
the government, in which such commercialised enterprises shall operate as a profit-
making ventures and without subvention from the government.” 
 
The NSC - the case study for this research - was categorised for commercialisation. 
The TCPC finished the first phase of privatisation and commercialisation in 1993. 
Eighty-eight enterprises were privatised and twenty-five were commercialised 
(TCPC; 1993). The NSC - the case study for this thesis - was not commercialised. 
 
The federal government promulgated the Bureau of Public Enterprise (hereafter, BPE) 
act in 1993 and TCPC was transformed to BPE and was charged to monitor the 
enterprises privatised and plan for future privatisation. However, from 1994 to 1997, 
little was achieved in public sector reforms. The Abacha administration which ruled 
during that period considered contract leasing of public enterprises, but that was not 
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achieved. Odosola (2004) attributed the failure of public sector reforms during this 
period to the government’s lack of commitment to public enterprises reforms, 
prolonged political crises, and the lack of the technical and managerial skills needed 
for rejuvenating the public enterprises. 
 
Public sector reforms were revived during the regime of General Abdulsalami 
Abubakar in 1998, with a promulgation of public enterprises privatisation and 
commercialisations decree no 28. The election of Obasanjo as a civil president in the 
same year saw the strengthening of public sector reforms; the military decree was 
adopted and the National Council on Privatisation (hereafter, NCP) was established as 
the policy body responsible for setting guidelines and policies for the privatisation and 
commercialisation programmes. The Bureau of Public Enterprise was established as 
its secretariat, responsible for implementing the NCP guidelines and policies. Some 
NSC’s subsidiaries were among the enterprises categorised for privatisation during 
this period. In a rushed deal sealed within few hours before Obasanjo handed power 
to the newly elected president, some subsidiaries were sold to consortiums. These 
sales were later reversed by the new president.  
 
4.5 Summary of the Chapter 
 
This chapter presents an analysis of the Nigerian environment. The chapter began by 
analysing the Nigerian society and the formation of Nigeria as a political entity by 
colonial authorities. Nigeria is the most populous country in Africa. The country is 
made of different people from different states and kingdoms that were brought 
together by the colonial authorities.  Nigeria secured her independence from the 
colonial authorities in 1960, and since then has been ruled by various civilian and 
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military governments, each having its own style and facing different political and 
economic crisis.  
 
The Nigerian economy has transformed from peasant farming through to cash crop 
farming and to an oil economy. The analysis reveals that the discovery of oil in 
commercial quantities and the rise of oil prices in the 1970s led to Nigeria engaging in 
various economic development projects, including expansion in public sector 
organisations. The fall of oil prices resulted in a massive financial crisis in Nigeria 
and that led to the introduction of SAP, with public sector reforms as one of its 
measures. 
 
The chapter also analysed the origin of the Nigerian public sector and the various 
reforms that have taken place. An initial attempt was made in 1981 to reform the 
Nigerian public sector; however, comprehensive reforms were made in 1988 
following the adoption of SAP. Public sector reforms are still ongoing in Nigeria.  
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5 CHAPTER FIVE: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND METHODS 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter presents the research methodology adopted in the study. The 
methodology details how the research questions will be addressed and how the 
study’s aims and objectives will be achieved. In addition to detailing the methodology 
which is the process of conducting the research, the chapter also discusses the 
research methods which are the techniques used to collect and analyse data 
(Silverman, 1993; Ryan et al., 2002; Moll et al., 2006). It is essential to stress at this 
point that the choice of research methodology is influenced significantly by the 
philosophical assumption underpinning the study while the choice of methods 
depends largely on the methodology followed (Chua, 1986).  
 
It can thus be argued that management science researchers should consider their 
values and beliefs regarding the nature of society and the social science prior to 
embarking on any research (Hopper and Powell, 1985). This chapter presents first, the 
beliefs and the philosophical assumptions underlying the thesis and second, the 
research strategy adopted in order to accomplish the research aim. The aim of the 
research was identified in chapter one as the need  to explore public sector reforms in 
Nigeria and these reforms impact  on the Management Control Systems (hereafter, 
MCS) of the case study organisation. 
 
The chapter is organised into seven sections. Following the introduction, the 
methodology section is presented detailing the philosophical assumptions 
underpinning the thesis and the study methodology. The next section presents the case 
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study strategy as the research method adopted in the study. The subsequent section 
details the process of gathering the empirical evidence for the study. This section 
discusses the preparations for the case study, how access to the organisation was 
negotiated and how the actual data was collected. The section after this details how 
the data collected is analysed followed by section which attempts to link the research 
approach to the theoretical framework adopted for the study. The final part presents 
the chapter summary. 
 
5.2 The Thesis Methodology 
 
Methodology refers to the process of conducting research (Hussey and Hussey, 1997; 
Ryan et al., 2002). In the literature two distinct methodological strategies have been 
identified as qualitative and quantitative approaches (Bryman, 1988; Bryman and 
Bell, 2003). The quantitative approach is objective in nature, entails deductive 
approach to theory and incorporates models from natural scientific practices and 
norms (collects and analyses numerical data and applies statistical tests); while the 
qualitative approach emphasises an inductive approach to theory, rejects the practices 
and norms of natural scientific models in preference to individual reflection on 
interpretation of their social world and views social reality as a constantly changing 
emergent property of individuals’ creation (Hussey and Hussey, 1997; Bryman and 
Bell, 2003).  
 
The appropriateness of either of these approaches has been widely debated in the 
literature (see, for instance, Patton, 1990). Within the accounting literature, 
researchers have traditionally followed a quantitative methodology; however, from 
1980s the appropriateness of this quantitative approach was questioned because of its 
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failure to examine accounting systems within their organisational contexts (see for 
instance Tomkins and Grove, 1983; Hopper and Powell, 1985; Chua, 1986). The 
realisation that the quantitative methodology offers limited explanation for the role of 
accounting in organisations resulted in a shift towards much the qualitative approach 
(see Ahrens and Chapman, 2006). Both the quantitative and qualitative methodologies 
are based on different philosophical assumptions hence it is important that researchers 
philosophical stands are clearly understood from the outset before the research 
methodology is selected (Burrell and Morgan, 1979; Hopper and Powell, 1985; 
Hussey and Hussey, 1997; Ryan et al., 2002; Saunders et al., 2007). Hopper and 
Powell (1985, p. 429) recognise the importance of philosophical assumptions when 
they suggested that: “Certain fundamental theoretical and philosophical assumptions 
underlie any piece of research -there is no such thing as a totally objective or value 
free investigation.” Every researcher bring his/her own worldviews, paradigms39 or 
set of assumptions to the research and these inform the conduct and outcome of the 
study (Lllewellyn, 1992; Denzin and Lincoln, 2000; Creswell, 2007).  
 
5.2.1 The Philosophical Assumptions Underlying the Thesis 
 
Various classifications of philosophical assumptions have been provided by several 
authors (Burrell and Morgan, 1979; Morgan and Smircich, 1980; Chua, 1986; 
Donalson, 1995). However, the most influential classification of these assumptions 
within the management and organisational studies literature has been provided by 
(Burrell and Morgan, 1979). The Burrell and Morgan framework is discussed in this 
section because of its influence within the management accounting literature (see 
                                                 
39
The philosophical assumptions are also referred to as paradigms. Hussey and Hussey (1997, p. 47) 
described the term paradigm as “The progress of scientific practice based on people’s philosophies and 
assumptions about the world and the nature of knowledge”. Paradigms lay down how research should 
be conducted by offering a framework which consists of acceptable theories, methods and ways of 
defining data. 
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Hopper and Powell, 1985; Chua, 1986). This framework therefore provides the basis 
for locating the philosophical assumptions underlying this thesis. Burrell and Morgan 
(1979) classify organisational research based on the idea that all theories of 
organisation are based upon a philosophy of science and theory of society. With 
regard to the philosophy of science Burrell and Morgan argued that all social 
scientists approach their subject with assumptions about the nature of the social world 
and the way in which it may be investigated.  
Table 5.1 below provides the schema for analysing the assumptions about the 
nature of social science research.  
 
Assumptions Objectivists 
approach to social 
science 
Subjectivists 
approach to social 
science  
Ontology Realism Nominalism 
Epistemology Positivism  Anti-positivism 
Human nature Determinism Voluntarism 
Methodology Nomothetic Ideographic  
Sources: Adapted from Burrell and Morgan (1979, p. 3) 
 
The ontological assumptions are concerned with the nature of the reality of the 
phenomena under investigation. Realism under the objectivists approach assumes that 
the social world and its structures can be regarded as having an empirical and concrete 
existence. It is independent, external to and precedes the cognition of individuals 
(Burrell and Morgan, 1979; Hopper and Powell, 1985). On the other hand, 
norminalism under the subjectivists approach assumes that reality exists only in the 
imagination of the individual. In other words, the external social world is made of 
names, concepts and labels constructed by individuals to structure reality (Burrell and 
Morgan, 1979). 
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The epistemological assumption is concerned about what is considered as acceptable 
knowledge in a field of study (Saunders et al., 2007). This assumption is concerned 
with the form of knowledge and how it can be acquired and transmitted (Burrell and 
Morgan, 1979; Hopper and Powell, 1985), it involves the examination of the 
relationship between the researcher and the phenomena being researched (Hussey and 
Hussey, 1997; Denzin and Lincoln, 2000). Burrell and Morgan present two extreme 
positions; the positivists which believe that only phenomena, which are measurable 
and observable can be considered as knowledge and the anti-positivists who reject the 
positivists idea and believe that the social world is relativistic and can only be 
understood from the point of view of the individuals that are involved with the 
phenomena under investigation.  
 
The next assumption relates to human nature and is concerned with the relationship 
between human beings and their environment. At one extreme is determinism, which 
assumes that individuals’ behaviour and experience are constrained and determined 
by the their environments and at the other extreme is voluntarism, which regards 
people as autonomous, free-willed and capable of constructing their own environment 
(Burrell and Morgan, 1979; Hopper and Powell, 1985).  
 
The three assumptions described above have a direct implication for the assumptions 
about methodology (Chua, 1986). Each has a direct consequence on how the 
researcher investigates and obtains knowledge of the social world and likely to incline 
the researcher towards a specific methodology (Burrell and Morgan, 1979; Ryan et 
al., 2002). The nomothetic believes that the social world can be understood using 
methods and techniques from the natural sciences, while the ideography believes that 
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the social world can only be understood by obtaining first hand knowledge (Burrell 
and Morgan, 1979). For the nomothetic, methods such as statistical analysis to test 
hypotheses in search of general law should be employed whilst, for the ideographic, 
techniques such as interviews and observations should be adopted to obtain 
information from individuals.  
 
Burrell and Morgan integrated the four extreme assumptions described above to form 
the subjective-objective continuum. These subjective-objective dimensions can also 
be linked to the qualitative and quantitative approaches discussed earlier (Hussey and 
Hussey, 1997). The assumption about nature of society comprises two conflicting 
debates regarding order and conflict. The order theories are concerned with explaining 
social order and equilibrium while the conflict theories are concerned with problems 
of change, conflict and coercion in social structure (Burrell and Morgan, 1979). 
Burrell and Morgan introduced the notion of regulation and radical change in place of 
the order-conflict debate. The sociology of regulation is concerned with the need for 
regulation in human affairs with basic questions about how society holds together and 
the sociology of radical change is concerned with explaining radical change in 
existing structures; man’s emancipation from the structures that deter and stunt his 
developmental potential (Burrell and Morgan, 1979).  
 
Burrell and Morgan presented a two-by-two matrix based on the two assumptions 
discussed above. The assumption about social science (the subjective-objective 
dimension of ontology, epistemology, human nature and methodology) was 
represented on the horizontal axis and the structure of society (sociology of regulation 
and radical change) was represented on the vertical axis. The framework also 
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identified the four mutually exclusive paradigms that exist in social science research 
(see figure 5.1 below). These paradigms are; radical humanists, radical structuralists, 
interpretive and functionalists. Burrell and Morgan (1979, p. 23) argued that these 
paradigms “define fundamentally different perspectives for the analysis of social 
phenomena. They approach this endeavour from contrasting standpoints and generate 
quite different concepts and analytical tools.” In other words the four paradigms offer 
different ways of seeing the social world. 
 
Figure 5.1 below presents the four paradigms for the analysis of social theory. 
 
  Radical Change 
        Radical Humanism             Radical Structuralism 
   
 
Subjectivism      Objectivism 
        
Interpretive Sociology              Functionalist Sociology  
  
    Regulation 
Sources: Adapted from Burrell and Morgan (1979, p.29). 
 
The functionalists paradigm is rooted in the sociology of regulations and approaches 
its subject matter from an objective point of view (Burrell and Morgan, 1979). The 
functionalist approach is concerned with explaining the status quo, integration, social 
order, solidarity, agreement, satisfaction of needs and actuality from the objective 
view point of realist, positivist, determinist and nomothetic. Functionalist researchers 
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assume that the social world is real, made of concrete empirical phenomena and 
relationship, which restrict individual’s actions and can be identified, studied and 
measured, hence the adoption of techniques of the natural science (quantitative 
approach) (Chua, 1986; Macintosh, 1994). Functionalists paradigm is also referred to 
as mainstream approach (Hopper and Powell, 1985; Chua, 1986; Ryan et al., 2002).  
 
The radical humanist approach is concerned with radical change from a subjectivist 
stand point. The radical humanist approach views the world from nominalist, anti-
positivist, voluntarist and ideographic perspectives. The basic notion underlying the 
radical humanist approach is that “the consciousness of man is dominated by the 
ideological superstructures with which he interacts, and these drive a cognitive wedge 
between himself and his true consciousness;” (Burrell and Morgan, 1979, p. 32) 
which subsequently prevents human fulfilment (Chua, 1986). Radical humanist 
theorists are concerned with finding ways of releasing humans from the existing 
social arrangement which restricts them from attaining their true potentials. 
Researchers adopting critical theory follow the radical structuralist assumption (see 
Hopper and Powell, 1985).  
 
The radical structuralist approach focuses on radical change from an objectivist 
standpoint. Their approach to social science is similar to that of the functionalist as 
they view the social world from a realist, positivist, determinist and nomothetic stand 
point. However, they are committed to “radical change, emancipation and potentiality, 
in an analysis which emphasises structural conflict, modes of domination, 
contradiction and deprivation (Burrell and Morgan, 1979, p. 34).” The common 
concern of the radical structuralist theorist is the view that modern society “is 
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characterised by fundamental conflicts which generate radical change through 
political and economic crises (Burrell and Morgan, 1979, p 34).”  
 
The interpretive paradigm is rooted in the sociology of regulation and approaches its 
subject matter from the subjectivist approach to the social world. Burrell and Morgan 
(1979, p. 28) described the interpretive approach as:  
Informed by the concern to understand the world as it is, to understand the 
fundamental nature of the social world at the level of subjective experience. It 
seeks explanation within the realm of individual consciousness and 
subjectivity, within the frame of reference of the participant as oppose to the 
observer of action. 
 
Interpretive perspective assumes that every individual interprets situation in their own 
way and this understanding becomes very real as they react towards events or 
situations on the basis of this personal sense (Macintosh, 1994). Interpretive 
researchers approach their studies from the nominalist, anti-positivist, voluntarist and 
ideographic stand point.  
 
This study is located within the interpretive paradigm with its subjective assumptions 
about social science and the sociology of regulations described above. Interpretive 
research assumes that reality is constructed through individual interactions; hence 
social practices such as MCS are socially constructed not a natural phenomena. 
Interpretive accounting researchers aim at analysing such accounting realities and the 
way they are socially constructed and negotiated (Hopper and Powell, 1985; Ryan et 
al., 2002).  
 
The concern of this thesis is to understand public sector reforms and changes in MCS 
in the case organisation, NSC. It is the assumption of the researcher that the public 
 126 
sector reforms and MCS change are socially constructed and can therefore be 
understood by relying on the subjective interpretation of the various organisational 
actors (Burchell, et al., 1980; Hopwood, 1987; Ryan et al., 2002). Thus the study’s 
ontological assumption is norminalism. The researcher believes that reform and the 
accounting realities are socially constructed by the various organisational actors. 
Thus, “the social world is re-created by actors with every encounter, and that reality is 
the accomplishment of individual sense making (Ryan et al., 2002, p. 38).” 
 
In line with an ontological position, the thesis adopts an anti-positivistic stand as its 
epistemology. The researcher believes that knowledge can only be gained through 
obtaining the subjective meaning of reforms and MCS change from the individual 
actors or managers that are involved with the reforms. With regards to the 
assumptions relating to human nature, the researcher assumes the voluntarist point of 
view with the belief that that human beings have free will and can change and shape 
their environment.  
 
The interpretive paradigm has been widely adopted in accounting research, especially 
in the field of management accounting. These studies are concerned with 
understanding the social nature of accounting practice (Ryan et al., 2002) and have 
focused on studying real world management accounting practices, decisions and 
settings, with the purpose of analysing, interpreting and understanding them and thus 
identifying solutions to pragmatic problems (Elharidy et al., 2008).  
 
Interpretive approach focuses on the process of interpretation which makes it difficult 
if not impossible to draw on other paradigms (Wilson, 1971; Tomkins and Groves, 
 127 
1983). As argued by Chua (1986) the interpretive approach provides opportunities for 
comprehending accounting in action because of the emphasis on actor’s definition of 
what is being studied and how this phenomenon is woven in a wider social 
framework. Interpretive approaches focus on the everyday life of organisations as 
they exist, rather than exploring abstract problems and providing artificial solutions 
by sitting at a distance and using some remote lens (Elharidy et al., 2008); it aims at 
producing rich and deep understandings of how MCS is understood, thought of, 
interacted with and used by managers and employees in organisations (Macintosh, 
1994).  
 
Hopper and Powell (1985, p. 447) emphasise that interpretive approach provides 
better understanding of accounting practices because of its emphasis on how 
accounting meanings are socially generated and sustained. A similar argument has 
been made by Chua (1986) that interpretive researcher offers a way of understanding 
accounting in it social and political setting.  
 
5.2.2 Methodological Choice 
 
As discussed earlier the choice of a particular methodology is influenced by the 
assumptions about ontology, epistemology and human nature (Burrell and Morgan, 
1979; Hopper and Powell, 1985; Ryan et al., 2002). In addition, to the philosophical 
assumptions other factors need to be considered when choosing a methodology 
(Creswell, 2007; Glaser and Strauss, 1967; Marshall and Rossman 1989; Strauss and 
Corbin, 1990, Hoepfl, 1997). Creswell (2007) identified five factors that need to be 
considered when choosing methodology. These are the research outcome, the 
audience questions, the background questions, the scholarly literature questions and 
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personal approach questions. Robson (1993) also suggested that the researcher needs 
to consider the purpose of the research and the research questions. Hoepfl (1997) 
argued that the decision to employ qualitative methodology should be done carefully 
as qualitative research is emotionally taxing, costly and time consuming.  
 
The ontological, epistemological and human nature assumptions that underpin this 
research have been explained earlier thereby locating the study within a 
subjective/regulation interpretive paradigm. These assumptions are in line with the 
aims of the research which are to understand the process of the public sector reforms 
in NSC and how MCS are produced and re-produced by the actors within the reforms. 
In line with these assumptions and aims of the research, an approach that places 
emphasis on the social constructions of MCS is deemed most appropriate. Tomkins 
and Groves (1983) suggested that qualitative inquiry is most valuable when 
researching issues such as how accounting reports are put to use, their influence on 
human behaviour and the purposes for which they are produced. Strauss and Cobin 
(1990) suggested that qualitative research is more appropriate where little is known 
about the phenomenon under investigation or when much is known about a 
phenomenon in order to gain new perspectives or when it is difficult to obtain 
information through the quantitative approach. Thus, qualitative research is 
considered as the most appropriate methodology to conduct the study. This study is 
considered as the first research so far that investigates MCS change in the context of 
public sector reforms in Nigeria.  
 
The choice of the qualitative approach is also theoretically justified since as argued 
earlier accounting systems are not natural phenomena but instead they are socially 
 129 
constructed and can thus be changed by the social actors themselves (Ryan et al. 
2002). This means that we should not be searching for universal laws and 
generalisations as in the case of the natural sciences, but for the implicit and explicit 
rules that structure social behaviour, however, these rules are themselves the outcome 
of social behaviour. 
 
Tomkins and Groves (1983, p. 364) stresses the importance of adopting qualitative 
research in accounting as follows:  
Academics interested in studying behaviour relating to accounting and the 
“value” of different accounting procedures, therefore need to place less 
emphasis on mathematical analyses and modelling, statistical tests, surveys 
and laboratory tests if these are not associated with specific real world 
problems in the sense of not relating to specific decision contexts.  
 
As a result, Tomkins and Groves suggested that academics might profit more by 
adopting detailed field-based approach to research. This will enable researchers to 
focus on understanding the context within which decisions are made and how 
practitioners perceived and interpret their world (see also Burchell et al., 1980). In 
effect this approach will enable researchers to concentrate on issues that concern 
practicing managers. Such an approach is also likely to lead to development of 
reliable theories about accounting in action and theories about the effects of 
alternative accounting procedure (Tomkins and Groves, 1983). 
 
A similar argument to the one presented above has been made by Boland and Pondy 
(1983, p. 225-226) that accounting researchers in organisations “must focus on action 
in organisational settings…must use case analysis of specific situations…must be 
interpretive…must step out of actor’s frame of reference, ….in the sense that the 
actor’s purely subjective interpretation must be transcended.” Qualitative approach is 
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about observing phenomena in it natural setting and reporting them in a systematic 
way (Atkinson and Shaffir, 1998). The characteristics of qualitative research have 
been presented by Hoepfl (1997).  
 
Overall qualitative research uses the natural setting as the source of data whereby the 
researcher observes and describes and interpret settings as they are, maintaining what 
Patton calls an “empathic neutrality” (1990, p. 55). Also, in qualitative research, the 
researcher acts as the human instrument of data collection and predominantly uses 
inductive data analysis. Qualitative research reports are often descriptive, 
incorporating expressive language and the “presence of voice in the text” (Eisner, 
1991, p. 36). Hoepfl (1997) also argues that qualitative research has an interpretive 
has and an emergent (as opposed to predetermined) design thereby making it a 
dynamic approach. 
 
Qualitative data provides rich descriptions of the social world, particularly the 
meanings attached to actions and events in the language of the main actors; it has 
facilitated the exploration of unforeseen relationships and reduces the researcher-
induced retrospective distortion and unsupported inferential leap (Covaleski and 
Dirsmith, 1990; Atkinson and Shaffir, 1998). It allows the researcher to acquire 
intimate knowledge of the phenomenon under study by investigating it in its natural 
setting (Tomkins and Groves, 1983; Hoepfl, 1997; Atkinson and Shaffir, 1998) and 
yields rich information that cannot be obtained through statistical inquiry (Hoepfl, 
1997). Qualitative approach presents a greater potential for open-ended interaction 
between the researcher and the researched (Ahrens and Chapman, 2006). According 
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to Atkinson and Shaffir (1998) central to qualitative research is experiencing reality as 
others experience it.  
 
The validity of using a quantitative approach in researching the social sciences was 
contested by some researchers who argued that quantitative approach is not 
appropriate for investigating social behaviour. Tomkins and Groves (1983) argued 
that quantitative methodologies are only appropriate when one can adequately deduce 
reality by the use of dependent and independent variables and the statistical 
relationships between them; however, deductive logic “rests on the assumption that 
the meanings attached to variables are independent of the situation in which they are 
used - that they may be interpreted “literally” and are not indexical expressions. Such 
literal interpretations of variables can (usually) be taken for granted in the natural 
sciences where problems of methodology are reduced more to ones of method 
concerned with the design of competent and practical techniques, but the same stance 
cannot be assumed in researching social action” (Tomkins and Groves, 1983, p. 366). 
As argued by Blumer (1978), conventional scientific analysis is inappropriate for the 
study of empirical social world. Thus scientific analysis forces data into artificial 
framework that may not have any relevance to real events in the social world.  
 
Qualitative methodology is employed in this thesis in order for the researcher to be 
close to the phenomena under investigation (i.e. public sector reforms and to the 
MCS). Qualitative methodology enabled the researcher to study and interpret how the 
members of the case organisation and other respondents construct their reality, in 
particular how the reforms network and MCS are shaped and re-shaped by various 
actors in NSC.  
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Qualitative methodology allowed the researcher to be part of the organisational daily 
activities and interact with the organisational actors. This approach facilitated the 
tracing of the reform processes and the how the MCS were constructed by the actors. 
It also enabled the researcher to discover other issues that were not part of the initial 
research questions, for example, previous reforms and how they are linked with the 
existing reforms.  
 
5.3 The Research Method – The Case Study Approach 
 
As discussed earlier in this chapter, the choice of methodology is influenced by both 
the philosophical stance and the research objectives and questions. The chosen 
methodology then determines the choice of research methods. In other words, the 
choice of an appropriate method depends on the researcher’s chosen methodology and 
the nature of the research (Scapens, 1990, 2004; Hussey and Hussey, 1997, Robson, 
1993). Yin (2003) argues that the choice of methods depends on three conditions 
namely; 1) nature of the research question, 2) the control the researcher has over 
actual behavioural events, 3) the level of focus on contemporary as opposed to 
historical events.  
Table 5.2 presents the situation when a particular research strategy is preferred.  
Strategy  Type of research 
question 
Required control of 
behavioural events? 
Focuses on 
contemporary events? 
Case study How, why No  Yes 
Survey  Who, what, where, how 
much, how many? 
No Yes 
History  How, why? No  No  
Archival analysis  Who, what, where, how 
much, how many? 
No Yes/No 
Experiment  How, why?  Yes Yes  
Source: Yin (2003, p.5) 
 
For the purpose of this thesis a case study approach is considered to be the most 
appropriate research method. Case studies are the preferred strategy “When a “how” 
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or “why” questions are being asked about a contemporary set of events over which the 
investigator has little or no control (Yin, 2003, p.9).” In the context of accounting 
research, Ferreira and Merchant (1992) argued that case studies are powerful tools for 
studying issues that are not well understood, complex or contextually contingent, 
sensitive in ways that survey response may be biased; and where the data required are 
not publicly available. Scapens (1990, P. 264) stresses the appropriateness of case 
studies further as: “Case studies offer us the possibility of understanding the nature of 
management accounting in practice; both in terms of the techniques, procedures, 
systems, etc. which are used and the way in which they are used.” Berry and Otley 
(2004) argued that case studies are appropriate for studies that focus on understanding 
context, contents and processes of accounting practice.  
 
According to Dyer and Wilkins (1991, p.615) the ultimate aim of case studies is 
“generally to provide a rich description of the social scene, to describe the context in 
which events occur, and to reveal what Light (1979) referred to as the deep structure 
of social behaviour.” Case study involves an in-depth study of a phenomenon. 
Creswell (2007, p. 73) defined case study as “a qualitative approach in which the 
investigator explores a bounded system (case) or a multiple bounded systems (cases) 
over time, through detailed, in-depth data collection involving multiple sources of 
information (e.g., observations, interviews, audiovisual materials, and documents and 
reports) and reports a case description and case-based theme.” Case studies can be 
employed in a variety of ways (Ryan et al., 2002). They can be employed to conduct 
either qualitative or quantitative research. Furthermore, evidence in a case study can 
be collected using qualitative or quantitative methods or a mixture of both.  
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Ryan et al. (2002) identified five types of case studies, namely, descriptive, 
illustrative, exploratory, explanatory and experimental. In descriptive case studies, the 
focus is on describing particular accounting systems, procedure and techniques. 
Illustrative case study aims at demonstrating new innovative practices developed by 
companies. This type of case study provides an illustration of what is being achieved 
in practice.  
 
Exploratory case study is adopted when the aim of the research is to explore the 
reasons for particular accounting practices. This approach allows the researcher to 
develop ideas and hypotheses, which subsequently can be tested on larger scale 
studies, with the objective of generalisation. In explanatory case studies, the 
researcher attempts to explain the reasons for observed accounting practices. The 
objective of explanatory case studies is to provide a good explanation of the case 
instead of dwelling on generalisation. Finally, experimental case studies are employed 
to examine the difficulties involved in adopting new procedures or techniques in 
practices and also in evaluating the benefits derived from them.  
 
The approach adopted in this study can be described as both explanatory and 
exploratory. Explanatory studies focus on a single case and employ a social theory for 
guidance, explanation and understanding (Rahaman and Lawrence, 2001). The 
research problem this thesis seeks to address is based on understanding MCS change 
in the context of public sector reforms in Nigeria. Comprehensive data about various 
reforms and how MCS are produced and reproduced can be obtained through a 
detailed case study. According to Scapens (2004) the selection of a case study should 
be guided by research questions and the theoretical framework which is the basis of 
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explanatory case studies. The current study is also exploratory because it attempts to 
find reasons for the adoption of the public sector reforms and the MCS in the case 
organisation.  
 
The strengths of case studies are stressed by various researchers. Yin (2003, p. 2) 
argued that case study method allows the researcher to “retain the holistic and 
meaningful characteristics of real-life events-such as individual life cycles, 
organisational and managerial processes, neighbourhood change, international 
relations and the maturation of industries.” Case study research enables researchers to 
gain an intimate, contextually sensitive knowledge of organisational phenomena 
(Patton, 1987; Birnberg et al., 1990; Atkinson and Shaffir, 1998); it offers the 
opportunity to learn about the conflicting meaning and tension that were ascribed to 
MCS operations (Covaleski and Dirsmith, 1990) and also permits the researcher to 
draw from various sources of evidence (Yin, 2003). 
 
Furthermore, a case study approach presents the possibility of understanding the 
nature of accounting practices, in terms of techniques, procedures and systems used 
and the way in which they are used (Ryan et al., 2002). Caplan (1989, p.117) argued 
that case studies “permit the researcher to examine the behavioural effects of 
accounting in the complex and interactive environment in which accounting actually 
exists. Without this “context,” the study of accounting becomes an abstraction, 
removed from reality-and that is particular unfortunate for a discipline that is 
essentially pragmatic nature.”  
 
 136 
It must be pointed out that despite these strengths, the case study approach has also 
been criticised by researchers for its lack rigour; subject to sample selection bias; use 
a small sample, hence their findings cannot be statistically generalised; and being time 
consuming and costly for both the researcher and the case organisation and result in 
massive unreadable documents (Ryan et al., 2002; Yin, 2003). 
 
The proponents of case studies have however provided defence for the above 
criticism. For example, they argue that case study rigour come through the careful 
consideration in collecting and analysing data and its findings can be theoretically 
generalised (Scapens, 1990; Yin, 2003). The aim of case studies is to expand and 
generalise theories (analytic generalisation) and not to provide statistical 
generalisation (Otley, 1994; Yin, 2003). This was reiterated by Ryan et al. (2002 
p.149) as: 
The objective of such studies is to develop theoretically informed 
understandings that provide explanations of the observed phenomena…the 
theories that provide convincing explanations are retained and used in other 
case studies, whereas theories that do not explain will be modified or rejected.  
 
Researchers also argued that case study biased can be reduced through collecting 
evidence from multiple sources (Birnberg et al., 1990; Scapens, 1990; Yin, 2003) and 
by conducting the studies in teams (Scapens, 1990) or through an interdisciplinary 
research team (Caplan, 1989).  
 
Based on the arguments presented in this section, a case study can be considered as 
the most appropriate approach in examining public sector reforms and the role of 
MCS in the case organisation (NSC).  
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5.3.1 The Thesis Case Study Strategy 
 
This section outlines how the study was conducted. A single and complex 
organisation was selected as the case study for this thesis. Creswell (2007) argued that 
a single case study provides more in-depth analysis than multiple cases, because the 
more cases in an individual study, the less in-depth are any of the cases. Dyer and 
Wilkins (1991, p. 614) stressed that the essence of a case study is: “the careful study 
of a single case that leads researchers to see new theoretical relationships and question 
old ones.” By conducting the study in a single organisation a rich theoretical insight 
can be gained from the case. According to Dyer and Wilkinson (1991, p. 615) 
multiple cases description “will be rather “thin,” focusing on surface data rather than 
deeper social dynamics…they tend to neglect the more tacit and less obvious aspects 
of the setting under investigation. They are more likely to provide a rather distorted 
picture or no picture at all, of the underlying dynamics of the case.”  
 
This study is considered to be the first conducted in Nigeria that investigates MCS 
change in the context of public sector reforms. NSC being one of the biggest public 
enterprise in Nigeria provides a means for obtaining an in-depth understanding of the 
reforms process and how MCS change. Stake (1995) suggested that researchers 
should choose a case study that can maximise what can be learnt. One can argue that 
NSC is one of the most important public enterprise in Nigeria, thus conducting a case 
study in NSC presents an opportunity to gain in-depth understanding of reforms in 
Nigeria in general and specifically the production and reproduction of MCS in NSC.  
 
Single case studies are distinguished by Yin (2003) as holistic and embedded. Holistic 
case study involves a single unit of analysis, while the embedded case study involves 
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more than one unit of analysis. This thesis is considered to be an embedded case study 
as the analysis involves other units. The reforms processes and MCS productions and 
reproduction were investigated and analysed at NSC’s head office and some of its 
subsidiaries.  
 
5.3.1.1 Planning for the Case Study 
 
A comprehensive guide on how to carry out case studies has been provided by Yin 
(see, Yin, 1989, 1994, 2003). Yin’s guidelines were found very detailed and useful 
and therefore followed in preparing and collecting evidence for this study.  
 
Yin (1994) suggested that before embarking on a case study, a researcher needs to 
acquire several skills, namely, be able to ask good questions and interpret the 
response, be a good listener, be adaptive and flexible in order to adapt to the different 
situation, have a firm grip of the issues being studied and be unbiased by 
preconceived notions.  
 
The current researcher, although new to academic research had some prior skills 
suggested acquired from a previous job. Before embarking on the PhD programme, 
the researcher had worked in various departments in a commercial bank
40
 and had 
interacted with different types of people. The researcher was also involved in many 
research activities, which involved interviewing and analysing data regarding the 
banks products and services. In addition, the researcher underwent some training on 
how to conduct case studies and read many books and articles on how to go about 
                                                 
40
 The researcher had worked as a customer services officer where she serves as the first and main 
contact point for the bank and its customers. The researcher interacted with these people in person or 
via telephone every day. The researcher also worked in the cash department where cash, cheque deposit 
are received and paid to various people and also served as the branch treasurer and head of operations. 
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conducting qualitative research. In order to become familiar with the case site and 
issues under investigation, various documents on public sector reforms in Nigeria and 
the case organisation were reviewed.
41
 An informal discussion was conducted with 
some of the case organisation’s employees, who were conducting their postgraduate 
studies at the same institution as the researcher, and also the organisation’s website 
was visited frequently.  
 
Furthermore, Yin (1994) suggested that the researcher developed a draft protocol. The 
aim of the protocol is to guide the researcher in carrying out data collection and also 
enhance the reliability of the research (Yin, 1994). Protocol imposes discipline on the 
researcher which is important to the progress and reliability of the research and its 
development brings out problems that will only be faced during the study (Tellis, 
1997).  
 
A research protocol consists of the following sections:  
 Overview of the projects which includes the case study objectives, issues and 
relevant reading about the topic under study.  
 Field procedure which includes credentials for assessing the case organisation, 
locating the data sources and reminders about procedures.  
 Case study questions which are the specific questions the researcher must keep 
in mind during the data collection. 
 Guide for case study reports, that is, the outline and format of the study report.  
 
A research protocol was developed to guide the thesis data collection process. The 
research protocol included several things such as the objectives of the study, 
background on the issue under investigation, case study questions, sources of data, the 
                                                 
41
 These documents include; newspapers reports, articles from magazines and the case site reform 
documents. 
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procedure for collecting data and letter of introduction written by the thesis supervisor 
(see appendix 5.1). However, during the field study the protocol was modified many 
times in order to capture new issues that had emerged. This is in line with Patton 
(1990), who noted that finalising research strategy before data collection is not 
possible and nor is it appropriate. 
 
5.3.1.2 Access Arrangement  
 
As discussed above the data collection for the thesis took place in a single, large and 
complex organisation. In most developing countries access to research site requires an 
informal arrangement (Uddin and Tsamenyi, 2005). According to Jankowicz (2005) it 
is important to use existing contacts if possible in order to gain access. In this study, 
an informal arrangement was made prior to the field work. As soon as the researcher 
identified the research problem and the research questions for the study, the 
researcher conducted a preliminary inquiry into various public sector organisations in 
Nigeria in order to identify the best organisation that suited the investigation. Stake 
(1995) suggested that a researcher should select a case study that can maximise what 
can be learned. The NSC was selected for the study due to its political, social and 
economic role in Nigeria and it provides the means for investigating the research 
problem.  
 
After the NSC was identified as a potential case site, the researcher made several 
phone calls to various NSC staff that she was acquainted with. This is in-order to find 
out whether it is possible to conduct the study in the organisation and to obtain some 
information about the reforms in the organisation. The researcher’s family and former 
lecturers were also contacted to assist in obtaining access. Assurance was gotten 
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(informally) that it is possible to carry out the study in the organisation and also some 
documents regarding the case site reforms were emailed/posted to the researcher.
42
  
 
The researcher went to Nigeria in August, 2007 to conduct the case study and 
remained there for a period of seven months. During the first visit to the case 
organisation, the supervisor’s letter was presented to the management of the 
organisation.  The study was approved by senior management and an acceptance letter 
was given to the researcher with permission to access the organisation for a period of 
three months (see appendix 5.2). At the expiration of the three-month period 
permission was sought for and granted to extend the stay further (see appendix 5.3). A 
total of seven months was spent in the organisation.  
 
The researcher was attached to the finance and accounts department, who were asked 
to co-ordinate the study. During the initial meeting with the department, a senior 
manager was advised to map out the strategy for conducting the study. The senior 
manager and the researcher discussed what the study is all about, the aims of the study 
and the sort of staff the researcher was interested in interviewing. The selection of 
potential interviewees was part of the research protocol discussed above. The 
selection was based on the research questions and the theoretical framework guiding 
the study, hence the selection was focused and theoretical (Ferreira and Merchant, 
1992; Miles and Huberman, 1994). The manager identified the participants that suited 
the study and interview appointments (dates and times) were scheduled with each of 
the participants. 
 
                                                 
42
 These documents were part of the initial documents reviewed discussed in section 5.4.1 
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The researcher visited the organisation every working day in order to conduct 
interviews, observe and interact with managers. The researcher also spent some time 
local libraries and other document centres reviewing various publications about the 
organisation and making photocopies of relevant documents. Yin (2003) suggested 
that during field study the researcher should allocate some time to visit local libraries 
and other document centres. The researcher’s role in the case study is what was 
described by Ryan et al., (2002) and Scapens (2004) as ‘visitor’. 
 
Access to other interviewees (i.e. a politician, an external consultant, external 
auditors, and Bureau of Public Enterprise (BPE) staff) staff) was gained through 
personal contact and in some cases the staffs in the NSC assisted the researcher in 
obtaining access. Access to World Bank and the International Monetary Funds 
country offices could not be obtained. Several attempts were made and in the end due 
to the time constraints the researcher had to give-up. 
 
5.3.2 Methods of Collecting Data  
 
In order to collect the relevant data for the study, a suitable method for data collection 
needs to be employed. There are various methods of collecting case study evidence 
(see, for instance, Yin, 1994, 2003; Stake, 1995; Creswell, 2007; Hussey and Hussey, 
1997). These methods include; archival records, direct observation, participants-
observations, documentation, physical artefacts and interviews. Each of these sources 
of evidence has strengths and weaknesses. Table 5.3: presents the strengths and 
weaknesses of each source.  
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Table 5.3: Various evidence sources and their strengths and weaknesses 
S/N Source of evidence Strength Weaknesses 
1. Documentation -Stable - can be reviewed 
repeatedly 
-Unobtrusive - not created as a 
result of the case study 
-Exact - contains exact names, 
references, and details of an 
events 
-Broach coverage - long span of 
time, many events, many 
settings 
-Retrievability can be low 
-Biased selectivity if 
collection is incomplete 
-Reporting bias – reflects 
(unknown) bias of author 
-access – may be 
deliberately blocked 
2.  Archival records -(same as above documentation) 
-Precise and quantitative 
-(same as above 
documentation) 
-Accessibility due to 
privacy reasons 
3 Direct observations - Reality - covers events in real 
time 
-Contextual - covers context of 
event  
- Time-consuming 
-Selectivity - unless broad 
coverage 
-Reflexivity events may  
Proceeded differently 
because it is being observed 
-Cost - hours needed by 
human observers 
4. Participant observation -(Same as above for direct 
observations) 
-Insightful into interpersonal 
behaviour and motives 
 
-(Same as above for direct 
observations) 
-Bias due to investigator’s 
manipulation  of events 
5. Interviews  -Targeted focused directly on 
case study topic 
-Insightful – provides perceived 
casual inferences 
-Bias due to poorly 
constructed questions 
-Response bias 
-Inaccuracies due to poor 
recall 
-Reflexivity –interviewee 
gives what interviewer 
want to hear 
6. Physical artefacts -Insightful into cultural features 
-insightful into technical 
operations 
-Selectivity 
-Availability 
Source: Yin (2003, p.86). 
 
However, not all of the sources need to be used for every piece of research. Since this 
thesis focuses on understanding the public sector reforms and their impacts on MCS, 
interviews, documentation and observations are considered as the most suitable 
methods to collect data. This is in line with Yin’s (2003, p.98) suggestions that “The 
use of multiple sources of evidence in case studies allows an investigator to address a 
broader range of historical, attitudinal and behavioural issue” and also allow 
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triangulation.” The three methods and how they were used to collect data are 
discussed below: 
 
5.3.2.1 Interviews 
 
Interviews are the most important sources of evidence in a case study (Yin, 2003). It 
is a data collection method in which participants (individuals or groups) are asked 
questions in order to establish what they do, think or feel, and they can be conducted 
face-to-face, voice-to-voice or screen-to-screen (Hussey and Hussey, 1997). A well 
informed participant can provide an important insight and shortcut to the prior history 
of the situation helping the researcher to identify other relevant information sources 
(Yin, 2003). It is useful to interview a number of people since perceptions are likely 
to vary (McQueen and Knussen, 2002). 
 
A total of seven months was spent in the case organisation. During this time, a total of 
seventy-three open-ended semi structured interviews with (NSC staff in head office 
and subsidiaries from different hierarchical positions, external consultants, external 
auditors, Bureau of Public Enterprise officials and politicians) were conducted. 
However, the interviewees were encouraged to discuss freely. Hussey and Hussey 
(1997) asserted that interpretative researchers should encourage the interviewees’ to 
discuss other issues. The majority of the interviews took place on the organisation’s 
premises, except for those conducted with other actors that were not employees of the 
organisations as discussed in the above section. Interviews constituted the main data 
source. However, the interviews were supplemented with various documents
43
 and 
observations.  
                                                 
43
 The documents obtained are discussed in section 5.4.3.2 
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The initial interviews focused on the recent reforms taking place at that time and the 
new MCS that were introduced. However, after analysing the initial interviews and 
some documents, the data suggested that the organisation had introduced various 
reforms, with the first in 1986 and as a result of those reforms various MCS such as 
were introduced into the organisation. The implementations of some of these MCS 
were still ongoing at the time of the research. Because of these findings the interview 
questions were modified to reflect and capture this new information and the interview 
guide was also modified (see appendix 5.5).  
 
The subsequent interviews focus on both the present and the previous reforms but 
with more emphasis on the design, implementation and uses of MCS. The managers 
that were part of the previous reforms were identified through referral from the 
managers interviewed. These referrals enabled the researcher to collect current as well 
as historical data. This is in line with interpretive perspective adopted for this study, 
which required detailed studies of accounting practices. Ryan et al., (2002 p. 87) 
emphasised that “It is necessary to locate current practice[s] in their historical, social 
and organisational contexts.” Furthermore, some of the managers have worked in 
more than one reform team. So the researcher had to rely on their memory. However, 
memory can be partially clouded by present views thus the researcher asked the same 
questions repeatedly to different people and also whenever possible drew from 
multiple evidence.  
 
These interviews with managers (and others), together with documentary evidence on 
the previous reform were used to construct the historical context of the past reforms 
and MCS introduced. The head office and three subsidiaries were visited to collect 
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evidence. The interviewees worked in different departments and held different 
positions in the organisation. The interviewee range include staff in the; Accounts 
department, Human Resources, Planning department, Quality Department and 
engineers. The interview process focused on understanding the idea behind the 
reforms, changes that occur and the role the interviewees played in the reform. The 
interviews with the external consultants focused on understanding their role in the 
reforms and their influence on MCS change. External auditors were also interviewed 
to understand the changes they observed in the case organisation.  
 
Thirty-eight of the seventy-three interviews were tape recorded, while the remaining 
thirty-five were not as per the interviewees’ requests. The reason for denying the 
request to tape record those interviews might be ascribed to the political nature of the 
organisation and also to the interviewees’ lack of exposure to academic research in 
general and qualitative research approach in particular. However, notes were taken 
during those interviews and when the researcher observed anything it was quickly 
jotted down in a note book. At the end of every interview the notes were typed.  
 
A research diary, field note book and a case study database where all the interview 
notes and documents are stored were kept; this is in accordance with Yin (1994) and 
Stake’s (1995) recommendations. The researcher also gathered and identified 
informal evidence. Scapens (1990) asserted that informal evidence might give 
indications about the validity of information sources. For instance, it was observed 
that people from one of the Nigeria’s dominant tribe do not like to talk about how 
things are on the ground rather they talk about how things are supposed to be. In such 
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exchanges the researcher has to probe further in order to get them talk about the true 
situation.  
 
Some challenges were faced during the field study. For instances, some interviewees 
rescheduled the appointments and this sometimes disrupted the interview plan. In 
addition, there were two occasions were during the interviews, the interviewee 
received calls from their superior, and were asked to go for an immediate assignment 
outside the organisation, thus the interview had to be postponed. Another problem 
occurred in cases where interviews were conducted in an office occupied by more 
than one person, e.g. the non participatory staff sometimes received a phone-call and 
this affected the quality of the recording. During transcription that part had to be listen 
to over and over again to make sure the correct data was obtained.  
 
5.3.2.2 Documentary Evidence 
 
According to Stake (1995) documentary evidence serves as a substitute for records of 
activities that the researcher might not have observed directly. They are likely to be 
relevant in any case study and they provides means for confirming and supplementing 
evidence from other sources (Yin, 2003). Documentary evidence such as, the 
organisations quarterly magazine, monthly newsletter, and reports and newspaper 
articles were collected. In addition, documents such as; the operations manual, 
monthly and quarterly performance reports, budget manual reports, reform documents 
and other internal documents were collected. However, in some cases the 
documentary evidence collection was complicated because of either the inappropriate 
documentation or because of the political nature of the organisation. For instance, on 
one occasion the researcher was made to promise that the documents received were 
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going to be used for the study only. Privatisation and commercialisation documents 
were obtained from the BPE. Further documents were also collected from the World 
Bank and IMF reports. 
 
5.3.2.3 Observations 
 
Observation can be used to illuminate findings or in examining a situation more 
closely (McQueen and Knussen, 2002), it enables the researcher to understand the 
case better (Stake, 1995). Sekaran (1992, p.215) noted that “observation is the 
application of the sense of vision to gather information about people in their natural 
work environment and to record their behaviour.” According to Patton (1990) deeper 
understanding can be obtained from observations than through interview alone, as it 
provides knowledge of the context in which the events occur and may enable the 
researcher to see things that the interviewees are not aware of, or are not willing to 
discuss.  
 
Direct observation takes place when the researcher visits the site and can be formal or 
informal (Tellis, 1997). The researcher spent seven months in the field and during that 
time made many observations, both formal and informal. During any interview when 
any observation is made by gesture or tone of the voice the researcher noted that and 
tried to probe for further clarification by asking more questions. Being in the 
organisation for seven months enable the researcher to observe the organisation’s 
daily activities; these include action such as opening time, the level of work done and 
MCS in action. Informal observations were also made, especially during lunch breaks.  
Participant observation was also made. The researcher attended a seminar on MCS 
organised for new recruit where she took part in asking questions. A meeting was also 
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observed. During the seminar and the meeting the researcher asked questions, made 
notes on the issues discussed and the way different level of staff interact with each 
other. Furthermore, having conducted the study in the NSC which had undergone 
various reforms and introduced different MCS, the researcher observed the plan 
implementation of some MCS. The plan implementation of System Application and 
Products in Data Processing (SAP1) and the new Performance Measurement systems 
were observed by the researcher. Observation was also made regarding the 
infrastructure of the organisation and the country as a whole in the context of the 
reforms process. 
 
5.4 Data Analysis 
 
Scholars such as (Miles and Huberman, 1994; Wolcott, 1994; Stake, 1995; Yin, 2003) 
have presented various ways of analysing qualitative data. However, these techniques 
and strategies are not well defined (Ferreira and Merchant, 1992; Yin, 2003), hence 
there is no right or wrong way of interpreting qualitative data. According to Creswell 
(2007) the core elements of qualitative data analysis are coding the data, combining 
the codes into broader categories or themes and displaying and making comparisons 
in data tables, graphs and charts.  
 
According to Stake (1995, p. 71), there is no particular stage where case study data 
analysis should be started; it “is a matter of given meaning to first impressions as well 
as to final compilations. Analysis essentially means taking something apart.” Miles 
and Huberman (1994) suggested that qualitative data analysis consists of three 
simultaneous flows of activities: data reduction, data display and conclusion 
drawing/verification. Yin (2003) presents the five modes of analysing qualitative data 
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as; pattern matching which involves comparing an empirical pattern with the 
predicted one (Trochin, 1989 in Yin, 2003), explanation building which involves 
analysing the case data by building an explanation about the case; time series traces 
changes in patterns over time; logic models involve matching empirical evidence with 
theoretical prediction and cross case synthesis techniques aggregate findings from a 
series of study (Yin, 2003).  
 
Pattern matching and explanation building are drawn and refined in this study in order 
to make sense of the data. In addition, during the early days and up to the end of the 
field study, the researcher adopted the early analysis method of contact summary 
sheet and coding as recommended by Miles and Huberman (1994). These early 
analyses “help organise data for later, deeper analyses…it helps the field-worker cycle 
back and forth between thinking about the existing data and generating strategies for 
collecting new, often better, data…It make analysis an ongoing, lively enterprise that 
contributes to the energising process of fieldwork” (Miles and Huberman, 1994, p. 
50).  
 
At the end of every interview, the researcher wrote up the interview notes, 
observation notes, and if the interview had been tape recorded, the researcher 
transcribed the interview verbatim within four days. These documents were later 
studied over and over again, and any reflective comments or remarks, such as 
observations made during interviews that were in contradiction to what the 
interviewee was saying, incidences that occurred during the data collection, and any 
idea that came to the researcher’s mind when reading the documents, were noted on 
the side of the documents. Marginal and reflection remarks add meaning and clarity to 
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the field data (Miles and Huberman, 1994). The interview main points were 
highlighted in a contact summary form, wherein all the main issues discussed, new 
issues identified, recommendations by the contact and further issues for concerned 
were filed (see appendix 5.6). For the document, a documentary summary form was 
also completed (see appendix 5.7). This process of data analysis was adopted 
throughout the fieldwork. 
 
Coding was then applied to the data. The aim of coding is to learn from the data and 
keep revisiting it until a pattern and explanation is understood (Richards, 2005). At 
the beginning of the field work, the theoretical framework and the research questions 
provided the basis for the codes, for example, codes such as political reason (WR-
PLT), economic reason (WR-ECO), social reason (WR-SOC) were derived from the 
research question of why public sector reforms (WR) in Nigeria (for the lists of the 
initial codes see appendix 5.8). However, as more data is collected and more issues 
were discovered the codes were refined in order to reflect those issues. The new 
issues discovered include past reforms that took place and MCS implemented. These 
codes were refined repeatedly during the data collection process to capture what was 
happening in the case. However, the later codes reflect only the major themes that 
emerged from the data.
44
 This is in line with Humphrey’s and Scapens’ (1996) 
suggestions that a theoretical framework should be loosely held so that it can be 
challenged and refined as a result of the research process. Scapens (1990, p.272) 
emphasises further “A researcher who favours the pattern model of explanation will 
view case studies as an opportunity to understand social practices in a specific set of 
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 Strauss and Corbin (1990) referred to this type of coding as open coding. 
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circumstances. Theories will be used to explain observations, and observations will be 
used to modify theory.”  
 
Dominant themes identified include themes such as political interference, power, 
consultants, corruption, mismanagement, maintenance and others (see appendix 5.9). 
The coding was done manually (no computer application was used), this is because 
different issues and questions were explored and some of the interviews were in the 
researcher’s local dialect and there is no software that supports that language. Scapens 
(2004) argued that computer packages such as NUD*IST or QSR are more suitable 
where similar issues and questions are covered in a number of interviews (Scapens, 
2004), thus manual coding is appropriate for this study.  
 
The next stage of the analysis is pattern matching and case explanation. However, the 
study did not strictly follow Yin’s recommendation of pattern matching by looking for 
comparison between the case evidence with the pattern established in the literature or 
the theory. Rather the main themes that emerged during the data collection provided 
the foundation for the main pattern and explanation of the study. The data and the 
themes were studied over and over again. Patterns were identified from the themes 
and plausible explanations were constructed from the regularities observed. In other 
words, the patterns were identified from themes such as power, mismanagement, 
political interferences. Those themes occurred repeatedly across the data. These 
explanations are presented in chapters six and seven. The explanations are re-analysed 
in chapter eight using the theoretical framework and the literature to provide the 
interpretational explanation of the case.  
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5.5 Theoretical Framework that Guided the Study 
 
The theoretical framework employed for this thesis was discussed in detailed in 
chapter three, thus a brief overview is provided in this section. A theoretical 
framework is an essential starting-point for any case study research. According to 
Ryan et al., (2002, p. 144) “Theory is used in order to understand and explain the 
specific, rather than to produce generalisations.” 
 
Actor Network Theory (ANT) is drawn from as an interpretive lens to interpret and 
explain the data collected. ANT brings together human and non-human, social and 
technical factors in the same analytical view (Hassard et al., 1999) and treats 
everything in the social and natural world as effects or products of heterogeneous 
networks (see, Callon, 1986, 1987, Latour, 1987, Latour, 1993). Ryan et al. (2002) 
noted that it is appropriate to classify accounting work that draws on ANT within  the 
interpretive perspective (Ryan et al., 2002).  
 
Even though, ANT is a theory, it has some methodological implications. For instance, 
Latour (1987) suggested that we should study science/technology in action, not a 
ready made science/technology (Latour, 1987). The researcher needs to arrive before 
controversies were settled (Latour, 1987). In line with this recommendation, the 
researcher arrived in the organisation when the reform was on going. Till now reform 
issues are controversial and ongoing in the studied organisation. ANT also suggested 
that in order to analyse the actors the researcher has to follow the actors (Callon, 
1986, Latour 1987, Lowe, 2000). In line with this recommendation, the researcher 
followed various actors both inside and outside the organisations that were part of the 
reforms. NSC staff members that were part of the reforms were interviewed. As 
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discussed in the above section some of the human actors were identified through 
referral or lead from provided by the previous actors interviewed.  
 
5.6 Summary of the Chapter  
 
This chapter has presented the methodology (which is the process of conducting 
research) and methods (which refer to the techniques used to collect and analyse data) 
(Silverman, 1993; Ryan et al., 2002; Moll et al., 2006) adopted for this study. It was 
argued that the choice of an appropriate methodology depends on the research 
questions and the philosophical assumptions underpinning the research (Hopper and 
Powell, 1985; Burrell and Morgan, 1979).  
 
In order to present the philosophical assumptions underpinning this study the Burrell 
and Morgan (1979) framework was drawn upon. It was argued earlier in the chapter 
that the thesis can be located within the interpretive paradigm in the Burrell and 
Morgan framework. Interpretive researchers depend on language, sense making and 
the reflexivity of actors in understanding social context (Covaleski and Dirsmith, 
1990). The perspective “indicates that, in practice, accounting information may be 
attributed diverse meanings. Such diversity is intrinsic to an emergent social being 
redefined.  
After presenting the philosophical assumptions underpinning the study the appropriate 
methodology was presented. Qualitative methodology was adopted. This approach 
allowed the researcher to investigate a phenomenon from its natural setting (Tomkins 
and Groves, 1983; Hoepfl, 1997). For example, it enabled the researcher to study 
public sector reforms and MCS in their natural settings. The case study method also 
provided opportunity for the researcher to connect the reforms and MCS to the 
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context of the organisation (see; Burchell et al., 1980; Hopper and Powell, 1985; 
Hopwood, 1983; Hopwood, 1987).  
 
In addition, how the research was conducted was discussed. This included; the 
preparations for field work, how access was negotiated and how the data was 
collected. The pattern matching and explanations (Yin, 2003) data summary sheet and 
coding techniques (Miles and Huberman, 1994) adopted in the data analysis were also 
discussed.  
 
The chapter also highlighted the connection between the Actor Network theoretical 
framework and the process of collecting data. ANT encourages the researcher to give 
emphasis to both human and non-human factors in order to understand how facts re 
constructed (Lowe, 2001). In addition, MCS are viewed in ANT as a technology, and 
the theory provides the means of analysing how such technologies are constructed.  
 
Having discussed the research methodology in this chapter, the next chapter presents 
the explanations from the main themes identified in the case study.
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6 CHAPTER SIX: BACKGROUND OF THE NIGERIA STATE COMPANY 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
The previous chapter presented the methodology and method adopted for the thesis. 
The researcher believes that reality is socially constructed and can therefore be 
understood through the interpretation of the meaning of the subjects; thus the thesis 
was located within the interpretive approach. Public sector reforms and changes in 
Management Control Systems (hereafter, MCS) are socially constructed and therefore 
can be understood by relying on the subjective interpretation of the various 
organisational actors (Burchell et al., 1980; Hopwood, 1987; Ryan et al., 2002). 
Therefore, in order to understand public sector reforms in Nigeria and their 
implication on MCS, a case study was conducted in the Nigeria State Company 
(henceforth, NSC). This chapter examines the background of the NSC in order to 
understand its current operations and the reforms that took place. The examination 
draws from the literature and the main themes and patterns that emerged during the 
data collection and analysis.   
 
The chapter traces the history of the NSC, NSC operations, present structure and the 
various reforms that took place were examined with the aim of understanding the case 
organisation context and the reforms that took place from the subject’s own 
perspective.  
 
The chapter is structured into five sections. Following the introduction, the next 
section provides an overview of the NSC. The origin of the NCC, - which later 
became NSC and the functions of the NSC are discussed. The subsequent part 
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analysed the various reforms implemented in the NSC. The reforms were introduced 
in order for the NSC to be more efficient and effective, and in some cases for political 
reasons. Six reforms were identified and examined. Section 6.4 discusses NSC labour 
issues. The NSC’s employment processes, training and reward and punishment 
systems were investigated. The last section presents the chapter summary.  
 
6.2 An overview of the Nigeria State Company  
 
The NSC is the national company of Nigeria. It is one of the biggest state-owned 
enterprises in Nigeria, contributing hugely to GDP, government revenue and foreign 
exchange. The NSC was created in 1977 from the merger of the Nigeria Commercial 
Company (NCC) and a sister Ministry. In order to better understand the background 
of the NSC in general and the reforms that took/are taking place, an understanding of 
the creation of the NCC is needed. The formation of the NCC is discussed below.  
 
6.2.1 The Nigerian Commercial Corporation 
 
The NCC was set up in 1971 by a Decree. It was created to carry out government 
policies and ensure its participation in the sector it operates. Prior to the mid 1960s, 
the Nigerian government participation in the sector was restricted to the collection of 
tax and rent and royalties (Bezanis et al., 2000).  
 
The NCC was managed by a board of directors and general manager. The board 
comprised various government top officials (internal document). The NCC was given 
power to sue and be sued and hold assets or enter partnerships. However, the NCC 
was not allowed to borrow funds or dispose of any assets without the approval of a 
supervisory commissioner, and any surplus funds should be disposed of at the 
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commissioner’s discretion subject to the Federal Executive Council approval (internal 
document). In addition, the NCC was not authorised to carry out any activities outside 
the decree that set it up. Any such activities had to be authorised by the government.  
 
6.2.2 The Nigeria State Company 
 
The NSC was set up by the merger of the NCC
45
 and a Ministry by decree. The NSC 
was created as a public organisation to manage the nation’s resources. It was also 
given some regulatory power. The NSC was empowered to engage in all commercial 
activities relating its sector, and was to be run by a seven-man board, headed by the 
commissioner, and assisted by permanent secretaries This structure is similar to the 
NCC structure; the main difference was that the NSC was granted a little freedom in 
terms of the contracts it could award, and it was granted limited power to borrow 
funds (Internal documents).  
 
The duties of NSC were enacted by the Law of Federal Republic of Nigeria. The law 
set up NSC to supervise, regulate and increase the government’s participation in the 
industry NSC operates. However, there was little regard to NSC commercial 
purposes.  
 
6.3 Reforms in the NSC 
 
The NSC has undergone many reforms since its incorporation. Some of the reforms 
were directly imposed by the government. Several NSC staff argued that the reforms 
had almost the same aims, which were to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of 
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 NCC was said to have defaulted in its duties.  
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the NSC and to put some favoured people in key positions. Some staff argued that 
most of the reforms were fruitless, as they did not change NSC operations and 
performance.  
 
A total of six reforms were identified; these were:  
 Early 1980s reform 
 Mid 1980s reform 
 Commercialisation Reorganisation and Recapitalisation  
 The 1998 reform (organogram) 
 Project Alpha  
 Post debt relief reform 
 
The evidence shows that the most important reforms were the Commercialisation 
Reorganisation and recapitalisation of 1988 and the debt relief reforms. Therefore, the 
two most important reforms are discussed in greater detail below. 
 
6.3.1 Commercialisation, Reorganisation and Capitalisation 
 
Before the discussion of commercialisation, reorganisation and capitalisation reform, 
the reforms that took place prior to it are briefly outlined. The first restructuring took 
place in 1981 during the administration of Alhaji Shehu Shagari. This reorganisation 
was pursuant to Tribunal report. The tribunal reported several irregularities NSC 
contracts awarded to third-parties, inefficient accounting procedures, and that the 
NSC structure was too large to run efficiently. The commission recommended the 
decentralisation and reorganisation of the NSC in order to make it commercially 
viable. Consequent nine subsidiaries were created and a supervisory ministry was re-
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established. These subsidiaries were created in order to improve NSC’s efficiency, 
effectiveness, accountability and specialisation.  
 
The second restructuring took place in 1985. This reorganisation was an effort to 
enhance operational efficiency. According to some staff interviewed, the purpose of 
the reorganisation was to re-position the NSC for better performance toward 
discharging the public responsibility vested in it. A senior manager explained this as 
follows: 
At that time, the NSC could not understand what status it had, because at that 
time we were always talking of how the government would give us subvention 
to fund our operations. At a time the government said is high time, we have to 
look inwards and see how we can have better performance, at least break even. 
We [the government] do not charge you to make a profit, but at least you 
should break even. That means we should be able to finance our operations.  
 
Another manager described that as: 
At that time, the NSC was an arm of government without any definite 
structure. We are like an amoeba with no shape; everybody is reporting to a 
single Managing Director. 
 
The NSC was divided into five (5) semi-autonomous sectors. Each sector was 
comprised of different companies. During that period, the NSC top management was 
very powerful. A manager stated that as follows: 
I was in Port Harcourt then; when the sector head visited us we do go to the 
airport and lined up for them; they were very powerful. If the sector head likes 
you, you will be promoted; if not, you get nothing. Good performance was not 
rewarded, and that made staff care less about performance.  
 
The third reform was commercialisation, reorganisation and capitalisation. This was 
the major reform that took place in the NSC. A manager noted the following: 
You know the act that set up the NSC did not detail who should do this and 
that. It was as if there was no framework for working, so people were just 
happening on whatever job they were doing; you happened on it, it happened 
on them, or they happened on the job, and you just found yourself carrying it 
out. Although there were departments and divisions, the functions were not 
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clearly defined, the bottom line was not clearly defined, processes were not 
clearly defined and things were just haphazard.  
 
The above suggests that there was no structure and procedures in place prior to 
commercialisation. As discussed in chapter four, Nigeria adopted the Structural 
Adjustment Programme (hereafter, SAP) in 1986, with public sector reforms as one of 
its important components. In line with SAP reforms the NSC was restructured in 1988 
by President Babangida. The five sectors discussed above were broken down into 
many subsidiaries. These subsidiaries are referred to as Strategic Business Units 
(hereafter, SBUs), and other Customer Service Units (hereafter, CSUs) were created 
with the head office as the holding company at a centre and a Group Managing 
Director (hereafter, GMD) as the overall head. The SBUs were registered as limited 
liability companies which were allowed to operate independently with their own 
Managing Director (hereafter, MD) and Board of Directors. The GMD of the NSC 
during the time of restructuring stated that the main objectives of the reorganisation 
into SBUs were to reduce central detailed control and allow the SBUs the needed 
flexibility to optimise their business and operate commercially for the group’s best 
interest.  
 
This reorganisation was described by the head of state as establishing the NSC as a 
financially autonomous and commercially integrated company. The main implication 
of this reform was that the NSC was made financially autonomous and also that the 
NSC was to be provided with the adequate capital for the commercialisation; 
commercial justification must be provided for investment, and the NSC was expected 
to pay the government dividend. 
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Furthermore, an internal reform in preparations for commercialisation began in 1986 
with the adoption of strategic planning, which produced new mission (see section 
7.3.2). A Commercialisation Reorganisation Capitalisation project (hereafter, CRC) 
was set up to assist the NSC head office and subsidiaries in spreading and 
implementing the new mission in 1988. The CRC was also done with the help of 
consultant Arthur Anderson and Co. Some experienced staff were drawn from the 
NSC to work with the consultants. The consultant and the staff (that is the reform 
team) went round the organisation and looked at jobs at the NSC; they received input 
from the staff who were doing the job and those who know the job, and established 
what the NSC was doing wrong, and how it could be corrected and improved. A 
thorough investigation and identification of the root causes of some problems and the 
possible solutions were carried out. A manager reported: 
 
We did the reform but to implement it became the problem. The blueprint was 
done but implementation is another thing. 
 
At the expiration of the Arthur Anderson contract, the CRC team was dissolved and 
the consultants were asked to leave. Many staff interviewed suggested that the reason 
for not extending the contract was that the NSC felt that they had spent more than 
enough money.  
 
However, NSC management wanted what the CRC had done to continue, so they 
asked the staff who had worked with the consultants to remain and form a unit 
Consultant Unit (hereafter, CU); the most senior NSC staff in the team was given the 
mandate to coordinate the unit and continue with CRC ideas. The CU produced many 
initiatives and later it served as an in-house consulting unit, in which all SBUs and 
other units could consult in areas where they were having problems.  
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CRC was not fully realised as the commercialisation and recapitalisation aspects were 
not achieved. The government grasped on NSC affairs, and operations continued and 
the NSC was not recapitalised.  
 
6.3.2 Project Alpha 
 
Project Alpha was the fourth reform that took place in NSC. Before discussing Project 
Alpha, an overview of Organogram is presented. Organogram was the forth reform 
that took place in the NSC. The reform restructured NSC into six Directorates in 
1998. The directorates were headed by Group Executive Directors (hereafter, GED). 
The aims of the organogram were to identify the staff requirement of NSC, flatten its 
structure in order to enhance efficiency, accountability and communications, 
introduce cost measures and outsource some of its activities (internal documents). In 
1999, Obasanjo returned to power as a civil president and revived economic reforms 
with public sector reforms at the key element. The administration reduced the NSC 
directorates described above from six to four, and set up a Committee in 2000 with a 
view to restructuring, liberalising and privatising some of the NSC SBUs (Internal 
Document). 
 
Project Alpha was introduced in 2004, during Obasanjo’s second term in office. 46 
According to the NSC GMD:  
The project was in response to the federal government’s mandate to the NSC to 
achieve an aggressive sustainable growth agenda  
 
The Project was introduced with the aim of restructuring the NSC into a World-Class 
Company like its peers. Several interviewees argued that the aim of Project Alpha was 
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 Note that presidential approval was given before the project was implemented (various staff). 
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to restructure the NSC into a holding company with subsidiaries as a distinct entity, 
and to focus more on commercial activity and gradually exit regulatory activities.  
 
The NSC’s state of affairs prior to Project Alpha was described by several 
interviewees as having been politicised without focus, accountability, capital, 
commercial mindset/execution and enabling processes. The GMD described the 
situation thus:  
…Many of our business processes are still manual and archaic; NSC’s roles are 
not completely clear and approval limits/ controls are cumbersome and actually 
slow down the pace of work. On the people’s dimension, I will like to see a 
stronger performance in accountability. In addition, there has been a serious 
deterioration in capability and capacity of our people and hence their productivity 
(NSC, 2004, p. 7). 
 
Like CRC, Project Alpha was done by consultants in collaboration with NSC staff. 
Two consultants, Accenture and Shell Manufacturing Services (SMS), were engaged 
for the project. The Project was introduced as follows: it was first discussed by the top 
management. Following the discussion, a memo was issued to all staff informing 
them that the NSC had decided to embark on the project. Staff who were interested in 
working with the project team were asked to apply. Following the application, the 
staff were asked to sit an examination, and the successful applicants were invited for 
interviews. Those who passed the interview were invited to work with the consultants.  
 
Project Alpha was done in two phases; the first Phase was the diagnostics phase, and 
lasted for four months. During this phase, the project team carried out a diagnostic 
assessment of the NSC situation, based on its mission, vision and oil industry best 
practices (NSC document). The NSC processes, people and technology were 
analysed; gaps were identified and ways of addressing the gaps were proposed 
(Internal document). The second Phase was the implementation phase and was 
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scheduled to last for 20 months. This phase was designed to address the findings of 
the first phase, recommend solutions, designed and implements new systems, policies, 
processes and staff training required (Internal documents). 
 
The project team carried out enlightenment seminars, in-house publications, 
publications in the newspapers and placed several notices on various NSC notice 
boards. The consultants interacted with staff to find out what the staff problems were 
and what should be the preferred solution. They identified what was called ‘quick 
wins’ and management gave them approval to start implementing some of the quick 
wins, especially the less complex ones, while the more complex problems were 
addressed at head office.  
 
The consultants discovered that the NSC had no culture, did not know what its core 
values are and its operations were not being done within a commercial practice. For 
example, in Information Technology, a member of the NSC staff had to reach a 
certain level before the organisation put a laptop or desk top on his/her table. 
Therefore, the argument of Project Alpha was that everybody should have at least a 
desktop on his/her table.  
 
Moreover, performance management and training were identified as one of the 
weaknesses of the NSC. Consequently, Project Alpha introduced career advisers, new 
methods of performance management, job evaluation, and job description. A new 
organisational structure was proposed but is yet to be implemented. An electronic 
market place was created in which the NSC can advertise and get contracts as well. 
Other initiatives include MIS, Performance Agreement Contracts, Service Level 
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Agreement; NSC new Culture Brand, Performance Measurement System and Human 
Resources connects.  However, implementing these initiatives became a problem. 
Further initiatives regarding management control systems are discussed in section 7.4.  
 
With regard to the subsidiaries visited, Project Alpha had not really worked on the 
first subsidiary the researcher visited. At the beginning, the subsidiary was looked at, 
but when the issue of privatisation
47
 came up, its reforms were de-emphasised. The 
reform concentrated on the subsidiaries that were to remain with the NSC. The 
subsidiary managers interviewed stressed that further, as the Project Alpha had not 
introduced any change in their operations, there are no well functioning computers; 
computers are more a status symbol, and there are no functioning photocopiers. 
 
In the second subsidiary visited, Project Alpha tried to restructure the organogram. 
According to many staff interviewed, the consultant’s main concern was that the way 
the subsidiary operates under the departments is not right. They proposed that the 
subsidiary should operate under its assets. The consultants enlarged the size of the 
subsidiary management, from having two Executive Directors (EDS) to five EDs. 
 
In the third subsidiary visited by the researcher, a manager who happened to be part of 
one of the Project Alpha teams explained his team assignment as designing 
appropriate tariffs for the subsidiary, as explained below: 
I was sent as an accountant to work with the team. And our involvement there 
is to supply information of the costs of our operations - both capital and 
operations expenditure - all with the view to work out appropriate tariffs to be 
charged on our services. 
 
                                                 
47
 The subsidiary was earmarked for privatisation. 
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The idea was that the federal government was going to open up the control and 
operations of the subsidiary, so that every other person who wanted to use the 
subsidiary’s facilities can do so; hence, the team was asked to propose a commercial 
tariff, irrespective of whether it is the NSC or any other third party: in other words, a 
commercial tariff.  
 
Project Alpha also looked at the third subsidiary supply distribution; as the NSC pays 
high demurrage. Project Alpha looked at what causes this high charge and 
inefficiency and what could be done to reduce the costs. In addition, the team looked 
at tools that could aid management in decision making and cost reduction in general 
(see chapter seven). However, the initiatives for the subsidiary were not implemented; 
some were cut off mid-way; some pilot implementations were tried, but they too were 
not successful. Furthermore, the subsidiary staff argued that the project failed to reach 
those staff in locations outside it headquarters.  
  
Overall, the evidence suggested that Project Alpha had not improved NSC activities. 
Many of the NSC staff interviewed argued that the full value of Project Alpha would 
not be realised until its recommendations had been fully implemented. They 
acknowledged that the implementation of these recommendations as a major 
challenge to NSC. This was confirmed by the consultants interviewed. The consultant 
explained that they are not allowed to work for the Nigerian government; they took 
the NSC job because it is a company. However, they found that the NSC culture is 
different from that of private organisations, which results in its working in a different 
way. They argued that decisions were often not taken or executed by the NSC. For 
instance, the consultants discussed and agreed on issues with the management but the 
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actual implementation of those issues is another matter. Most of the time, nothing is 
being implemented. 
 
However, some staff argued that the project did not carry them along and the change 
was fast. According to the interviewees, the project did not address the NSC’s core 
problems, which is a free hand to run the business; rather the project created a feeling 
of discomfort among them. Many staff were retrenched and new hands employed. 
According to one manager, about nine thousand (9000) staff was retrenched as a 
result of the project. Many of the interviewees questioned the criteria used for the 
exercise, and also those of recruitment. A manager commented as follows: 
They will say they [referring to the consultant] have interviewed new staff but 
that is a lie; they come with their own agenda, they will end up recruiting their 
own staff and giving them higher positions … They will come and say we need 
group recruitment and they know the quality; they will sit down and draw up 
fantastic criteria for recruitment, they will look at everything but along the way 
they smuggle their own people in, claiming that they have all those 
qualifications and at higher posts, so that they will continue to give them the 
jobs, and they will continue to survive. Isn’t it a Third World? These are some 
of the problems; it kills the spirits and makes a lot of us not want to work. It 
makes a lot of us believe that these people come with an agenda. 
 
The opinion of some interviewees was that the Project was taking on the ideal 
situation, which is not there in NSC. One of the managers even challenged the 
researcher to ask anybody to show her an income statement. He argued that nobody 
can present it, because it is not a priority. The manager emphasised the point further: 
As far as I am concerned, what is aspired by project Alpha is a dream; whether 
we want to actualise it or not is another matter. 
 
It was argued by some managers that the project did not put pressure on NSC 
management to implement some vital changes. For instance, in the NSC one has to be 
a manager before one can get a laptop/desktop. The staff argued that the consultant 
did not make it a requirement to the NSC management for every member of staff to 
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get a laptop/desk top and network the entire organisation. They argued further that the 
consultant did not tell management this is what to do, for example, train people and be 
vertical or horizontal; what they did was produce volume of templates.  
 
Some staff even admitted to hating the project. They argued that the NSC had wasted 
money on what the staff themselves can do, as what the consultant had delivered was 
not significant. However, some argued that the consultants, being an external party to 
the NSC, acted as a third eye and also gave the project some credibility; if this had 
been done by internal staff, such credibility would not have been achieved.  
 
The comments of people outside the NSC were sought with regard to the project’s 
impact on NSC performance. A response from one interviewee was as follows: 
My own view is that NSC performance has not changed as a result of the 
transformation; in fact, we see the performance changing negatively. [staffs are 
transferred to different subsidiaries]We see those people in meetings; they 
don’t know what is happening and they don’t want to learn. Those staff deals 
with other staff from [Multinational Corporations (MNC)] that had held the 
same type of portfolio for 16-17 years. You will see the MNC people trying to 
deal with somebody that came just two months ago, so obviously he has more 
knowledge over him.  
 
Several people interviewed outside the NSC were of the opinion that NSC reform had 
not met the government objectives. The transformation was criticised for having no 
mission, vision or objective and not being value driven. It was seen as a waste of 
money; large amounts of reports had been submitted but nothing had been 
implemented. An external auditor stated the following: 
Anyway, we were here when they talked about it [Project Alpha]; some of 
them staff went to Abuja to enjoy themselves, and came back with theories and 
theories. As far I am concerned, I have not seen anything that Project Alpha 
has brought into the system. Nevertheless, the people who introduced it will 
tell you about one thousand and one changes that have taken place. 
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It was argued by some managers that the reform has not addressed all aspects of the 
NSC business; Project Alpha and the other reforms do not touch the details of what is 
happening with foreign partners. Those components were assumed to be on the right 
path, doing very well. It is only those areas manned, controlled or being governed by 
Nigerians that the reforms are applied to. The operations with partners are where the 
whole business is, and according to staffs where the transformation is needed. 
Everywhere that the Nigerians are working is where the reform is looking at, but the 
one the white people are handling most of the time is assumed to be satisfactory. 
 
Nevertheless, a number of staff argued that they do not blame the reforms or the 
consultants for that; even concerning their processes and procedures, it is not that they 
do not have them, but that NSC staff does not look at them. Processes and procedures 
are ignored; nobody is bothered or cares about them.  
 
A manager described the situation as follows: 
All the reforms are lies. They did not bring anything. 
 
A politician gave a general view about reforms in Nigeria, as follows: 
I believe there was no reform in Nigeria. Nigerians are selfish and they don’t 
want any reform. There are groups of Nigerians who are against any reform 
that may affect them, so they try to undo the promoters of the change. 
 
Project Alpha came to an end in August 2007. The NSC management asked the 
consultants to close their books and leave. According to some interviewees, the 
consultants were asked to leave because they were not operating as fast as they were 
supposed to (the consultants were not achieving targets). Initially, the consultants 
were not monitored. Towards the end of the project, the management set up a team to 
manage the reform and the consultants. The situation with the consultants was 
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described differently by some managers as follows: there was a difference in 
understanding between what the consultants mean by implementation and what the 
NSC management thought. For consultants, implementation means designing 
templates and handing them to the NSC, whereas the NSC thought it was the actual 
implementation. The NSC management argued with the consultants that this was not 
what they employed them to do; the consultants replied was that this was what they 
were supposed to do, and if the NSC wanted them to implement the 
recommendations, then a new contract would have to be negotiated. The NSC refused 
to renegotiate a new contract, and the project came to an end. Furthermore, a new 
government came to power and a new GMD was appointed. The aim of the new 
government was to restructure the whole industry.  
 
The responsibility of implementing the project Alpha imitative was handed over to 
Total Quality Department. The department took over the implementation in the head 
office and passed on implementation in the subsidiaries to the some managers situated 
in those subsidiaries.
48
  
 
In summary, the various NSC reforms were viewed by many staff as an attempt to 
achieve the same thing. One manager argued about CRC and Alpha as follows: 
To me CRC and Alpha is just the nomenclature; it is just a change of name 
because I was one of the commercialisation committee. I just keep asking 
myself what is new?  
 
The reforms were both made with the use of consultants. An interviewee, who 
happened to work with the consultants during both the CRC and Project Alpha, stated 
that: 
                                                 
48
 Note that the managers reported to their respective CEOs and collaborated with department in head 
office 
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The CRC did a better job than project Alpha, the white consultants. We deal 
with them better than the Nigeria base Accenture. During the CRC, the NSC 
staff has more power, but for Alpha the consultants were given more authority 
than the staff. 
 
The last reform identified the post debt relief reform. This is a radical reform which 
targets the entire sector NSC operates in. The reform aims to divide the NSC into five 
separate companies.   
 
In summary, as at the present time, the NSC is still undergoing reforms. As noted 
above, the purpose of all the reforms can be summarised as trying to make the NSC 
more commercially oriented, also for political reasons. For most of the time, 
whenever there is a change in government in Nigeria, NSC management is also 
changed. The next section presents an overview of NSC labour issues. 
 
6.4 An overview of Labour Issues in the NSC 
 
In this section, the NSC employment process is analysed. The NSC training process, 
remuneration, reward and punishment system are illustrated. Employment in the NSC 
is a big problem as it has to be approved by the Nigerian government. During the 
economic crisis, the Nigerian government placed an employment embargo on all 
federal government ministries and state enterprises; thus, employment is one of the 
problems identified by project Alpha. A manager described that as follows: 
One of the issues Project Alpha discovered is that our structure is like 
kwashiorkor
49
; there was no employment for 12 years, so the top is heavy 
while the lower staff levels are very, very thin. 
 
In other words, the manager meant the top level of the organisation is saturated with 
staff while at the lower level there was a shortage of staff. The NSC downsized from 
                                                 
49
 Kwashiorkor is a disease cause by lack of protein that affects children. It results in the child having a 
big upper body and a thin lower part. 
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seventeen thousand (17,000) to eight thousand (8,000) staff. Later, around two 
thousand (2,000) new people were hired. The new hired staff included experienced 
and graduate trainees for succession plan.  
 
The NSC employment process is as follows: First the NSC seeks approval from the 
president or the supervising minister - whoever is responsible. Following the 
presidential or the ministerial approval, the NSC places an advertisement in national 
daily newspapers. Once the applications have been received, they are looked at and a 
short-list is drawn. The short listed people are called for aptitude tests. The short-
listed candidates are notified through publishing their names in different newspapers. 
Sometimes, they are contacted by email and mobile phones. After the aptitude test, 
successful candidates are called for interviews. Following the interviews, the NSC 
draws up lists of prospective candidates who are eligible for employment. The list is 
sent to the president or the minister for his approval, and when approval is granted, 
employment letters are dispatched to the successful candidates. 
 
During the recruitment, the NSC is mandated by the Nigerian government to consider 
what is referred to as the Federal character (Quota system), and also gives more 
priority to people some part of the country. In some instances, the NSC engaged 
consultants to carry out the recruitment (after getting the approval from the federal 
government to go ahead and recruit).  
 
However, only NSC head office can recruit staff. The SBUs management were not 
permitted to recruit; they can recruit only National Youth Service Corps Scheme 
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(NYSC)
50
 and Industrial Trainees (IT) staff.
51
 Several interviewees attribute some of 
their problems to the manner in which the NSC recruits its staff. A manager reported 
the following: 
In Nigeria and NSC we do things differently; for example, when we are 
employing, we don’t look at merit. All we do is massive employment, without 
regards to what we need.  
 
 
The general practice in the NSC is to train its staff at least one week per annum. 
However, that revolves around availability of funds, as the NSC cannot afford to train 
everybody. Project Alpha introduced a training needs analysis form. The form is 
attached to individual appraisal forms. Each individual, together with his supervisors, 
is asked to identify the kind of training she/he needs and write it down on the form. 
The forms are sent to the head office Group Learning Department who identifies and 
allocates relevant courses. The process is the same in the SBU: they send the forms to 
the Group Learning Department; a manager in the SBU described the process further:  
Those staff that the Group Learning Department did not attach any relevant 
course to, we look at their training need here at our level and assigned courses 
to them.  
 
These training courses are carried out within and outside Nigeria. In addition, the 
NSC head office and the SBUs organise local courses. However, a member of staff in 
SBU described an incident regarding training as follows: 
There was a time when HR sent us a questionnaire about what is done well, 
what needs to be improved and areas in which we need training. When I filled 
mine in, colleagues told me, you are supposed to know all of these things; if 
not HR will think you are not qualified enough. I told him no, I want them to 
train me, so when the time for training came, they called me many times and 
those same colleagues started saying that I had lobbied for it, I told them no. I 
had told HR what I needed and they provided it for me. 
 
                                                 
50
 NYSC is a compulsory national scheme on all Nigerians under the age of thirty who have graduated 
from universities and polytechnics. 
51
 Within the student programme, the researcher was given an IT status during the data collection; this 
enabled smooth entry into the organisation. 
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However, in the NSC, to train staff is one thing; to utilise what was gained from the 
training is another. One of the politicians interviewed noted the following: 
In the NSC, for example, staff are sent abroad for training. But by the time 
they come back, they will get promoted and leave the place the training is 
meant for, meaning the training has not benefited the NSC or even themselves.  
 
This was confirmed by an interviewee in one of the SBUs, who had attended training 
on their new MIS when he was part of the team implementing the MIS. The staff 
explained that after the training he was transferred; thus he never used the MIS.  
 
Furthermore, training in the NSC is political. A manager explained that as follows: 
there was a training course assigned to his role and, as the person on that role, he was 
supposed to undertake the training. However, his immediate boss did not like him, 
and he was not sent for the training. The training was later allocated to the person 
acting on his behalf while he was on annual vacation. 
 
The NSC takes good care of its staff, as many staff interviewed believes their 
remuneration package is very good. In terms of rewards, the NSC had what was called 
the Chief Executive Merit award and a yearly increment. With regard to punishment, 
supervisors are empowered to issue queries. Any member of staff who has been 
queried three times is issued with a warning letter; that may also affect his/her 
promotion and can lead to termination of employment.  
 
6.5 Summary of the Chapter 
 
This chapter presents an analysis of the NSC. The origin of the NCC which later 
became part of the NSC was described. The NCC, later the NSC, was the public 
sector organisation through which the Nigerian government participates in the sector 
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NSC operates. The analysis shows that, although the NSC was charged to engage in 
all activities related to the industry it operates, it has not yet delivered on that. For 
most of the time, some of NSC SBUs are down; its company production is 
insignificant in comparison to the overall production of the sector. Various 
restructuring had taken place in order to make the NSC more efficient and effective, 
and also for some political reasons. These restructuring processes were analysed, and 
revealed that economic reforms and changes in government had triggered all the 
reforms and that most of the reforms had not reached their logical conclusion. NSC 
reforms were carried out with the help of consultants; when the consultants left, the 
reforms suffered some setbacks. CRC and Project Alpha initiatives were not fully 
implemented; some were abandoned.  
 
The structure of NSC and its labour process are illustrated. Even though NSC was 
established as a public enterprise, the analysis revealed that it is tightly controlled by 
the government. Employment and appointments are decided by the government.  
 
The next chapter presents the NSC accounting systems and changes in MCS.  
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7 CHAPTER SEVEN: ACCOUNTING SYSTEMS AND ACCOUNTING 
CHANGE IN NSC 
 
7.1 Introduction 
 
The previous chapter provided an overview of the history, operations, reforms and the 
present structure of the Nigeria State Company (hereafter, NSC), the case study of this 
thesis. In this chapter, the NSC accounting systems in general and Management 
Control Systems (hereafter, MCS) in particular are analysed. This analysis draws from 
the main themes and patterns that emerged during the data collection and analysis. 
The data was manually sorted and the accounting systems that kept re-occurring were 
identified. This chapter is important in order to understand the NSC’s MCS and their 
changes from the users’ (that is, NSC staff and management) own perspectives. What 
the users perceived as MCS, how they work and what hinders or aids how they work 
was analysed. At the same time, important attention was given to the new MCS 
change, the process of the change and its implementation.  
 
The remainder of the chapter is organised into four sections, as follows. Section 7.2 
analyses the NSC external accounting process. The legal requirement for the NSC to 
produce financial accounts, and the actual practice is examined. The subsequent 
section examined the NSC internal accounting processes. The MCS employed and 
how they are utilised are all discussed. Specifically, the NSC strategic planning and 
budgeting processes is analysed. Section 7.4 examined the NSC MCS change 
initiatives and implementation. The NSC has introduced various recent MCS 
innovations and these were all examined. The final section presents the chapter 
summary.  
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7.2 External Reporting 
 
The Group Accounts Department is responsible for preparing the NSC head office 
final accounts and consolidating the Group Account. Each subsidiary (hereafter, SBU) 
prepares the financial statements and gets them audited by their auditor before 
submitting the reports to the head office for consolidation. Customer Service Units 
(henceforth, CSUs) do not prepare their financial statements as they were normally 
considered as part of the responsibility of head office. All SBU assets belong to the 
NSC. The SBUs pay the NSC leasing fees on the assets.  
 
The NSC, being a state-owned enterprise, is mandated under section 85(2) of the 
Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 to prepare an annual account. 
Section 85(2) stated: 
The public accounts of the Federation and of all offices and courts of the 
Federation shall be audited and reported on to the Auditor-General who shall 
submit his reports to the National Assembly; and for that purpose, the Auditor-
General or any person authorised by him in that behalf shall have access to all 
the books, records, returns and other documents relating to those accounts. 
 
In addition to the above section, the act that set up NSC required the corporation to 
prepare, audit and submit its accounts. 
 
Furthermore, section 331 of Companies and Allied Matters Act 1990 makes it 
compulsory for all companies operating in Nigeria to keep proper financial records. 
However, despite all this legislation, the evidence suggested that the financial 
statements of the NSC are prepared late. Several staff recalled a period when their 
financial statements were about eight years in arrears. A manager recalled an instance 
as follows: 
I remember vividly in 1991 when the government was trying to take some 
strategic decision for public enterprises, and the NSC could not present the 
 179 
current accounts - both financial and whatever. Then almost everybody was in 
trouble, running up and down. 
 
This delay in producing financial accounts led to the introduction by the NSC of the 
SUN system.
52
 However, the introduction of the SUN accounts did not completely 
improve the financial reporting system. For instance, in some of the subsidiaries, the 
SUN account system is not linked to all its offices. Each department has its own 
database and is supposed to back up its monthly, quarterly, half yearly and annual 
data and send it to their subsidiary head office for consolidation. This results in 
delaying the preparation and production of the subsidiary financial accounts, and the 
NSC’s group accounts as well.  
 
An external auditor to one of the SBUs stated the following: 
I recalled five or six years ago when we came for the audit; we had to do about 
three or four years’ audit in which they were not doing, but the audit now is on 
a yearly basis; for example, the one we are doing is for the year end 2007. For 
the past six years, we have been doing it on a yearly basis and there is 
improvement on their record keeping and management of accounts as a whole. 
 
However, when the researcher tried to link the improvement of financial reporting 
with the implementation of Sun Accounts, the external auditors view was that the Sun 
Accounts had been there for a long time, but its management had not; they argued that 
there were no proper hands to manage the Sun Accounts. The improvement in the 
recent financial reporting was attributed to better hands managing the Sun Accounts 
and audit instance.  
 
Financial accounts, or rather accounting in general, are not given much importance in 
the NSC. A manager noted the following: 
                                                 
52
 The adoption of Sun Accounts system is discussed in section 7.4.2 
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Actually here the managers don’t know you because you don’t pay them by 
cash or cheque. The only accountant who is working is the one that pays them. 
As far as they are concerned, those of you who are in charge of the preparation 
of annual accounts are not useful. They don’t understand the importance of the 
annual accounts and other accounting functions. The accounting function is 
given less importance than other functions. Accountants are just pay masters. 
 
Several accounting staff described the constraints they face owing to the lack of 
adequate staff. For example, in one of the SBUs the researcher visited, the 
Management Accounting department was supposed to be manned by six (6) 
personnel, according to the SBU structure. However, the department was manned by 
only three staff and at some point by only one officer. A manager described that thus: 
All the staff you see here are not full staff; they are Nation Youth Service 
Corps (NYSC) and Industrial Trainee (IT), so how can you run a department 
like this? In the NSC everybody wants to remain in head office; the head office 
is jam packed with no job to do there. Our management don’t value 
accounting, or management accounting. They don’t care whether we are staff 
or not. 
 
It was believed in the NSC that their annual accounts are not for public consumption. 
There were many reports regarding the non availability of NSC financial accounts in 
the newspapers. A manager explained that in 2005, when the Nigerian government 
became committed to accountability to the public, the NSC felt that there was a need 
for them to start publishing their accounts in the newspapers, and not wait until 
someone come and tell them to start doing so. Hence, in 2005, the NSC decided to 
print an abridged statement for public consumption. However, the publication of the 
accounts was viewed by another group of staff as improper. One manager argued the 
following: 
Everything here is political, so you have to be political as well. How can you 
publish an un-audited trial balance in the newspaper and go out and shout that 
we are making money. People will say, yes, the NSC is making money without 
taking into consideration capital spent to earn that revenue. If what is given to 
us is given to a private company they would have made more than the profit 
we had. They do publish un-audited accounts. 
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The above analysis shows that in the NSC financial reporting is not given the priority 
it should be given. The preparation and auditing of financial accounts is not perceived 
as an important aspect of the business.  
 
7.3  Internal Reporting 
7.3.1 Costing System 
 
The NSC does not have a structured cost accounting system. Some accountants with 
whom the researcher interacted were of the view that the NSC is not a factory, hence 
there is no need for a costing system. Also, concerning the way the NSC operates, 
some of the subsidiaries, depend on processing fees as their source of income. The 
processing fee is determined by the NSC and is not based on cost of production.  
 
However, another group of staff argued that not having an adequate costing system is 
a major problem, as most of the time determining NSC operations costs is very 
difficult. At the time of the research, a member of the management staff explained 
that the accounts department is required to produce a corporate policy on cost 
allocation, which they have yet to do. The staff questions the basis on which their 
planning department allocates cost, because there was no policy in place. The 
researcher asked some planning managers about how they allocate costs, and the reply 
received was that they do not allocate cost. Instead, when each SBU/CSU brings 
his/her own costs, the planning department checks that with their own prices. If there 
is a discrepancy, the head of that SBU/CSU has to justify why their cost is higher than 
their own. They argue that their department is like a check.  
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In the NSC, rules and politics dominate timeliness, efficiency and cost effectiveness. 
An auditor described this further as follows: 
Everything is being funded by the head office. At the end of the year the SBU 
prepares and sends their budget to head office. The head office approves any 
amount they feel like approving; they just make a blanket approval. It is now 
up to the management to be able to say: okay, this is how the cost should be 
applied. Also, some of the costs are outside the control of the SBU 
management, like salary and wages. The staff strength is determined by the 
head office. The head office can send and transfer any staff, as they want. 
Hence the SBU cannot control this cost, so cost management is not properly 
applied here. It is not really here.  
 
What most costing units in SBUs do is capture cost; a member of the costing unit staff 
described this as follows: 
We are not engaged initially - for example - to look at whether what we are 
doing is profitable or not. We do not do the analysis; engineers do the costing, 
we are just being asked to pay. We don’t take part; engineers and top 
management do that. 
 
Costing is not given priority in the NSC; this can be confirmed by an example given 
by an interviewee from NSC regulators as follows: 
We attended a meeting with one of NSC’s MD. When asked about cost of 
producing one of NSC’s product he couldn’t answer us; he said he would find 
that out and get back to us. He couldn’t even tell us the industry’s average 
costs of production. 
 
In summary, most of the interviewees were of the opinion that the whole NSC cost 
system is not scientific. However, the researcher found out that one of the SBUs 
visited has what they called Activity Base Costing (hereafter, ABC). The SBU’s ABC 
is discussed in the next section. 
 
7.3.2 Planning and Budgeting and Performance Measurement Activities in the 
NSC 
 
In the NSC, planning and budgeting is done jointly. According to several interviewees 
and documents analysed, the NSC introduced strategic planning in 1986 and was 
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among the pioneer companies to have adopted it in Nigeria. The strategic planning 
was adopted following the Nigerian government’s adoption of the Structural 
Adjustment Programme (SAP) with public sector reforms as its main elements 
(Internal Document) (see chapter four for discussion on SAP adoption in Nigeria). It 
was introduced in preparation for NSC commercialisation, in order to reform it 
towards becoming an efficient, accountable and a result oriented organisation. Arthur 
Anderson and Co (consultants) were engaged for the process. The initial focus of the 
strategic planning was on efficiency, profitability and prudent management. A 
strategic plan was drawn for all Strategic Business Units (hereafter, SBUs) identified 
within the NSC, and a new mission was formulated.  
 
A Commercialisation, Reorganisation and Capitalisation (Hereafter, CRC) project 
was set to provide expertise and help for the NSC management and the SBUs to 
implement the above mission. CRC was discussed in section 6.3.1.  
 
The implementation of strategic planning lasted for two years. Workshops, 
consultation, seminars and training were carried out to educate staff on the concept. 
The NSC strategic planning involved examination of the business environment, 
identification of areas of strength and weaknesses, business mission development, 
objective settings and strategies to achieve them. Staff that witnessed or were part of 
the strategic planning implementation noted that, prior to the introduction of strategic 
planning, there was nothing really like planning in the NSC. What is done is the 
budget and there was nothing to link the budget to performance. A manager 
commented as follows: 
It was when we started the strategic plan that we began to look at the whole 
picture, and the totality of what we are doing, because now when people get 
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the budget, every budget is tied to a performance; when you spend the money 
you have to show the product of the money. Strategic planning brought in 
accountability.  
 
The NSC’s strategic planning is done top down. The cycle starts around May each 
year. During that time, the NSC’s top management, which comprises the Group 
General Manager (GMD), Group Executive Directors (GEDs), subsidiaries Managing 
Directors (MDs), and Group General Managers (GGMs), hold a retreat. During the 
retreat, the top management looks at the previous year’s business plan and 
performance, the current year’s plan and performance and how far the NSC has 
achieved its mission and vision, and the lessons learnt as well as the difficulties and 
opportunities. In addition, the global and domestic business environment is reviewed. 
The Corporate Planning and Development Division (hereafter, CPDD) are the 
facilitators of the retreat; CPDD makes presentations and puts what top management 
has discussed in writing. At the end of the retreat, whatever the top management has 
agreed upon becomes the planning objectives, which become the medium term 
strategic direction of the NSC. These strategic directions are further articulated by the 
CPDD into top-down directives and three-year corporate planning guidelines for the 
entire NSC. The CPDD then holds a planners’ meeting to which all planners and 
planning managers are invited from all CSUs/SBUs and are informed about what top 
management wants to do in the following year. Budget circulars are issued and the 
planning managers are asked to go to back to their respective CSUs and SBUs and 
work on the plan, how they are going to do it, what they need and the challenges 
anticipated.  
 
In the SBUs, the planning managers prepare the strategic plan and the strategic 
direction of their respective SBU, and draw the budget in line with the strategic 
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direction and plan. SBU planning department obtains inputs from all the various 
departments. Each department states its strategic plan and direction for the year and, 
in line with that, states what would be needed to achieve that. In other words, each 
department must state what they need in order to achieve its plan in monetary terms. 
By the time all the departments submit their strategic plan and budget to the Planning 
and Budget Monitoring Department (hereafter, PBMD), the PBMD looks at whether 
the departments have abided with the projections given to them, collates everything 
and produces a consolidated budget for the SBU. 
 
The PBMD organises a budget defence session for each division. Every division (all 
departments under a division) is invited to come and defend its budget. The defence is 
conducted in the presence of the divisional head. After the divisional budget defence, 
the PMBD organises another general budget defence session to which all Heads of 
Departments (HODs) are invited, regardless of their division; the Managing Director 
(MD), Executive Director Services (EDS) and Executive Director Operation (EDO) 
will all be present. The PBMB presents the general picture of the budget to them for 
their assessment, criticism and contribution. After the general defence, the PBMD 
takes all observations into consideration and reworks the budget. The redrafted budget 
is then presented to the Management Executive Committee (MEXCOM); if they are 
satisfied with it, the budget is then sent to the CPDD for consolidation into the NSC 
group budget. This procedure is similar to that of the CSU.  
 
The CPDD, after receiving of all the SBUs/CSUs budget proposals, organises a 
budget defence session for every directorate, to which all the SBUs/CSUs under the 
directorate will be invited; for example, Exploration and Production Directorates, all 
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CSUs/SBUs under those directorates, the GMD and the directorate GED will be 
invited, as well as Managing Directors (MDs) and Group General Managers (GGM)
53
 
who have to defend their budget to the CPDD and top management. Following the 
defence, the CPDD compiles the plan and budget of all SBUs/CSUs into a single plan 
and budget of the entire NSC. The consolidated budget is then presented to top 
management by the CPDD for input, consideration and recommendations for the 
board approval. The top management input is considered, the budget is redrafted in 
line with that and submitted to top management again for their approval and passage 
to the NSC board for further approval. Once the budget is approved by the NSC 
board, it is then passed to the Minister or the President depending on who is in charge 
for final approval. The planners in SBUs and CSUs report to their MDs or GGMs, not 
to the CPDD, although they do send various reports to the CPDD. 
 
NSC operates a three-year rolling plan. The plan is a three-year long term and one-
year short term. The budget is divided into two: revenue budget and expenditure 
budget; the expenditure budget is further divided into two: capital and operation 
expenditure. The capital expenditure is also divided into movables and major capital 
projects.  
 
The NSC’s capital expenditure budget is prepared annually along with the operations 
budget. Because of the nature of capital projects, the project cost is spread over years, 
with the cost budgeted for on a yearly basis. Provision is made for the phase of the 
project to be done every year. In addition, every capital project must have a 
justification package.  
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 Both SBUs and CSUs are headed by Group General Managers (GGMs), but in SBUs they are not 
called GGMs, but managing directors.  
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However, some groups of managers have argued that the manner the capital budgeting 
is done in some cases leads to capital projects being abandoned, especially when the 
cash flow is negative. Further, in the case of capital expenditure, no overrun is 
permitted, whilst for operation expenditure, expenditure is permitted, even if the 
budget is not provided for. 
 
7.3.2.1 Budget Monitoring  
 
Once the budget is approved, the CPDD passes the approved budget to Group Finance 
and Accounts Department (hereafter, GFAD) in head office and Finance and Account 
units in SBUs for implementation and monitoring. The budget section of the Group 
Budget and Project Department monitors the operations and the movable expense 
section of the budget, while the Project Section of the Group Budget and Project 
Department monitors the capital projects part of the budget. Although the budget 
section is supposed to monitor the revenue section that has not been done. 
 
Monthly budget performance reports are produced and circulated to management for 
guidance and control. In the case of the SBUs, HODs are responsible for their 
department budget and the finance managers are responsible for the monitoring and 
implementation of the SBU budget. Furthermore, in each SBU, there is a budget 
department in which there are budget officers who monitor the budget daily. These 
units prepare monthly and quarterly reports which show the balance of each 
units/section budget. The copies of the reports are sent to the user departments and the 
head office. This type of reporting is similarly done in the head office. The budget 
department in the head office prepares a monthly performance report and distributes it 
to the budget controllers. In addition, the department prepares and distributes the NSC 
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group performance report (the report is a consolidation of reports sent by SBUs). The 
group performance report is circulated to all the top management. According to the 
head of the unit, the report is like the management account reports. 
 
The CSUs and SBUs were expected to comply strictly with the budget. However, 
recently a plan review session was adopted, during a certain period of time when the 
budget was being reviewed. Furthermore, in some cases an approval can be sought for 
from the management to move funds from one section of the budget to another 
section. However, this is allowed only within the same budget head.  
 
In the NSC, an approved budget does not mean that the expenditure/project 
automatically qualifies for funding. Before any fund is released, it has to be budget 
cleared (part of budget monitoring), and there must be available funds (cash flow 
availability). The user department has to apply for the money, justify the request and 
obtain approval. Two documents are used for budget clearing: a “Financial Control 
Slip” for operations expenditure and “Authority for Expenditure (AFE)” for movable 
assets and projects. The slips are filled in by the user departments and signed by an 
authorised person. Upon receipt of the forms, the budget officers check the form to 
make sure it has fulfilled all the requirements; for example, there must be a budget for 
the requirement, the person that signed the AFE or the financial control slip is 
authorised to do so and the amount signed for is within his/her limit. If all the 
requirements are met, authority is given for the expenditure. This procedure is similar 
in SBUs. The forms have to be completed and passed to the finance and accounts 
department before payment is released, but if what is requested is above the SBUs’ 
MD limits, the request is forwarded to GGM CPDD for processing. Some managers 
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interviewed expressed their dissatisfaction with this lengthy procedure; they argue 
that this leads them to lose competitive advantage. A manager commented as follows: 
In the case of NSC, the budget controls you; instead of the budget being used 
as a guide, it is a constraint. 
 
In the SBUs, the Finance and Account department keeps what are called note books 
for each budget head and sub-head for budget monitoring. Once the budget is 
approved, the Budget Control department of the Finance and Account department 
disburses the amount to all the budget heads and sub-heads. All SBU budget 
disbursement requests have to be budget cleared by the Budget Control department, 
and the note book is updated during the process. In some SBUs, a computer 
application is used together with the note book. In addition, when a budget is 
exhausted, the budget control department writes to management seeking approval to 
overrun the budget; if approval is granted the budget is overrun, but when approval is 
not granted the expenditure is stopped.  
 
In addition to accountants monitoring the budget, the planning managers also do 
monitoring. The planning managers monitor the budget to make sure that the funds 
allocated to SBUs/CSUs are used for the purpose budgeted for. In some cases, the 
planning managers visit some SBUs/CSUs to see what is on the ground. Planning 
managers also prepare monthly and quarterly reports.  
 
7.3.2.2 How the Budget is Actually Prepared 
 
In the above section, the NSC planning and budget cycle was discussed. Looking at it 
from the outside, one may assume that proper internal controls are in place in the 
NSC, but that is not the case. This section aims at describing how individual managers 
prepare their plan and budget. Several interviewees described the budget as a matter 
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which is not taken very seriously. The budget is not a true picture of what the 
units/sections/departments want. A manager explained this as follows:  
What we do is we exaggerate the budget because we know the planners are 
going to cut it. Like if a unit needs ngn5million, they will budget for it as 
ngn15million, the planner will cut ngn5million, and the unit will end up with 
ngn5million excess of what they need. 
 
Another manager explained the above practice further:  
What we do during the budget preparation is to add about 5% of the previous 
year’s budget to the current budget. For example, if - let us say - our actual 
budget is 50% of the planned budget, when we are preparing next year’s 
budget we do not cut our budget by 50%. This is because if - let us say - the 
following year we want 70% we cannot explain that to management, so what 
we do is to keep that budget, even if it is in excess of what we need; we cannot 
cut down the budget. 
 
The reason for not reflecting the true figure of the budget was explained by another 
manager thus: 
You know that in a government establishment, even if you said you want to be 
very prudent, for not even spending the budget as expected or you want to even 
save some cost, it is to your own detriment for the following year because they 
will say, Ah - we budgeted 30million for you but you used only 5million, so 
next year they will now say please just take 6million. So you see, ah ha for that 
logic.  
 
Some managers explained that the NSC budget places more emphasis on expenditure 
than on revenue. The budget is done without thinking about revenue; expenditure is 
not linked with revenue. A manager explained this further: 
Here in this SBU the engineer does the budget without thinking about funds. 
The budget is not focused on what we are to generate or what is available for 
investment. It is just about we want to produce so and so products; how we 
fund that is another thing entirely. 
 
Another middle manager confirmed the above problem as follows: 
I have been in planning for sixteen years and I have never seen our budget 
comply with the plan.  
 
 
 191 
7.3.2.3 Budget Allocation 
 
The budget is allocated in NSC on an incremental basis and funds available. One 
accountant described the budget allocation as follows: 
We maintain an incremental budget, and that is the system they adopt in 
headquarters, which is not good. For instance, let us say last year we spent 
ngn50million; in the previous year we spent ngn48million. Okay, let me just 
give them 5%, which is what they do in head office; that is basically what they 
do, and it is not supposed to be so. In a well managed or established 
organisation you don’t do that, you justify everything, but here one just awards 
the budget. Everybody is supposed to come up with his budget and be able to 
defend the budget, but it is not like that, although we do go for defence. At the 
end of the day you will be given - okay, last year we gave you 10%; let us just 
put it at 12%. That is why things are not working well. 
 
Furthermore, the NSC budget is allocated based on available funds rather than on 
business need. A senior manager explained how the budget is allocated to 
SBUs/CSUs as follows.  
I mean we are planning and we talk to finance and maybe for this year they 
may say we have just a 100 million to spend, and of course by the time all the 
businesses brings in their budget, it’s like 300 million, so we have only a 100 
million to share. 
 
SBU might come up with thirty projects but might end up with only ten being 
approved, because that was what NSC could afford as NSC is not allowed to borrow. 
Everything is financed in-house from the revenue generated from the business.  
 
SBU planning managers were dissatisfied with the way the budget is allocated to 
them; one of the planners argued that he does not think there is anybody in the CPDD 
who had worked in a manufacturing SBU before, and yet they decide on what the 
manufacturing SBU wants and does not want. An auditor gave his opinion regarding 
some of the problems manufacturing SBUs managers are having as a result of the way 
the budget is allocated; he commented as follows: 
The manufacturing SBU will send the budget to head office for approval, by 
the time the head office give a blanket figure; for example, if the SBU says 
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salary and wages are this, transport and travelling are this, the total of all other 
expenses will be about ngn5billion by the time the head office approve it. It 
will just approve maybe ngn2billion without taking into consideration items by 
items that make up that budget. The SBU has to be prudent concerning how 
they should now apportion the budget. 
 
The fund released in many instances is less than the approved budget. Furthermore, 
the approved budget is not allocated to line managers; the budget is there in bulk, like 
a pool. A manager noted the following:  
The accounting system is not targeted at individual departments; one 
department can finish the budget. We do not have a system where the budget is 
apportioned to each and every department. 
 
7.3.2.4 Budget Implementation and Decision Making 
 
Despite the issues discussed above, the implementation of the NSC’s budget depends 
on the Nigerian government. A manager illustrated one of the reasons as follows: 
Protocol sometimes stops budget implementation; sometimes we operate 25% 
of the budget until the time when the budget is implemented. Sometime it takes 
up to February or March, because of bureaucracy.
54
  
 
Some managers interviewed expressed the point that, since the NSC is just like the 
federal government, the budget is not approved for several months. Sometimes it 
takes up to June before the budget is approved. How the managers handle the above 
situation was described as follows:  
So you see in the first quarter nothing is being done; in the second quarter you 
can make other commitments to outstrip the budget, and make up the first 
quarter from the second quarter. Sometimes we asked our contactor to charge 
us more so that we can use the excess for other operations. 
 
Although the budget is supposed to aid managers in decision making, several 
managers were of the opinion that the budget constrained their businesses. One 
manager made the following observation: 
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 Note that budget is cut off at the end of December and by January a new budget is supposed to start 
running. 
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How much money we have controls what we do; it is not really that, it drives 
what we do. Because if we said it drives what we do it means we have enough 
for the things we want to do - there isn’t enough money, I think the budget 
should drive, not control, but our own is this is the amount I have, so this is 
what you can get. 
 
Another manager explained that:  
The budget is not implemented at both levels; we manipulate the budget 
silently to allow us to carry out our operations, as stated above. Some can 
cover the contingencies in order to be in the system. Sometimes we get the 
approval and we go quickly to implement it. Capital budget is not approved up 
to now. We are in October, and this year’s capital budget has not been 
approved. People have to devise means to support the operations. 
 
One manager gave an example of an incident in which they had a problem with their 
printer (a new printer cost ngn 35, 000),
55
 but because a printer is categorised as 
capital expenditure, such expenditure is not allowed. The manager explained that they 
were asked to send the faulty printer to the head office for repairs, and sending it cost 
almost ngn 50, 000; but because it is not capital expenditure, that expense is allowed. 
According to the manager, they expended almost ngn150, 000 in total, and at the end 
he got tired and stopped sending the printer. Another manager gave a similar example 
as follows: 
A member of staff went on training in Lagos
56
; what he did was to call in sick 
and add additional days. When he came back he used the extra per diem and 
bought what he needed. That is the extent to which we go in making our 
operation work. And the manager in charge will just keep quiet. Right now, I 
need a printer but it is not there, so I bought one and keep it at home. I have a 
flash drive, and whatever I want to print I take it home to print. The top 
management also do that; they distort the figures of products sales in some 
months in order to cover the month’s operations. 
 
The budget is also not adhered to at the top. It was stated by many interviewees that 
the NSC is directed by the federal government to fund some operations that have 
nothing to do with its business. For example, the NSC is requested to buy cars for the 
military, fund peacekeeping in the neighbouring countries and other activities. The 
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 Ngn is an abbreviation of naira, the currency of Nigeria. 
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 Lagos is one of the Nigeria’s thirty-six states. 
 194 
NSC has no option other than to follow the order and expend the cost somewhere in 
the budget. A manager claims that sometimes it is even their staffs who inform other 
ministries and State Enterprises that the NSC has funds. One manager noted:  
We may recall that the overall GMD is appointed by the president, so his 
alliance to the president is paramount before any other thing. 
 
Another manager elaborated on the issue further, thus: 
The GMD has a budget; nobody knows how much it is or how it is being 
spent. No one approves the budget; it is just there for him to spend. It makes it 
difficult to account to anybody, as sometimes the directive might come from 
the presidency and that budget is used. So you cannot link, review or 
investigate that budget. 
 
7.4 Management Control Systems Change Initiatives 
 
In this section, the new MCS introduced in the NSC are analysed. The evidence 
shows that the NSC has introduced many MCS and accounting innovations in recent 
years. Strategic planning was the first MCS change introduced in the NSC. However, 
its implementation and usage is discussed in the previous sections; therefore it will not 
be discussed here.  
 
7.4.1 Activity-Based Costing  
 
The NSC manufacturing SBUs introduced ABC in 1997. The reason for ABC 
adoption was the result of a meeting between NSC top management and the head of 
state (General Abacha); during the meeting, the NSC was asked about the cost of 
processing their main product. The government wanted the information to determine 
whether it is more economical to import the processed products, rather than 
rehabilitate the faulty manufacturing SBUs. The NSC could not provide the 
information. The Head of State instructed the NSC management to determine 
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immediately the cost effectiveness of their manufacturing SBUs and report to the 
government; this led to the introduction of ABC in the manufacturing SBUs.  
 
NSC manufacturing SBUs ABC was designed by consultants and some NSC staff 
were trained on how to use it. A detailed manufacturing cost of processing their main 
product was produced using the ABC methods in the same year. At the beginning, the 
head of all the manufacturing SBUs organised a quarterly meeting during which ABC 
reports were discussed. However, later the ABC report was prepared every quarter for 
the manufacturing plant MD and the responsibility of preparing the reports lies with 
the Business Development Department (BDD); the Finance and Accounts department 
only provides inputs like the other departments. For example, the Finance and 
Account department presents the cost for the period. A standard format is used to 
collect data on direct labour and materials from various departments; a demand made 
by a particular product on activities is determined using cost drivers as a measure of 
demand, and the cost of activities is traced to each product (Internal document).  
 
ABC was loaded on a system and all the BDD staff responsible for ABC input various 
figures on to the system. The information is inputted in to the templates from the time 
when raw materials are brought into the SBU for processing up to when the final 
products are produced. Other costs such as the cost of water used, staff and their 
entitlements, electricity, chemicals are all inputted to the templates. The officer in 
charge of preparing ABC reports explained this as follows: 
We now said the raw materials comes in as so and so amount; it goes to the 
first area which is area one, and all those things. They are putting fuel oil to 
heat up, there is electricity to the pump, they are putting so and so, so all these 
products are coming out as so and so amount. They go into the next plant at 
that amount, and then add all the costs being incurred to the second amount, 
and it goes on and on like that. Then you could say my product A is finally 
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coming as so and so amount, my product B as this and that. Then again there 
are some other products; the products are more of bottom products; these 
products come out as the costliest, even though they are useless or less 
important to us. The thing we do is this: we apply some ratios to redistribute 
the cost of the final product in between. We now redistribute and now task the 
lower value things, and put some more money on the higher value products. 
 
However, the initial people trained on the ABC were transferred and the people who 
came after them were not trained; hence they mechanically put in the figures and 
obtain the output mechanically as well. The manager responsible for ABC described 
the situation thus:  
By the time they do the analysis, when it comes to me I see so many flaws in 
the analysis, and I can tell you that hardly ever since after the key person that 
received that training left has that report come out to my satisfaction. Because I 
would now say, like even the unit, for instance I saw the last report which had 
so many naira kilo watt per hour; so that means naira per kilowatt per hour; 
naira is an entity so just put naira there, per something per litre or per hour 
kilowatt, just put naira per something. But when I say that type of a thing I 
correct it, send it back to the person and the person doesn’t even understand 
what was wrong with it. Sometimes it comes back to me with another mistake 
somewhere else, so I just keep it. 
 
ABC is domiciled only in the manufacturing SBUs and the head office has nothing to 
do with ABC; the figures are not used in determining the manufacturing SBUs 
processing fees. The report resides with the planning department of the manufacturing 
plant and is just kept for record purposes.  
 
7.4.2 Sun Account  
 
The Sun accounting system was the first computerisation attempt in the NSC. It was 
introduced in 1991 in order to enable the NSC to computerise its accounting function. 
Before the introduction of the system, record keeping was done manually, thus, 
affecting the production of financial statements and other basic reports that would aid 
management in decision making. This was emphasised by a manager thus: 
The primary thing is at least at the end of the day we should keep records. We 
needed to tell somebody: this is the extents of profits we make this year, this is 
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our assets and liabilities, we need to have a global reporting of the business 
transaction within that accounting period, but that was lacking at a point when 
the system is seven, eight years in arrears of the financial statement, and other 
periodic reports as and when they are due. 
 
However, the initial system at that time was described by another group of managers 
as not entirely manual; the managers explained that at that time what the NSC had 
was a central main frame batch processing system in its head office, and what the 
SBUs/CSUs did was to take all their tickets to head office for posting and I.T 
technician does the posting. A manager described it thus:  
So it is not as if it was typically manual then, but most SBUs actually keep 
their manual records, because before you get your returns from the computer 
time has gone and you need something to present to management or any user. 
People are relying more on their manual records, until the time when the 
central computer is ready with the information. 
 
However, this processing waste a lot of time. Before transactions are posted, it takes 
at least three months, and if there is any mistake the tickets must be taken back to 
head office for correction and the correction takes another three months.  
 
How Sun account system was brought into the NSC was described by a manager as 
follows: 
The stakeholders were not able to know the direction of business flow in the 
NSC. It was like the activity of the NSC was shrouded with secrecy, but that 
was inefficiency that emanated from the absence of a competent and effective 
accounting system. So that now led the government to think about what to do 
with the NSC accounting system and somehow the World Bank came into the 
scenario. Now it sponsors the review of the accounting system in the NSC. 
Pick Marwick Consultants were hired in conjunction with seconded staff to 
review the accounting system. 
 
The consultants felt that there was a need for the NSC to introduce a computer-based 
system; research was carried out for a potential system and the Sun account system 
was selected. A more robust package was not chosen because at that time there was 
limited computer knowledge. Therefore, a system that was not too high as well as not 
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too low was introduced; thus the staff can learn from it and develop competencies. 
Prior to the 1991 review, there was an earlier attempt in 1988 by Arthur Anderson to 
computerise the accounting function, but that attempt failed.  
 
The Sun accounts system was implemented by consultants. The Sun accounts system 
was a modular accounting system with ledgers - the general ledger, fixed asset 
register, sale order processing, processing order, inventory control and corporate 
allocation - and each module was implemented based on NSC need. The general 
ledger was the first module to have been implemented, and its implementation was 
done in phases; the implementation was phased according to the NSC’s zones. The 
next ledger implemented was the fixed assets register using the same zone phase 
system. This was followed by sales order processing, but it was not entirely 
successful. The sale order was implemented in two SBUs only. Corporate allocation 
was implemented in only one SBU. However, purchase order and inventory control 
was not implemented because they were not needed in the NSC. The Sun accounts 
system is online but not in real time. For example, some SBU headquarters are not 
linked to its area offices. All SBUs have their own database. This is part of the 
problem of the NSC not producing its annual account on time, as discussed in the 
above section. 
 
In terms of general acceptance, Sun accounts system was accepted because it was 
the first computerisation in the NSC. However, that was not without some 
resistance because the internal auditors felt excluded as there was no audit package 
for them. In addition, Sun accounts reports post transactions, and the sales people 
felt that they had not been incorporated into the system, because they are more 
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interested in what happened before sales transactions, not after sales transactions, 
as Sun system reports after sales transactions; hence the sale department acquired 
a separate system.  
 
Although the SUN system has the capability to generate various reports, this study 
found that many reports are prepared using Excel-based or other computer 
applications. An officer explained that Sun account system has the facility to produce 
many reports, as follows: 
It has the facility to produce management reports; it has ledger A-J. Ledger A 
is the actual ledger, and B is the management accounts ledger where you can 
enter commitments and run expenditure, but at the moment no SBU is using it. 
 
The Sun system is not used in the preparation of management reports; Excel is 
normally used for many reports. A manager described it thus: 
The ledger account is the one mostly used. There is a budget module but it is 
not used. There is a facility for management accounts variance but that is not 
fully utilised. 
 
Several managers attribute the reason for not fully utilising the Sun system as follows: 
when the system was deployed the interest was to move from manual to electronic 
records, and there was a lack of knowledge, as many people did not have full 
knowledge about it. The workforce was not well trained. The training was done little 
by little, and many of the employees were not introduced to the system. However, a 
manager argued that posting on the system is simple, so is updating the journal; 
everybody can post on the journal. He commented further: 
The fixed assets register is on Sun; apart from me and other staff, nobody can 
use that section. And in our area office … apart from me and some of the staff 
that have an interest in it, nobody is updating it. 
 
This implies that the Sun system is not given priority. Up to the end of data collection 
for this study, the Sun system is the accounting package used in the NSC.  
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7.4.3 Introduction of Total Quality Management to the NSC 
 
The NSC adopted TQM in 1994. According to several interviewees, the NSC adopted 
TQM because of need for change as there was a problem in the way the NSC was 
doing it business. At the time of TQM introduction, many companies in the world had 
adopted it and were becoming successful, so the NSC adopted TQM with the hope of 
becoming like those companies (several interviewees). How the NSC discovered the 
concepts was described by a manager as follows: 
CU goes out, so from research and contact training we noted that among the 
management concepts in vogue among companies there was TQM, and 
companies were using it to make tremendous improvements. They were using 
it to make an impact, they were using it to improve production, using it to 
improve service delivery; some companies were using it to become the best 
and are getting awards, so CU felt, why not?  
 
TQM was introduced by the Consultancy Unit (CU).
57
 CSU introduced TQM to top 
management as a theme of the first Executive Orientation Seminar on 15
th
 February 
1994. The seminar was organised in search of a better way to make the NSC more 
efficient (Internal Document). The management of the NSC realised the benefits of 
the TQM, and at the seminar took the decision to adopt its culture as a survival 
strategy in all its business, and set in motion the process for its implementation. The 
NSC was described at that time as being like a ministry.  
 
In April 1995, the TQM council was formally launched; the council comprised GMD, 
as the chairman, all Group Executive Committee (GEC) members, and the GGM 
CPDD and CU manager as executive secretary. The council function was to state 
vision, values, direction and planning requirements clearly to implement TQM in the 
NSC, and also to serve as a clearing house for CU and SBUs quality steering (Internal 
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 For the creation of CSU see chapter 6.3.1 
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Document). Following the launching of the TQM council, steering committees were 
launched in all SBUs and CUs to spread the TQM culture and its benefits in the entire 
corporation. In the SBU, the steering committee consisted of the MD as chairman, 
MEXCOM members and all HODs and quality units as secretaries. CU was to serve 
as a resource centre and the custodian of TQM action throughout the corporation, and 
the department supported the development and implementation of the TQM process. 
The adoption of TQM resulted in the introduction of a new mission and vision. TQM 
was implemented by NSC staff; external consultants were invited only for training. 
The CU department was later renamed Total Quality Department (TQD). 
 
7.4.3.1 TQM Implementation 
 
TQM was implemented as follows: 
 First, the buying by management.  
 This was followed by the reorientation of staff towards TQM; TQD held a series 
of campaigns to let staff know that NSC management had adopted TQM 
concepts. Campaigns were held in both the headquarters and SBUs to make staff 
accept the idea. 
 TQD trained staff on the TQM concepts (trained people in what TQM is all 
about).  
 Process improvement began.  
 
Several interviewees noted that emphasis was put on process improvement. A 
manager explained this as follows: 
So TQM focuses on process: what process did you use to produce this? TQM 
will tell you to go and look at the process from the beginning. So you identify 
all your processes, as there are as many processes as there are products; in 
anything that produces something there are processes involved: it can be a 
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combination of processes, so once something is not coming out the way you 
expect it, go and check the process; something has gone wrong in the process 
line, so that is what TQM emphasises: identify as many products as you have, 
look at their process; is there anyone that is not working well, go and do 
process improvements, go and check what is the problem, and when you have 
found out the problem, do process improvement. 
 
Furthermore, TQD staff review reports from other departments and whenever a 
problem is noticed the TQD staff visit the department and meet with the staff. A 
project team is set up to look at the problem. The team members are drawn from 
anywhere (from TQD, or any other unit/department from which the process owners 
felt a solution could be found). The project team looks at the problem and suggests the 
solution. Process improvement was described as the main issues pursued by TQM in 
the NSC. Other issues considered but without much success included cultural change, 
benchmarking, ISO certification documentation and performance measurement. A 
manager reported as follows: 
We did performance measures; KPIs one big volume but nobody implemented 
it. 
 
All departments have quality improvement teams, which are charged with the 
responsibility of improving the ways things are done. The guidelines of the procedure 
for implementation are issued by the quality department. The quality department also 
issues certificates saying ‘well done’ to the best department, and gives advice to the 
worst departments. 
 
However, TQM concepts have encountered many problems in the NSC. Some 
managers believe the problem is related to TQM being too theoretical and irrelevant 
to NSC’s culture. One manager noted the reason as follows: 
TQM - I think one of the things when we started it, was it was too technical. In 
fact, that was what one of our MDs complained about; you came and talked 
about TQM. Yes, I know what TQM should do but how to make it tangible. 
Let me know, how does it change me, how does it impact on my behaviour, 
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how does it impact on what I do? They said, Okay, we should now have 
processes, we should write out our processes for our job. I said, processes for 
my job? Okay, as a manager we should draw this thing so that this person 
reports to this and that, so that any other person that comes in automatically 
knows this is my reporting line and all that. I say, Okay, fine and good but I 
don’t see how this one will change me or change my job. All I want to see is 
what I can do so that if I do the wrong things it shows immediately that I am 
falling out of line. What did you put in place? Those are the type of things I 
would have wanted to see, but I never saw anything like that; all we ended up 
was in the processes for our work.  
 
The cultural problem was described by a manager as follows: 
At times the talk they do on TQM is alien to us, it is alien to our culture. It is 
good on the surface, but if you look at it there a lot of alien things for us; our 
level does not reach that. We have not reached that level to be compared with 
those companies they are talking about; we have not reached that stage like the 
certification and so on. We are nowhere near those areas, so there is no basis 
for you to say you want to bring those things to us; now in the NSC, it will not 
work. Definitely right from the onset it is doomed to fail. 
 
One manager compared TQM concepts in the NSC to the two major religions in 
Nigeria, as follows:  
The religions keep preaching and preaching and nothing changes, and to me 
that was how TQM was. TQM is just preaching and it cannot change anyone 
who does not want to change. 
 
The fact that, in the NSC, top management held the key to major decision making 
might have affected how TQM was implemented. A manager explained how the team 
abandoned the lower officers as follows: 
In my SBU and other area offices, those that are supposed to know are not 
exposed; they are not involved in implementation and roll out. What the TQM 
people did was go to a hotel do some presentations; they did not go to the area 
offices to address people working there. They have not taught/shown the lower 
people how to identify processes and systems. In particular, the people in the 
operations department do not know what TQM is all about.  
 
TQM concepts continued for many years until a GMD who did not believe in it was 
appointed. A manager noted the following: 
It is just that TQM would have been successful, but it did not receive the 
support Project Alpha received; Alpha was backed up by government and the 
executives, but TQM was probably on Executive level and their support is not 
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much. The GMD that time supported it, and so did his successor. But when the 
next GMD come, he did not believe in TQM; that is how TQM died. 
 
A manager gave his personal opinion that, had TQM been adequately supported and 
funded, the NSC would have recorded an improved achievement a long time ago. 
Many staff shared this view, as they linked all the changes the NSC underwent as 
trying to do and achieve the same thing; the only difference was the name given to 
each of the changes.  
 
In addition, some staff linked TQM failure to the lack of a succession plan in the 
TQD. Many of the staff interviewed explained that the head of TQD was among the 
first people sent on compulsory retirement when a new GMD took office (the GMD 
who did not believe in TQM) and the staff who are next in the hierarchy have not 
reached management level; thus the retirement of the head caused a huge blow to the 
TQM concept. However, some managers explained the reason differently. According 
to them, any change is perceived as suspicious, as change suggests that somebody is 
going to gain somewhere. In addition, some staff believed that the manner in which 
TQM was implemented was the cause of its failure. One manager explained that the 
TQM team used the whole idea to travel around and get money out of it and did not 
encourage other staff. Lack of infrastructure was another reason for TQM failure; an 
officer noted that as follows: 
The orientation is good, but if you hear all kind of sermons and the facilities, 
the environment for you to put it into practice does not exist. It becomes a 
mere sermon; sooner or later you even forget the sermon. It does not reflect in 
our productivity. 
 
Some interviewees argued that TQM failed because it was not something that would 
satisfy the government. A manager stated the following: 
Top management are always there to satisfy stakeholders, government 
demand; changes that affect our accounts, operations and so on are not seen 
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through. Frequent change in management and no continuity, and also we 
cannot measure what we do. Nobody looks at our book to see whether we are 
doing well or not.  What I always said is that the NSC is like Nigeria; the 
problem of the NSC is a reflection of the country’s problems.  
 
Some staff held the opinion that TQM had failed because it had been introduced in 
parallel to Planning and Finance and Accounts department, so it lacked the support 
and commitment of those staff. A manager noted that as follows: 
Even when such things/efforts are being undertaken, it is usually not the 
management accounting department or so that drives; for example, one attempt 
the NSC made was TQM. The purpose was also to optimise the processes, 
integrate processes, reduce areas of wastages, reduce delays, reduce costs, 
improve revenue, increase efficiency, - these are all strategies, but usually the 
accounting department is hardly ever involved in such efforts.  
 
However, some staff doubt whether they had ever practised TQM in the first place; a 
manager commented: 
My own understanding of TQM is that it is a management concept; a 
management tool that tended (I will put it in past tense because I am not yet 
convinced that we practise it) to introduce innovation in management to a very 
large extent. I don’t think we abided by the tenets and rules of TQM. I did not 
know how much impact it had in the activity of my unit, honestly speaking, 
because we never preach that gospel, because if we preached it we would have 
probably been trained to the extent that we will not have trained to champion 
TQM and did not see it aligned to our job schedule properly. I can stick my 
neck out and say we don’t practise it. 
 
The researcher asked several managers whether they are still using the TQM 
concept; and their reply was: had they ever used it? A manager emphasised that he 
was asked to write down his processes, so he asked this question, now that he has 
drawn down his process; should he memorise the process or is it that when he is 
doing anything he has to go back and check the process? The manager argues that 
this is not the way it should be. The manager explained further that he was 
confused about how to tie it all together. What is the usefulness of that? He has 
written his reporting line, but he argues that the reporting line should have been 
done away with; TQM should have an open door for every staff member to go to 
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the MD if he needs something; it should not be done by writing this is a line of 
this and that.  
 
7.4.3.2 TQM in SBU at present 
 
The evidence shows that TQM is practiced differently in the NSC head office and its 
SBUs. The following section presents how TQM is done in the SBUs visited. A TQM 
manager of the first subsidiary the researcher visited described how they do TQM as 
follows:  
The implementation is simply having people here like me; you can see me, 
before I came here TQM had died completely, there was no TQM per se, what 
they had was somebody representing quality. In fact when I came I found an 
office that was not manned; nobody was there in terms of TQM, nothing was 
happening, nobody was doing the TQM job, and the person representing 
quality was there mainly for other aspects of the job (Health Safety and 
Environment), so the whole place is as if there was no more TQM until I came. 
 
Process improvement is a continuous process of improvement in all areas of 
operations and this is done by examining existing processes, determining their 
efficiency or lack of it, and also suggesting ways or measures that can enhance 
efficiency. As in head office in the subsidiary a committee is set up whenever a 
problem is identified. The committee brainstorms, discusses and suggests solutions 
for the problem. The problem areas were normally identified through departments’ 
daily, monthly and quarterly reports or when TQM department notices any decline in 
production or services, depending on the unit/department.  
 
Similar to the first subsidiary, TQM was revived in the second subsidiary the 
researcher visited when a new manager was transferred to the department. The 
researcher noticed a TQM suggestion box at the subsidiary’s reception and asked 
several staff about it; the response of one manager was: 
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You are just seeing that for now. I saw that some three months ago; recently, 
they appointed a new man as TQM head; before then it was dead, nothing. 
 
The TQM department function in the second subsidiary visited was explained thus: 
the TQM staff walk around and inspect the office cleanliness of all departments and 
monitor procedures. The department keeps procedures for all other departments and 
compares the procedure with what is happening on the ground. This function is 
conducted in three ways: standard, measurement and improvement. In addition, the 
TQM department is charged with the responsibility of organising retreats for the MD 
and EDs. furthermore, the TQM staff attends the weekly and monthly meetings of 
other departments and asks questions about the departments’ activities. TQM officer 
explained that as follows: “We measure to see whether departments - for example, 
production - have produced what they are expected to produce.” Unlike in the first 
subsidiary visited, the second subsidiary visited places little emphasis on job 
processes.  
 
The concept of TQM was also dead in the third subsidiary the researcher visited. A 
manager stated that as follows: 
TQM died some years but the department is still going on; what we do now is 
more or less knowledge management. TQM started well but later died, but if 
there was continuity, TQM would have being built on to become knowledge 
management, which is almost the same ideology. Nobody is there for TQM. 
 
In summary, the evidence shows that the presence of the TQM department is the 
major factor that caused the TQM name to continue in the NSC. A manager reported:  
For sometimes management was not really talking about TQM, but the 
department is there so we continued improving processes, doing things to have 
results. 
 
The TQM department was viewed as a redundant department in some SBUs. Several 
interviewees explained that when extra hands are needed for some work, the staff is 
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pulled out from the TQM department. Also, the researcher happened to sit at the same 
table during lunch time with a staff member who had recently been transferred to the 
TQM department; the staff member was voicing to his friends his displeasure at being 
transferred to the redundant department. However, TQM was revived when Project 
Alpha was terminated. The responsibilities of implementing Project Alpha initiative 
was handed over to TQD. This resulted in posting new TQM managers to SBUs to 
implement the SBUs Project Alpha initiatives. At the time of the data collection, the 
TQD was concentrating on process documentation for certification; this certification 
is also in line with the expected reform, which is likely to take effect in the near 
future.  
 
7.4.4 Performance Management System  
 
In 2006, the NSC introduced a new Performance Management System (hereafter, 
PMS) with key performance indicators (hereafter, KPIs). The PMS was introduced by 
consultants as part of the Project Alpha programme. A manager gave the reason for its 
introduction as follows: 
The consultants discovered that employees’ performance by appraisal is 70 per 
cent; almost everybody is getting a 10%
58
 increase at the end of the year, while 
the actual performance of the organisation is not up to 40 per cent. They said 
something is wrong. Let us look at the organisational performance; why grade 
everybody as good, while in the actual sense nothing is done.  
 
The new PMS was introduced to improve appraisal distribution. Several interviewees 
explained that their old appraisal used to be subjective, but now it is more objective. 
The new appraisal is top-most driven, which comes with KPIs from the federal 
government to the last person on the shop floor; a manager reported: 
                                                 
58
 In the NSC at the end of staff appraisal, the staffs who are promoted get a 12% of their salary 
increment while staffs that are not promoted received what they called a salary increment award which 
ranges from 10-0 percent. 
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KPIs come from corporate objectives, and you know we are solely owned by 
the government. Our GMD cascades government objectives as they affect our 
industry; this is further cascaded down to the GEDs. The GEDs cascade their 
object to MDs under them. The SBUs MDs distributes this directives to the 
Executive Directors under them, the Executive Directors cascade theirs down 
up to the last person in the shop floor.  
 
Each department/units/section has its KPIs, and each person gets his share of it as 
tasks and targets; at the end of the day the individual is appraised based on whether 
he/she has achieved or not achieved their share of tasks and targets. The tasks and 
targets are set at the beginning of each year. They are developed, discussed, agreed 
upon and signed by supervisor and their subordinates. The forms are countersigned by 
the unit manager. The agreed targets are reviewed half yearly to make sure that they 
are achievable; if not they are reviewed downward or changed. In addition to the tasks 
and targets, staffs are measured against the NSC core values. A manager described the 
appraisal as follows: 
The system of appraisal is now such that we have measures; when we give you 
a task you meet the task, you do not meet the task, or you exceed the task; for 
me to think of promotion and better reward you have to exceed your target. 
Because when you meet your target that is exactly what is expected of you; 
you have to exceed the targets before you think of getting a higher reward. 
 
The old performance measurement system was described by a manager as follows: 
Project Alpha modified the appraisal; the objectives and target settings were 
introduced and percentage allocated. What we used to have was a job carried 
out. Operators itemised jobs and at the end of year appraisal is assessed on the 
job performed, not necessarily on the percentage target on achievement.  
 
Another manager explained this further thus:  
Basically we were judging staff based on their job description, not on the 
business objectives. The job description is just there for staff; as an officer you 
are expected to do this and that, describing your job.  
 
The old appraisal was conducted at the end of the year; the staff picked up the forms, 
started thinking what they had done that year and wrote it down; the process was the 
same with the superiors who did the evaluation. A manager noted the situation thus:  
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You will see towards the end of the year that some people will be nice to you, 
so that when the appraisal comes you will score them highly; after that they 
will change to their true selves. 
 
It was widely believed in the NSC that the PMS is a good thing, and if properly 
implemented it will help the NSC overcome its performance problems. It has made 
targets clearer, more specific and direct; everybody can measure his/her own 
performance and at the end of the year defend it. It is no longer based on favouritism 
or tribalism. A manager described it as follows: 
We set a target for the next year, in which you have your objective for the 
whole year; you have a weighting, a measure of what you are actually doing 
and how you are going to get the target, and also you have milestones so it has 
made it very easy for me as a supervisor to assess my subordinate now. So 
really it’s performance guided; it is not just from my head that I am going to 
say he is very good, hardworking and intelligent; I can say, right, you are 
supposed to do a number of meetings, you are supposed to cover so many 
SBUs. Whether he did do them, how often he did them, is all there, so I am 
actually judging his performance.  
 
It is important to note that most NSC staff, when asked what performance measures 
they use in measuring their performance, replied that it is based on annual appraisal. 
Therefore, staff appraisal is seen as an important performance measure. However, 
when the researcher asked the staff how the new PMS is linked to the NSC’s overall 
performance, none of the staff was able to link it up. The Human Resources staff 
asked the researcher to talk to the planning department, as they are the people who are 
supposed to do that, and when the planning managers were asked about the 
relationship between the appraisal and the organisation performance, none of the 
managers linked the processes. A manager noted the following: 
Appraisal does not boil down to performance, so you see if my task is to 
organise a retreat I can set my targets as two, even though I can actually 
organise four, so I manage to do three, which means I have outperformed; that 
is because nobody comes back and looks at whether the retreat has translated 
anything into the business appraisal. 
 
Another manager observed the following:   
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Performance is not linked to appraisal; we are making a loss here in our 
subsidiary. Our selling price is determined by the government, still we are been 
promoted and in operations. 
 
A manager was asked about how the KPIs affect his department, and the response 
received was: 
These are some of the things that are not fully implemented in our department. 
They are implemented in some but not every department. It is supposed to be 
linked, but it is not as neatly linked as you think; if the whole thing has gone to 
its conclusion then you will see this neat link. Now the link is that more or less 
every department has tasks and targets, and every member of that department 
has his own task and targets within the context of the department task and 
targets, so everybody at the end of the year is appraised based on whether he 
has made his tasks and targets or not. If they meet them, it means the 
department has achieved its own link. But if you think in terms of one side 
what could have happened is first of all to appraise a department before you 
appraise the individual or both; it is the overall performance of the department 
that should affect the individual performance, so that you cannot have a 
situation where individuals in a department are doing excellently, whereas the 
department is not doing well, so you cannot tie the two. 
 
Furthermore, there were problems with the tasks and targets, where one job input 
depends on another person’s output. Most of the staff interviewed perceived the PMS 
as being mean and not as objective as it is supposed to be. Some of the interviewees 
were not happy with it. An officer explained the problem thus: with the old appraisal, 
the lowest increase we can get is 5%, but with the new appraisal it is 0%. Another 
officer emphasised this as follows: 
We do our work correctly and on time, yet we get 6% increase. We are not 
happy with the appraisal systems. 
 
A manager faulted the appraisal grading as follows: 
They tried to ensure that people who are performing and giving high 
performance are rewarded; but for instance they will come to me and say only 
2 people can get 10 per cent increment and when I look at it I will see that I 
have more than 3 or 4, but they say that from the whole department only 2 can 
get it, so those things are there. 
 
Furthermore, the way the tasks and targets are set is not clearly defined; a middle 
manager explained this as follows:  
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At my level I wrote my own tasks and targets; I wrote my boss’s tasks and 
targets, I wrote his boss’s tasks and targets as well in relation to other 
departments that are under that boss; my boss was so impressed with what I 
did, because understanding the thing is the problem. I swear to God I am not 
joking; people don’t relate these kinds of things directly, you don’t have to put 
some bombastic things simply because head office gave it to you. It has to be 
something that you can achieve. At the same time, you don’t have to water it 
down to where you don’t have any targets to achieve, and you score yourself 
90%, so there is this problem. 
 
The targets given to the SBUs are supposed to be achieved, and if they are not, the 
SBU is supposed to suffer for it, from their MD downward. However, that was not the 
case; both the SBU and the head office collected the information, but nobody looked 
at it. A manager gave an example in which only three people were promoted to 
management level in the manufacturing plant that was working. The manufacturing 
plant was the only NSC manufacturing plant operating at that time, with overall 
performance of 65-70 percent on-time, but the other two manufacturing plant that 
were not operating with 0 percent on-time have more people promoted, and the 
reasons given for their promotion was that the 0 percent production is not their own 
doing. A manager stressed this point as follows: 
The reason that is not their doing, does it matter? You cannot punish the one 
that is performing but has not reached the targets you have set for him with the 
one that has not done anything, and say that, that one is not his fault; yet you 
reward them fantastically. Does it make sense? So this is where we have a 
problem. 
 
7.4.5 Balanced Scorecard 
 
Project Alpha designed a Balanced Scorecards Performance Management System for 
the whole of NSC, but that was yet to be implemented. Key Performance Indicators 
(KPIs) for each SBU and CSU were designed. The KPIs were developed along the 
four perspectives proposed by Kaplan and Norton (Kaplan and Norton, 1992, 1996a, 
1996b, 1996c) financial, people, operational excellence and stakeholder and customer. 
One manager explained how BSC is to be implemented: 
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We are to drive the implementation of the KPIs in SBUs; that is what we are 
going to do in 2008. We will do the implementation through the GEDs; we 
will send the lists of KPIs the GEDs and ask them to deliver on it. We are 
pushing through planning department. We do our performance based on an 
individual appraisal system. So what we want to do now is to measure 
performance, department by department. 
 
However, up to the time the researcher left the field, the implementation of BSC has 
not yet started.  
 
7.4.6 System Application and Products in Data Processing Introduction in the 
NSC 
 
System Application and Products in Data Processing (hereafter, SAP1) was 
introduced by consultants to the NSC as a result of Project Alpha. The consultants 
suggested that the NSC adopt the system. Many interviewees argued that the impact 
of the Project Alpha will be appreciated fully when SAP1 is adopted, especially in the 
accounting function. A department named SAP1 reporting directly to the GMD was 
created at the NSC headquarters to oversee SAP1 implementation. The SAP1 
department was headed by a General Manager recruited from a multinational 
company. The reasons for introducing SAP1 were to increase efficiency in NSC’s 
processes, transparency and information integrity, and to help NSC achieve its 
mission and vision (Transformation documents). A manager emphasised the 
importance of this as follows: 
To cut off the issues of departments having to do something different, material 
department doing their records differently, accounting doing their records 
differently, HR doing theirs separately, it is to integrate all of us as one data 
base so that we don’t have duplication; from here we will know what materials 
have been received so that we can make provision for the money; we don’t 
have to wait until they come as if everybody is on his own.  
 
According to some of the managers interviewed, if SAP1 is implemented fully, the 
management and all the staff of NSC will be able to know the obligation they have for 
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their creditors, debtors and other operations activities. A manager commented as 
follows: 
I should be able to know what and what, who and who are owing, who and 
who supplied their goods at the end of the year that have not got into the 
accounts, ... I will be able to know that contractor ABC has supplied so and so 
on 31
st
 and so on, so that I will make sure that my own system and what I am 
reporting are up to date. So, if I am going to say at the end of the year we are 
owing ABCD, it should be exactly what we are actually owing, but now 
because everybody is working on a different data base I have to wait for them 
to bring it. They might not even bring it; they might not even know why they 
must allow me to know.  
 
The SAP1 application was to be used as a technology platform to support improved 
business processes. A manager described that as follows: 
We have lots of data but it’s just data. It has not been converted into 
information because we have not packaged the thing in the manner that is user 
friendly. And that IT really means having a very good IT structure, a database 
which is one of the pillars of Alpha to develop a very good IT structure and 
certain work processes, that would make work easier in planning, finance, and 
other things like that. 
 
The NSC SAP1 was designed by consultant. The consultant reviewed the processes 
the NSC had on the ground and did a gap analysis and fitted those things the NSC 
wanted but SAP1 could not do and what SAP1 do and NSC did not need, and came up 
with SAP1 for the NSC. The SAP1 was to be implemented by the consultant and NSC 
counterpart’s staff, who would work together for the sake of knowledge transfer. The 
implementation would be in phases beginning with head office, and later in other 
CSUs and SBUs (transformation document).  
 
The SAP1 was planned to be implemented in the three years from 2007-2009; 
however, up to the time the researcher left the field (March 2008), the implementation 
had not yet started. The researcher asked many staff towards the end of the study why 
SAP1 implementation had been delayed, and their response was that there was a 
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problem between NSC and the consultant. The NSC wanted to engage the services of 
SAP1 South Africa team for the implementation, but the consultant had refused; they 
claimed they were the organisation that had designed it, and therefore, they should be 
the one doing the implementation. This lead to the consultant reporting the matter to 
the Nigerian government, and by the end of the field work the NSC was still waiting 
for the outcome. Furthermore, the contract for the implementation should have been 
given by the NSC board, which up to August 2009 the board membership had not 
been appointed by the Federal Government.  
 
Some staff expressed their scepticism of SAP1 achieving success in the NSC. Some 
believe that SAP1 is a theory for now. One manager suggested that, the reason for this 
was that there was no computer network in place between the different SBUs and 
head office. The manager compared the NSC with the Banks, as one can put money in 
a bank and go anywhere he likes and cash it. There are cash machines available 
almost everywhere. The NSC can afford to provide such things or much more, but 
have not done so. In addition to the lack of infrastructure, some staff perceived SAP1 
- if implemented - as a threat to their jobs; one officer stated as the following: 
The idea of SAP1 is automation; the jobs of 4 people are to be done by 1. In 
other words, they are talking about downsizing, to become a paper-less 
company like the international companies we are imitating, forgetting that we 
don’t have our own building. If we beautify this house the next thing you hear 
is that the landlord is increasing the rent. Management talk too much grammar 
but there is no action. 
 
However, some staff sees SAP1 as a system that will control operations better and 
curtail corruption, and for that reason they fear for its successful implementation.  
 
7.4.7 First Subsidiary Visited Management Information System  
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Part of the Project Alpha initiatives in the first subsidiary visited was the development 
and implementation of a new Management Information System (MIS). The MIS was 
introduced with the essence of having a single consistent data base for the whole of 
the subsidiary; this would provide information that would aid management in decision 
making and also help the subsidiary in achieving its mission and vision. Before the 
introduction of MIS, there was no such data base in the subsidiary. A middle manager 
explained the MIS as follows: 
Basically the MIS is a data base that has all the information about the 
company, from HR, finance and accounts, operations, and from there you can 
recall data and use them to generate any kind of reports, be it operations 
reports (talking about how production) or financial or accounts reports. 
Basically you can call them business reports. You can use the data base to 
generate reports which show you the performance of the company. 
 
The MIS information is supposed to be used to generate reports for management 
decision making. An officer described that as follows: 
Prior to Project Alpha, we didn’t have anything like that. If you wanted any 
information you had to a go and start opening old files, hard files and look for 
data, but now with MIS functional at least we can save that time. One of the 
advantages is that it has reduced the time used in generating reports. 
 
The system was designed by the consultants and the subsidiary’s staff. First the 
design team requested specification from various departments and potential users. 
The team went to find out what kind of data each department had, how they 
wanted it and what kind of report they would like. The team then designed the 
architecture and deployed the MIS. After the deployment, there was the second 
phase where the aim was to make sure the MIS had been put into use. 
 
The MIS was made up of two sides: the data capture side, in which people from 
various locations enter data, and the reporting side in which management views the 
data for information for decision making. In the reporting side, some of them have a 
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dashboard where in a snapshot management can see indicators - green for good, 
amber for something that requires attention and red where the performance is not too 
good. The dashboard covers all aspects of the operations of the first subsidiary the 
researcher visited. The dashboard was shown to the researcher, who noticed that it 
was designed like the Balanced Scorecard advocated by Kaplan and Norton, with four 
perspectives and KPIs. The KPIs are supposed to ensure that the subsidiary has 
business objectives. The KPIs, their indicators and how to measure them are designed 
during the quarterly business review organised by planning, and the KPIs show the 
performance of the whole subsidiary. How the MIS work was explained to the 
researcher by a manager thus: 
For example, the EDS and management agree that he shouldn’t spent more 
than this and that, and it is accepted by both parties; we programme it into the 
MIS. However, at a later date, let’s say we discover new business the EDS 
wants more money; the management can review and increase his spending, so 
what we do is we go back to where we set the KPIs and change it, so that each 
time the ED, MD or any other authorised person logs into the dashboard he 
will see the real picture (whether you are under performing, performing and 
whatever).  
 
The MIS faced some problems. The first problem was prioritising MIS work; the 
HODs do not release staff to input on the MIS on time. In addition, the staff who are 
supposed to input on the MIS also see it as having lower priority than their normal 
day-to-day job. The second problem was the lack of usage; the MIS is not updated; 
nor is it being used for report generation. An officer explained an incident that 
happened recently as follows: 
I saw a colleague compiling a list of our subsidiary contracts status manually. I 
said this thing should be on the MIS, so the manager was wondering and said 
where? So I just showed him where on the MIS, but unfortunately, when we 
checked, the last contract that the subsidiary had implemented was in 2006, 
which obviously we know is not correct.  
 
The data suggested that the non-utilisation of the MIS was the result of lack of top 
management support. The constant changes and retirement amongst top 
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management has reduced the support MIS has. In addition, many staff in the 
subsidiary do not understand the MIS. This group of staff argued that computers 
were not readily available and that access to the MIS is restricted. One manager 
noted the following: 
We started using the system for appraisal before, but because of the non-
availability of computers we stopped that; it is now done manually. 
 
The MIS is accessible to top management only, and even the top management have 
limits on what they can access, as explained by an officer: If the MD logs in he sees a 
comprehensive dashboard, whereas if the EDs log in they see a different dashboard 
(dashboard concerning his operation); he cannot see the MD’s dashboard. 
Furthermore, for those who are inputting the information, there is a limit to what they 
can do or not do with the MIS. An officer noted the following:  
This is our daily operations reports but this is not generated from the MIS; it is 
still manually generated. I don’t know whether anybody in the subsidiary has 
access to the MIS. The system is there; it is supposed to be on the network but 
I don’t know how many people get access to the network. You cannot even 
access whether staff understand it or they are enjoying it, as information is not 
available. Maybe as time goes on they will open it up to everybody to use (if 
the zeal is there).  
 
Some staff were trained on how to input data, but only a few received training on how 
to use the system to generate reports. The subsidiary top management were trained on 
how to use the MIS, but almost all the top management had changed, with changes of 
MD twice or three times from when the MIS was first implemented. An officer who 
was among the staff that had received training on MIS explained: 
You know this problem about a computer: learn about software and never use 
it, give yourself two-three months you forget everything. If we have a good 
system in place, and I have gone for that training I am supposed to have access 
to that system, so I should be able to use it and generate data. Since we came 
back from the training in June 2006, I have never had access to it, so what is 
the purpose of the training? 
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Despite the MIS capabilities to produce reports and indicate performance, it has not 
actually been updated in that sense; one MIS officer explained that as follows: 
If you look at the production plan (show the researcher on the screen) you will 
notice that they have not entered the plan production for 2007; that was 
supposed to be entered around September/October 2006 so that it can be used 
to generate reports. Since those people have not entered the plan, we will have 
errors in any report generated; this is basically the problem we are having with 
the MIS. Some departments don’t use it, or they don’t input any information. 
 
This was confirmed by another officer as follows: 
 
Generally speaking, we are not using the MIS installed here by project Alpha; 
we generate the reports manually by collecting information from each 
department. 
 
Apart from HR - and that was because of pressure from their manager who does not 
accept reports - if it is not from MIS no other department uses it. The Finance and 
Accounts departments used Sun accounts and at the end of the month were required to 
generate a report from their ledger accounts, which was to be deposited and updated 
into the MIS data base. An officer noted the following: 
For sometimes now they have not submitted any of their reports for update 
here; if you go to the accounts data base, you will not be able to see up-to-date 
information. 
 
Some staff argued that the MIS implemented by the consultants is inferior to what 
they need, as it is not online and in real time. Some staff argued that it has not made 
any impact on their job, and that Project Alpha initiatives will die with the project. 
This was highlighted by an officer thus: 
Like most people think, the normal thing, the NSC, Nigerian thing- after 
project Alpha that everything about it had died. Most people take the MIS to be 
a Project Alpha activity and Project Alpha has finished, so everything about it 
has finished, except those people that are handling it on a day-to-day basis. If 
not, most of the staff feel that was Project Alpha work and project Alpha has 
finished. Just forget about Project Alpha and MIS.  
 
At the end of the data collection, the MIS had not been fully utilized. 
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7.5 Summary of the Chapter 
 
This chapter presents an analysis of the NSC accounting systems and practices (both 
financial and management accounting). The analysis shows that the NSC is legally 
required to prepare an audited financial account at the end of every financial year. 
However, the NSC is not keeping to that requirement. The analysis also reveals that 
the NSC does not have any clear costing strategy. The head office and other SBUs 
allocate and determine cost without referring to any formal strategy.  
 
The NSC had undergone various reforms, and, as a result of these, many MCS 
innovations were introduced. The NSC introduced strategic planning in 1986, which 
was integrated into its budget. The budget is the main MCS technique used in 
controlling the NSC activities and processes. Other MCS techniques such as ABC, 
TQM, BSC, PMS, SAP1 and Sun Accounts were introduced. Some of these 
innovations have managed to stay, some had failed, and some were just documented 
and put on the shelves, while some are in the process of being implemented. 
Furthermore, the analysis shows that, although the NSC was commercialized in 1988, 
it is yet to operate fully as a commercial entity. The politicians could not reduce their 
grip on the NSC. New systems and processes have been introduced but are not fully 
use because of divergent interests. 
 
Having empirically analysed the NSC internal and external accounting systems and 
changes in MCS, the next chapter is the discussion chapter. 
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8 CHAPTER EIGHT: DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS 
 
8.1 Introduction 
 
The objective of this thesis is to analyse the public sector reform in Nigeria and how 
this impacts on the Management Control Systems (hereafter, MCS) of the Nigeria 
State Company (hereafter, NSC). In the previous chapter, the NSC MCS were 
examined, drawing from the main themes and patterns that emerged from the 
empirical data. In this chapter, the empirical findings are analysed and discussed 
drawing on the Actor-Network Theory (hereafter, ANT) proposed in chapter three. 
ANT provides the opportunity to analyse the role of the heterogonous actors in the 
reform process.  
 
The analysis traces the major public sector reforms in Nigeria and how these cascade 
down to the NSC (the case study organisation). The dynamics of the relationship 
between the actors in the reforms are explored, with the findings compared with those 
from the literature. Specifically, the process of how the actor-network has been 
constructed, and how the MCS is produced and reproduced in the reform network are 
theorised using ANT. By doing this, the thesis is able to provide understanding of the 
mechanism through which heterogeneous actors are interresed, enrolled and mobilised 
into the reforms network, and how the reforms networks are stabilised, and in some 
cases disintegrated. 
 
The reforms studied are presented in chronological order beginning with the earliest 
to the latest attempts.  
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Table 8.1: Major Reforms in Nigeria and NSC 
 
 Period Reforms Actors 
1. Early 
1980s 
Economic stabilisation act Nigerian government, general 
public, state-owned enterprises 
2. 1986 Structural Adjustment 
Programme/PSR reforms 
Nigerian government, World Bank, 
IMF, SAP, general public, State- 
owned enterprises 
3. 1986 Strategic planning/CRC/TQM  NSC top management, middle 
management, lower staff, 
consultants, NPM doctrine 
4. 2004 Debt forgiveness/Project 
Alpha 
NSC top management, middle 
management, lower staff, 
consultants, NPM doctrine, IMF, 
World Bank, general public 
 
The chapter is divided into five sections. Following the introduction, the next section 
presents the definition and the relationship between the various actors identified in the 
study. Section three analyses the translation of the public sector reforms in Nigeria by 
focusing on how the reform networks are built, stabilised and disintegrated. The 
subsequent section presents an ANT analysis and discussion on MCS change in the 
NSC by highlighting the various MCS that the NSC has implemented in its search for 
efficiency and legitimacy. The final section provides a chapter summary. 
 
8.2 Tracing the Relationship between the Various Actors  
 
As presented in chapter three, from the perspective of ANT, the public sector reforms 
can be conceptualised as products of the network of relationship between human and 
non-human actors (Callon, 1986; Latour, 1987; Law, 1991). Consequently, in order to 
understand the reform, and their impacts on MCS, the human and non-human actors 
of the reforms are traced. This process is guided by Latour’s (1987) rule of methods. 
Specifically, Latour’s (1987) second rule of methods recognises the need to examine 
the transformation that practices undergo in the hands of actors. To achieve this, 
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Latour’s first rule of methods suggests that we study practices in action instead of 
viewing them as readymade. In so doing, Latour encouraged us to either arrive before 
the facts or we follow the debate that led to these facts.  
 
In analysing the public sector reforms and their impacts on MCS, we travelled back to 
when the reforms were a possibility, and studied both the human and non-human 
actors that were part of the transformation. As a result, the reforms are traced back to 
the 1980s, a period when they were problematised. Latour’s (1987) rules three and 
four urged us to consider symmetrically the efforts to enrol human and human 
resources actors in the process of the network. In terms of selecting the actors to 
follow, Latour’s rule five suggested that “we have to be as undecided as the various 
actors we follow…every time an inside/outside divide is built, we should study the 
two sides simultaneously and make the list, no matter how long and heterogeneous, of 
those who do the work.” Thus in this thesis both the human and non-human actors 
that formed the Nigerian public sector reforms are traced. 
 
The analysis is further guided by Latour’s rule seven which encouraged us to pay 
attention to the many ways through which inscriptions are gathered, combined, tied 
together and send back. In a nutshell, the analysis adopted in tracing the actors 
follows Latour’s various suggestions above which require us to among other things to 
focus on the dynamics of the relationship and to explore how facts are constructed. To 
be able to follow the actors, the thesis adopts global and local classification. 
Wickramasinghe and Alawattage (2007) argued that in order to understand how 
networks are built, we may be guided by global and local dichotomy. Briers and Chua 
(2001) also adopted this categorisation in studying the implementation of ABC in an 
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Australian organisation. Thus in this thesis actors are broadly classified into global 
and local. 
 
8.2.1 The Global Actors 
Global actors are rich in concepts, competence and connections (Briers and Chua, 
2001). Public sector reforms can be conceptualised as emanating from global actors as 
they are phenomena that have emerged from western countries such as USA, UK, 
New Zealand and Australia (see for instance, Broadbent and Guthrie, 1992). They 
involve changes in structures, culture, functions and processes of the public 
organisations - changes such as reducing government funding to public organisations, 
corporatisation, commercialisation, privatisation, performance contracts, improved 
financial management, private-sector styles of management, contracting, and 
decentralisation (Boston et al., 1996; Parker and Gould, 1999; Awio et al., 2007). 
These reforms are labelled “New Public Management” (Hood, 1991). In line with 
previous studies, New Public Management (hereafter, NPM) is conceptualised as a 
global actor (Gao, 2005; Stanforth, 2006; Heeks and Stanforth, 2007). As argued by 
Latour (1987), actors need not necessarily be human but instead they can be non-
human such as technology or practices. 
 
Similar to other developing countries, as presented in chapter four the World Bank 
and International Monetary Fund (hereafter, IMF) were enrolled and mobilised into 
the NPM network in Nigeria. Thus NPM reforms were presented to Nigeria and other 
developing countries as a way forward for their public sector. NPM reforms were 
viewed as solutions to the endemic problems affecting the public sector in developed 
countries (Humphrey et al., 1993; Awio et al., 2007). However, the set of doctrines 
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and financial management techniques encapsulated in the NPM reforms of developed 
nations appears to developing countries as promising solutions to imitate in search of 
efficiency, effectiveness and accountability of their public sectors (Awio et al., 2007).  
 
The World Bank and the IMF constitute the global actors who hold the position of 
lender of last resort to Nigeria and other developing countries. These institutions, 
together with donor agencies, have encouraged and directed NPM reforms in 
developing countries through loan conditions (Asaolu et al., 2005) such as Structural 
Adjustment Programmes (Toye, 1994; Cook and Kirkpatrick, 1995; Olowu, 2002; 
Uddin and Hopper, 2003; Hopper et al., 2009). These reforms have largely been 
imposed on developing countries (especially those that depend on western donors for 
their main sources of funds) (see Uddin and Tsamenyi (2005) for an account of this). 
The role of the World Bank and the IMF in the public sector reforms in Nigeria as 
discussed in chapter four makes these institutions major actors in the construction of 
the public sector reform network in the case study organisation.  
 
MCS is a global actor (Robson, 1991, 1992; Preston et al., 1992; Lowe, 1997; Lowe, 
2000; Greener, 2006) and shifted the focus of public sector MCS from probity, 
compliance and control to that of promoting efficiency, effectiveness, cost saving and 
streamlining organisations (Broadbent and Guthrie, 1992). MCS change (private 
sector method) was introduced into public sector organisation to enhance efficiency, 
accountability and performance (Humphrey et al., 1993; Hood, 1991; 1995; Olsen et 
al., 2001; Parker and Gould, 1999). O’Connor et al. (2004) found that the main 
objectives of change in MCS in China were to improve decision making and 
performance accountability. As discussed in chapter seven, NSC reforms involve the 
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adoption of these global MCS. Specifically, the MCS adopted that were identified in 
chapter seven and which are discussed later in this chapter are strategic planning, 
budgeting, performance management, total quality management, activity based 
costing, balanced scorecard and sun accounts. 
 
Other global actors include international management consultants. International 
management consultants are mobilised into the NPM network through their service. 
Consultants are identified as the transporters of change (Sahlin-Andersson and 
Engwall, 2002). This group of actors is also enrolled by the governments of various 
developing countries and the IMF and World Bank to assist in finding solutions to 
their public sector and implementing them (Larbi, 1999). Jones and Dugdale (2002) in 
a study of ABC development drawing from ANT reported that a consultant actor 
plays a key role in the development of ABC. It was reported by Christensen (2002 and 
2005) that consultants had contributed to the implementation of NPM reforms. This is 
the case in NSC, as most MCS innovations in the organisation were introduced by 
consultants. In a study of the role of international consultants in public sector reforms 
in Sub-Saharan Africa, Fyson (2009) argues that private sector consultants are 
increasingly involved in shaping the reform process in these countries. A similar 
observation was made in this thesis where private sector consultants were 
instrumental in shaping the public sector reform network in Nigeria and the NSC.  
 
Latour (1987) identified technology as a non-human actor in the ANT framework. In 
this thesis computers and other advancements in information technology can be 
viewed as global actors. It has been reported by various scholars that advancement in 
information technology, such as the advent of the PC, enterprise resource planning 
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systems, e-commerce, the internet, electronic data interchange and electronic 
meetings, had facilitated changes in MCS (Burns et al., 1999; Burns and Scapens, 
2000; Burns and Vaivio, 2001). Jones and Dugdale (2002) reported that computer 
software played a key role in ABC’s diffusion. In MCS ANT studies, Briers and Chua 
(2001), Jones and Dugdale (2002) among others conceptualised computers as actors.  
 
Having identified the various global actors above, the next sub-section identifies the 
local actors that made up the public sector reform network in Nigeria. 
 
8.2.2 The Local Actors  
As presented in the theoretical framework (figure 3.1 chapter three), the local actors 
comprise the national actors (which include the Nigerian government and general 
public) and local actors (which comprise the NSC top management, middle and junior 
staff). These actors are similar to those identified by Gao (2005) in a study of China’s 
strategy for telecommunication transformations. In his study, Gao identified the state, 
public and society and the operators as three groups of local actors.  
 
The state is an actor because in developing countries (including Nigeria), the state is 
central economically as it is the major source of capital formation, controlling a large 
portion of the gross domestic product and employment (Hopper et al., 2009). The 
Nigerian government embarked on a massive expansion of its public sector during the 
1970s (Olukoshi, 1993a). During this period most large enterprises in Nigeria were 
owned by the state. However, the economic crises in the 1980s as discussed in chapter 
four resulted in the government turning to the international financial community for 
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assistance. As a condition for this assistance, the state was enrolled and mobilised into 
the public sector reforms actor-network. 
 
The Nigerian general public were also mobilised into the public sector reforms 
network thereby constituting local actors. Though not directly involved in the reform 
policy initiatives, the public were seriously affected by the crisis and therefore 
accepted the reform as a solution. The Nigerian unemployment rate rose significantly 
and the living standards of many Nigerians deteriorated significantly during this 
period (Olukoshi, 1995). The government mobilised public enterprises to adopt public 
sector reforms. The NSC top management, being the managers of one of the Nigerian 
public enterprises, were mobilised into the reform network. This group of actors is 
responsible for implementing government policy in the NSC. For public sector 
reforms to be effective, the middle managers and lower staff have to be interresed, 
enrolled and mobilised (Latour, 1987). The middle managers' group of actors oversees 
the day-to-day affairs of the organisations.  
 
Changes in MCS that are part of NPM need to be accepted and implemented by this 
group of actors, as they are the actors that work directly with the systems. Lower level 
employees carry out the day-to-day operations of the organisations. They need to 
understand and work with the new changes introduced by the reform. In addition to 
the various human actors identified above, it is argued that non-human local actors 
such as infrastructure, maintenance and expertise also play a role in the reform 
network. These groups have played a part in constructing and shaping the reform 
network. Rhodes (2009) made a similar observation when he identified these 
structures and systems as non-human actors.  
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The list of actors can be endless (Latour, 1987). Bloomfield and Vurdubakis (1999) 
noted this as one of the limitations of ANT when they argued that one of the 
challenges posed by ANT is when to delimit the network as there is the problem of 
succumbing to the temptation to include the entire world, or concentrating on few 
actors, and consequently, missing relevant actors. In order to avoid the problem 
presented by Bloomfield and Vurdubakis, this study followed actors as outlined 
above. These actors were identified as being critical in forming the Nigerian public 
sector reform network. Table 8.2 presents the key actors identified and their roles in 
NSC’s reforms. 
 
 233 
Table 8.2: Key Actors Identified and their Roles in NSC’s Reforms 
   
Group of actors 
human/non 
human 
Global/local  Role  
Human  Global  World Bank/IMF Lender of last resort 
  Consultants Expertise engaged to help in 
reforms. 
  International creditors Provide credits to the 
government and Nigerians  
 Local Nigerian government Responsible for running of the 
country and its economy. 
Formulates policies and ensures 
their implementation. 
  General public Ensure the government policy is 
favourable to them.  
  NSC top management Responsible for smooth running 
of their public organisation. 
  NSC middle 
management 
In charge of the daily operations 
of the organisation 
  Other staff In charge of the organisation 
daily operations 
Non-human Global  Nigerian economic 
reforms 
Technology of change 
  Economic crisis  Intermediary that redefine the 
Nigerian government 
punctualised actor 
  SAP1/PSR/NPM 
doctrine 
Technology of change 
  Strategic planning Pave way forward for NSC 
(change technology) 
  Sun account Technology of change 
  TQM Technology of change 
  ABC Technology of change 
  PMS/MIS/BSC Technology of change 
  Computers  Smooth running of operations 
and technology of change. 
 Local  Infrastructure 
(electricity) 
Ensure operations run smoothly 
  Premises  Help in ensuring business is 
conducted as usual. 
  Maintenance  Help human and non-human 
conduct their functions 
  Expertise  Help in delivering effective 
products and services. 
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8.3 The Translation of Nigerian Public Sector Reforms: Global vs. 
Local Actor-Network 
 
The Nigerian economic, political and social systems have undergone various 
transformations as discussed in chapter four. These changes have influenced and 
brought changes to Nigerian public sector organisations (including NSC). As 
presented in the above section, these reforms emanated from the developed countries 
and were transported to developing countries through global actors such as the World 
Bank and IMF, and International aid agencies (Uddin and Tsamenyi, 2005; Hopper et 
al., 2009). Apart from these global actors, the local actors involved in the reform 
process have also been identified above. 
 
As argued by Latour (1987), to fully comprehend the role of actors necessitates 
examining the roles they play in the construction of the network. This will require 
tracing and following the actors in order to understand the process of translation. In 
this section, how the Nigerian public sector reforms network was constructed is 
examined. This is necessary to understand how the various actors came together and 
produced the actor-network of the public sector reforms through the process of 
translation. Translation is the process of actor-networks building (Callon, 1986; 
Latour, 1987; Brown and Capdevila, 1999; Hassard et al., 1999). In other words, 
translation provides a forum for innovators or actors to agree that the network is worth 
building and defending, and as discussed in chapter three, translation involves four 
processes: problematisation, interessement, enrolment and mobilisation (Callon, 
1986). Alcouffe et al. (2008) adopted the concept in examining the diffusion of the 
George Perrin Method and Activity Based Costing innovation in France. Other 
accounting studies including Chua (1995) and Lowe (2000) have examined 
accounting change through the process of actor-network translations.  
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The translation of the Nigerian public sector reform network through the process of 
translation is discussed in this section. The analysis presented in chapter six showed 
that there were two major reforms. As a result the discussion of the process of 
translation will centre on how these two reforms networks were built. 
 
8.3.1 The First Reform Network (1981-1993) 
 
From the perspective of ANT, MCS are products of a network, and, to understand 
how they are produced, we need to analyse how the networks are built and how MCS 
are created (Chua, 1995; Wickramasinghe and Alawattage, 2007). As presented in 
chapter six, NSC was established in the 1970s and is one of the biggest public 
enterprise in Nigeria. NSC is charged with overseeing the government’s participation 
in the industry it operates and carrying out all businesses in the sector. The NSC is 
also charged with the responsibility of providing product to Nigerians. The case 
findings show that the duties assigned to the NSC have made it the most significant 
public organisation in Nigeria. This was reiterated by one senior manager interviewed 
as:  
Whatever is happening in Nigeria affects the NSC and whatever is happening 
in the NSC is of interest to the general public, the politicians and other 
bureaucrats.  
 
Change in NSC was problematised in 1981. A tribunal was set up by the President 
Shagari administration to investigate the accusations made against the NSC regarding 
misappropriations of sales figures. The tribunal reported various irregularities, among 
which were improper accounting records and improper structure (see section 6.3.1). 
The report led to the government restructuring the NSC into nine subsidiaries. 
However, the findings reported in chapter seven show that progress in implementing 
appropriate MCS was never achieved. Furthermore, in 1985 the NSC was restructured 
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into five semi-autonomous sectors. This reorganisation was done in order to make the 
NSC more efficient and effective. However, the findings reveal that similar to the 
earlier reform, this latest restructuring did not lead to any changes in the MCS. 
Previous studies (Burns et al., 1999; Burns and Scapens, 2000) had argued that 
change in organisation structure drives MCS change but the findings reported in this 
study show that although the structure of NSC changed, this was not accompanied by 
changes in the MCS. One possible explanation for this is that the change was 
politically motivated and that the political authorities who imposed the new structure 
had limited knowledge of the role of MCS.  
 
8.3.1.1 The Formation of the Nigerian Public Sector Reforms Global Network 
 
A significant change in the MCS took place in 1986, driven mainly by the global 
actors who had knowledge of the role of MCS. These changes were problematised 
following the Nigerian government’s adoption of the Structural Adjustment 
Programme (hereafter, SAP) in 1986. This problematisation is similar to that reported 
by Preston et al. (1992). In the studies of Preston et al., changes in MCS were 
problematised following the debate on conditions facing the National Health Service 
(NHS) about the level of funding, management and responsibility of doctors and 
administrators. Latour’s (1987, p. 258) rule six emphasises that we “study the length 
of network thus being built,” and Christensen’s (2005) recommendation that, to better 
understand public sector reforms, an understanding of how the path to those reforms 
began is beneficial. Thus, how the first Nigerian public sector reforms were developed 
is discussed and analysed below. 
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As presented in chapter four, Nigeria, an agricultural country discovered oil in 
commercial quantity in 1956 (Roberts, 1998; Uche, 1992; Ihonvbere, 1998; Bezanis et 
al., 2000). In the 1970s, oil become the main source of revenue for the government 
and the increase in the international oil price saw the Nigerian government engaging 
in various expansion projects, such as expanding the manufacturing sector, state-led 
industrialisation, increasing external borrowing, increasing civil service salaries, 
increasing spending on infrastructure, public sector expansion and other social 
programmes (Lewis, 2006; Olukoshi, 1995, Abulraheem et al., 1986; Adedipe, 2004; 
Bangura and Beckman, 1993). Callon (1991) argued that intermediaries bring actors 
into relationships. The oil revenue acting as an intermediary brought the Nigerian 
government, external creditors, Nigerian public, public sector organisations, free 
services, infrastructure and other actors into an actor-network. At this stage, the 
Nigerian actor-network can be viewed as a punctualised actor (Law, 1992; 2003). 
Punctualisation refers to the combined effect of all the actors in the network (Law, 
1992; 2003). In other words a network is the responsibility of one individual actor but 
instead it is the collective responsibility of all the actors. When this network breaks 
down then punctualisation ceases to exist. 
 
As presented in chapter four, a drastic financial crisis hit Nigeria and that redefined 
the Nigerian government’s punctualised actor network, bringing in other actors that 
would not have been brought into the network otherwise (Callon, 1991). The Nigerian 
government, external creditors and the Nigerian general public became visible actors 
in the network (Law, 1992). The Nigerian government, as the focal actor, enacted an 
economic and stabilisation act in 1982 (Olukoshi, 1995; Iyoha, 2004). The economic 
and stabilisation act was presented as an obligatory passage point for the network 
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being built by the government. The term ‘obligatory passage point’ refers to a 
common solution presented by the main actor to other actors in the network (Callon, 
1986). In other words, it is a common path through which all the other actors interests 
must pass through. The economic stabilisation act thus became the path through 
which the building of the network occurred.  
 
Further progress in redefining the Nigerian actor-network was not possible and new 
actors were enrolled and mobilised into the network. System builders built networks 
by combining technical, social and economic elements; these elements, together with 
the builders, are at the same time constituted and shaped in those networks (Heeks and 
Stanforth, 2007). The Shagari administration enrolled the IMF (global actor) in 1983 
to examine the economy and put forward solutions (Olukoshi, 1995). The IMF and the 
World Bank were enrolled further through the government’s application for an 
Extended Fund Facility and structural loan (Bangura, 1987; Olukoshi, 1995).  
 
The IMF and World Bank did not accept the Nigerian government’s obligatory 
passage point; rather these actor groups presented their innovation, i.e. SAP, as the 
way forward, thus serving as a counter actor for the Nigerian reform network. For the 
innovations of the Nigerian government’s reforms to be successful, the government 
had to fight and defeat the counter actors (IMF and World Bank) and their programme 
(Alcouffe, et al., 2008). Unfortunately this was not possible as the IMF became the 
focal actor and began to construct its own network and enrolled and mobilised the 
external creditors. The IMF became the spokesperson for the network (Latour, 1987).  
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SAP was not accepted by the Shagari administration and the general public as an 
obligatory passage point, and the administration was overthrown in 1983 in a coup 
d'état. Buhari became the head of state, and the administration continued negotiating 
with the IMF and World Bank actor-network. Interest alignment with IMF and World 
Bank actor network and the Buhari administration was not reached before the 
administration was overthrown in 1985. The Babangida administration became the 
next actor and the new administration continued negotiations with the IMF and World 
Bank actor-network. The administration opened a public debate on issues of SAP to 
the Nigerian general public. This debate can be interpreted as an interessement device 
(Callon, 1986; Latour, 1987) for enrolling and mobilising the general public to accept 
SAP as an obligatory passage point.  
 
After several negotiations and manoeuvres, the Nigerian government was enrolled and 
mobilised into the IMF SAP network. Thus, the regime signed up to the authorship of 
SAP texts. Further progress was made when the government manoeuvred the general 
public actor into accepting SAP as the obligatory passage point by interpreting the 
outcome of the public debate in SAP favour. The spokesperson of the general public 
rejected SAP (Abdulraheem et al., 1986; Bangura and Beckman, 1993; Jega, 1993; 
Yahaya, 1993; Olukoshi, 1993a), but the government interpreted the outcome 
differently.  
 
The above shows that the process of building and changing of networks is dynamic 
and political in nature as actors put forward favoured solutions and contest these 
(Stanforth, 2006). The Nigerian government was enrolled and mobilised into the 
global SAP network constructed and translated by the IMF and World Bank. The 
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government claimed that the Nigerian SAP was developed by Nigerians for Nigeria; 
however, the Nigerian SAP was like that of any other developing country, engineered 
and imposed by the international financial community (Olukoshi, 1993, 1995; 
Zayyad, 1990; Jega, 2000). Thus, a global SAP reformed network was constructed 
following the enrolment and mobilisation of various human and non-human actors 
(Callon, 1986; Latour, 1987).  
 
Briers and Chua (2001) argued that change is the outcome of many diverse and fluid 
interconnections between global and local networks of actors. The adoption of SAP 
saw the focal actor changing from the IMF to the Nigerian government. The 
displacement and replacement of the two main actors, took about four years to 
achieve. The interest of the Nigerian government, the IMF and World Bank, SAP, 
Nigerian general public and the external creditors were aligned after several 
negotiations and translations. The adoption of IMF and World Bank reforms found in 
this study is inconsistent with the findings of other MCS studies in developing 
countries. For instance, Uddin and Tsamenyi (2005) reported that SAP reforms were 
imposed in Ghana by international aid agencies and the IMF and World Bank.  
 
The case study findings reveal that as public sector reform was one of the key 
measures of SAP, the adoption of SAP problematised public sector reforms in Nigeria 
in general and NSC in particular. This finding is consistent with other findings 
reported by Uddin and Hopper (2001); the studies of Hoque and Hopper (1994) and 
Tsamenyi et al. ( 2002) that demonstrate the influence of the World Bank and IMF 
and international agencies in the public sector reforms of developing countries.  
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The findings show that other actors such as top management of NSC included were 
mobilised into the SAP reform global network. The mobilisation of public enterprises 
top management may be seen as responding to the agenda of the government. In 
Nigeria, the ruling government and its policies have a significant influence on public 
sector organisation. In most cases, the top management of public enterprises are 
appointed by the head of government (see Tsamenyi et al., 2009). Thus, top 
management of public sector enterprises interest are more aligned to the political 
machinery than to the organisation they are managing.  
 
8.3.1.2 Translation of the reforms at the local level 
 
Lowe (2000) argued that problematisation would need to be carried out at a local level 
for the broader public sector reforms to enter into the operations network of the public 
organisation. As discussed in section 6.3.2, the NSC top management problematised 
SAP broadly and began constructing a local network to reform its internal structures, 
processes and systems. Progress was made in the construction of the local network 
when the top management enrolled Arthur Anderson consultants (global actor) to 
provide the expertise on how to reform the NSC. According to an NSC senior 
manager, “the NSC employed consultants to help us act as a third eye”.  
 
As noted in the previous section, international consultants were mobilised into the 
NPM actor network through their services, and they sold these reforms to other 
organisations. Christensen (2005) reported that international consultants have 
developed a new status as the ‘third hand’ in public sector reforms. An emphasis of 
NPM doctrine identified by Hood (1991; 1995) was the introduction of private sector 
practices such as strategic planning and accrual accounting into public sector 
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organisations. Indeed, the findings reported in chapter seven show that the consultants 
(including Arthur Anderson) presented strategic planning as an obligatory passage 
point for the NSC reformed network. This is consistent with the assertion made by 
Humphrey et al. (1993), Hood (1995) and Olsen et al. (2001) that MCS change 
(private sector method) is widely accepted as a way of strengthening financial 
accountability and controlling scarce resources within public sectors.  
 
A strategic plan was drawn up for all Strategic Business Units identified in the NSC, 
and a new mission was formulated towards making the NSC an efficient, profitable 
and prudently managed commercialised organisation. A manager noted the following: 
I can remember in 1987 we carried out financial projections as well as strategic 
direction of NSC. Our first strategic plan for the next five (5) years was 
developed in 1987 to address our needs for those years. 
 
It can thus be argued from the above that  the NSC local actors followed the global 
actor through strategic planning (Wickramasinghe and Alawattage, 2007). Networks 
become stronger with the enrolment of human and non-human allies (Latour, 1987). 
The findings show that interessement devices, such as salary increase, more 
responsibility, freedom in activities and job security, were used to interest, enrol and 
mobilise middle managers and lower level staff into the local network. The alignment 
of these groups of actors to the network can also be interpreted as their weakness to 
reject top management’s proposals. This was summarised by one junior interviewee 
as: “Resistance to top management initiatives can lead to severe consequences such 
as job losses”. Thus these groups of actors have limited influence in shaping the 
network. 
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The findings show that further progress in the formation of local network was made 
when a new actor was introduced into the network. In this case the 
Commercialisation, Reorganisations and Capitalisation (Hereafter, CRC) project actor 
was introduced to provide expertise and help the NSC management and the SBUs to 
implement the new mission. The team consisted of the consultant and some 
experienced NSC staff. This team played a key role towards reforming the NSC, and 
became the spokesperson for the NSC reform network. As suggested by an 
interviewee, this group of actors “drew up new structures and new processes and new 
systems for the NSC and its subsidiaries.” Furthermore, the government restructured 
the NSC in 1988 into a holding company with twelve subsidiaries (Internal 
Documents). The reorganisation was described by the head of state General 
Babangida as establishing the NSC as a financially autonomous and commercially 
integrated company (internal document), thus strengthening the CRC actor-network. 
 
As discussed in section 4.4.2, the Nigerian government promulgated the Privatisation 
and Commercialisation Decree no 25 in 1988 (Anya, 2000; Asaolu et al., 2005). The 
decree established the Technical Committee on Privatisation and Commercialisation 
(hereafter, TCPC) as the implementation agency with powers to supervise and 
monitor the programme (Commercialisation Decree no 25). The NSC was listed 
among the enterprises to be commercialised. However, the evidence shows that the 
TCPC network and the NSC reform actor network worked on a separate platform. The 
TCPC prepared documents about the manner in which NSC should be commercialised 
(TCPC, 1993); however, the NSC did not sign the contract. This finding is similar to 
the finding reported by Uddin and Tsamenyi (2005), in which the enterprise they 
studied in Ghana bypassed the monitoring agency set up by the government.  
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The failure of the NSC and TCPC actor-networks to enrol each other weakened the 
translation of reforms in NSC. Furthermore, progress in implementing the reforms 
was not achieved as the consultant left at the end of his contract. A manager described 
this as: 
The reform comes and they talk about changes and the staff like it. But once 
the consultant left, that was the end of it, the usual continues, life goes on as 
usual, nothing changes.  
 
The finding reveals that the NSC local network encountered more controversies when 
government support was withdrawn, through not realising the autonomy promised and 
recapitalisation and also the abandonment of SAP in 1994. Thus the local reforms 
network of aligned interest of reforming the NSC to become a commercial, efficient 
and autonomous company disintegrated, albeit temporarily. The network was betrayed 
and as it could be argued that at this stage translation became treason (Callon, 1986). 
 
The traces of the CRC network remain in a Customer Unit department (hereafter, 
CU). As presented in chapter six, the CU was formed by the NSC top management to 
continue with the CRC ideas. However, the CU actor group failed to enrol and 
mobilised new allies that would have seen to the implementation of the CRC 
initiatives. The processes, systems and other initiatives failed to be translated into the 
NSC activities. A manager described this thus: 
We did the reform but to implement it became a problem. The blueprint was 
done but implementation is another thing. 
 
The failure of CU to implement the new initiatives can be attributed to the lack of an 
interessement device. The CU saw the top management mandate as the main 
interessement device for the reforms to take place. A similar finding was reported by 
Alcouffe et al. (2008). Alcouffe et al. reported that part of the reason for the failure of 
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the George Perrin Method to be translated in France was that its innovator relied on 
commercial interessement only. Figure 8.1 below depicts the NSC actor-network (the 
global and the local actor-network). 
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Figure 8.1: NSC reforms actor-network 
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The above discussion and analysis suggest that though innovations had been 
introduced by various actors, however for such innovations to be successful the 
interests of various actors need to be aligned (Chua, 1995). The NSC local network, 
problematised public sector reforms as a result of the government’s adoption of SAP 
which required it to transform itself. However, the NSC top management was limited 
to setting up a reforms agenda through consultants and therefore could not fully 
implement such reforms. Strategic planning and decentralisation were achieved, but 
the failure of the government to grant NSC full autonomy and recapitalise it seriously 
affected the achievement of the NSC local network reform agenda. The next 
subsection presents the second wave of public sector reforms in Nigeria. 
 
8.3.2 The Second Reform Network (2003-present) 
 
As presented in section 4.2.2 the first wave of public sector reforms ended in 1993 
and the TCPC submitted it reports to President Babangida (TCPC, 1993) and NSC 
was not commercialised. Little was done by the Nigerian government on public sector 
reforms during the period 1994 to 1998 (Odusola, 2004) and there was no drastic 
change in the NSC. However, Activity-Based Costing (hereafter ABC) and Total 
Quality Management (hereafter, TQM) were introduced in 1997 and 1994 
respectively. As commented by one interviewee “their impact was not drastic.”The 
translation of these techniques will be discussed in the next section.  
 
Public sector reforms were revived fully following Obasanjo’s second term in office 
in 2003. The actors that constituted this reform are followed around to understand the 
transformation process (Lowe, 2001). As presented in section 4.4.2, during 
Obasanjo’s first term, his administration pursued debt relief and an arrangement was 
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made with the IMF to implement economic reforms. However, the reforms were 
abandoned as the government missed some key targets (Lewis, 2006). Following the 
re-election of Obasanjo, a new economic reformed network was set up, headed by the 
Minister of Finance. The Minister of Finance came from the World Bank, where she 
worked for many years and rose to the position of Vice President in the bank. An 
appointment of a senior member of staff of the World Bank enrolled and mobilised 
the IMF and the World Bank into this new global sociotechnical network. A manager 
reflected on this as: 
That is what we called in those days agents of imperialism, neo-colonialism; 
they just came to be used in destroying our economy. These are the kind of 
human beings they want; they brought them to Africa to exploit us. That is 
why when they trained you to believe that their own is always the best and you 
always operate like them. 
 
This new global network serves as a problematisation for the second major reform in 
the NSC. The NSC began its own internal reforms: a manager observed: 
The NSC new reform was more or less inspired by the government reforms, 
the NSC top management produced the initiatives. We came with our own - 
the one we want to do to get out without government imposing her own 
reforms, and the one that we can prove to the government that, look, we can do 
this one and we can survive; because we had the money we decided to do that. 
It is a bandwagon attempt because we will not stay in isolation in a global 
world; that why we began the new reforms.  
 
The GMD at the time of Alpha confirmed that the reforms were in response to 
government mandate to the NSC to achieve sustainable growth in the sector they 
operates (Internal Document).  
 
An actor network is built through the process of translation (Callon et al., 1986; 
Brown and Capdevila, 1999). Like the previous reforms, two consultants (global 
actors), were enrolled by NSC top management to help transform the NSC. A 
manager explained the aim of the reforms as: 
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We are operating locally but we want to be a World-Class company like our 
international peers; we want our structures to be like them. If you look at our 
structure we are not like them, but we are aspiring to be so. We want to 
restructure like a commercial organisation.   
 
Similar to the previous reform, a group of NSC staff was engaged to work with the 
consultant. The staff were asked to put in formal application for this role, and those 
who did apply sat an examination and attended an interview; those who were 
successful were then offered the opportunity to work with the consultant. This actor 
group became enrolled and mobilised into the new reform network. The new local 
reformed network was named project Alpha (Reform document).  
 
The consultants, together with the staff working with them became the spokesperson 
for changing the NSC systems (including MCS, processes, structures and procedure). 
This actor group problematised the reforms through reviewing the NSC’s processes, 
systems and procedures, and identifying problems and solutions. Changes in systems, 
processes and procedures were presented as the obligatory passage point in the 
network (Callon, 1986). The change was presented as the survival of the NSC, in 
which its status depends on radical transformation. A manager noted the reforms 
carried out as follows: 
Alpha has 17 projects; there was a project for administration, a project for 
services, a project for material management, a project for finance and accounts 
transformation, and projects for all processes, so there were 17 projects; so all 
the 17 project consultants were handling them. 
 
The finding in the second reform was similar to that from the first reform discussed 
earlier. Progress was made in building the network through the consultant actor 
group’s various seminars, training, in-house publications, publications in the 
newspapers and placement of several notices on various NSC notice boards (various 
interviews) to push the change agenda. This can be seen as the interessement device 
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which was used to lock the other actors (middle management and top management) 
into the Alpha network (Chua, 1995). Furthermore, the consultants interacted with 
staff to find out what the staff problems were and what the preferred solution should 
be. This also serves as an interessement device. However, this interessement device 
worked negatively in some cases; some staff viewed it as a way of making their 
position unimportant and thus leading to termination of their employment.  
 
The evidence shows that at the time all the actors in the network agreed that the way 
forward for the NSC is for it to transform itself radically. The interests of the middle 
managers, lower level staff, the government and the project team were aligned 
(Latour, 1987). All the actors were enrolled and mobilised into the new reform socio-
technical network constructed by the consultants. Non-human actors such as NPM 
doctrine, and new MCS such as a new Performance Measurement System (PMS), 
Management Information System, Balanced Scorecard performance measurement 
system, were drawn upon toward achieving the change. Change in MCS is considered 
to play a central role in shaping the perceptions of organisational actors and in 
contributing to the spreading of the culture of quantification and rationalism 
(Broadbent and Guthrie, 1992; Ogden, 1995; Parker and Gould, 1999). Other non-
human actors, such as infrastructures which include computers and networking, were 
drawn upon toward achieving the change. The implementation of project Alpha MCS 
initiatives is discussed in the next section.  
 
When the diffusion of innovation is successful, the innovation acquires a solid 
appearance and it becomes a blackbox which cannot be questioned, at least for some 
time (Latour and Woolgar, 1979). The empirical findings showed that the project 
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Alpha actor network was successful at the beginning and many initiatives were 
implemented. However, it failed to become a blackbox. Similar to the strategic 
planning network described in the above subsection, the project Alpha actor network 
was weakened when the GMD that introduced it was retired following a change in 
government. Furthermore, the consultant’s contract expired, thus leaving the NSC 
without having implemented most of the innovations proposed. The findings reveal 
further that the implementations of some of the innovations were abandoned halfway 
through the process. In addition, the new elected government of Yar’adua has a 
different idea regarding how the NSC should be reformed; thus the government 
support for Alpha was withdrawn. Following the government’s withdrawal of support, 
consultant contract expiration and the retirement of the GMD, the network 
disintegrated. The middle management and the lower level staff unsubscribed to the 
network. This can be confirmed from the following statement from a member of staff 
interviewed: 
You know the Nigerian thing is like after Alpha, everything about it has died. 
The staff takes the innovations as project Alpha activities, and project Alpha 
has finished so everything about it has finished too.  
 
This can be attributed to the interessement devices used by the project team actor 
group. The team relied on enrolling staff through seminars, notice boards and 
publications. They did not enrol other blackbox actors, such as the internal consultants 
(TQD), engineers and accountants. These groups of actors were not properly defined 
and interessed hence the disintegration of the network (Latour, 1987). The project 
team identified all staff as separate, not belonging to a network; thus the same 
interessement device was used for all the staff. Callon (1987) noted that different 
interessement devices are needed to bring actors into relationships with one another 
and shield any possible competing relationships with other entities. The failure of the 
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project team to identify and enrol blackbox actor networks into the network weakened 
the stabilisation of Project Alpha actor network.  
 
Nevertheless, using ANT we were able to explain how the reform networks were 
constructed at the global level and subsequently translated at a local level, which led 
to the creation of a local network, with subsequent change in MCS. However, the 
findings reveal that all these changes were problematised during a strong reform 
oriented government. For instance, strategic planning and CRC networks were built 
during the administration of Babangida when SAP was adopted and Alpha during the 
administration of Obasanjo. Furthermore, strategic planning was not fully 
implemented as a result of the government’s failure to grant NSC autonomy and the 
loss of the government interest in SAP. Project Alpha was abandoned when the new 
government proposed a new reform agenda. The argument here is that, although in 
ANT power is conceptualised as an effect of a network (Callon, 1986; Law, 1992), in 
this case the government has an authoritative power which shaped and reshaped the 
network (Uddin and Tsamenyi, 2005). Actors such as the NSC top management 
signed up to any government agenda; at the same the middle managers and lower 
level staff signed up to whatever reform was introduced by top management without 
any negotiations or resistance.  
 
In the next section, the translation and inscription of new MCS introduced in NSC are 
analysed. 
 
8.4 Actor Network and Management Control Systems Change  
 
In the above section, we analysed and discussed how the Nigerian public sector 
reforms global network and local networks in the NSC were constructed. The findings 
 253 
show that these networks produced diverse MCS. Various scholars, such as Lowe 
(2000a; 2000; 2001), Briers and Chua (2001), Alcouffe et al. (2008) and Preston et al. 
(1992) had drawn on ANT to study MCS change in different enterprises. These 
studies conceptualise MCS as technology and demonstrate that MCS are products of a 
network of relationships between human and non-human actors. In line with this 
argument, this thesis conceptualises MCS as technology, which is the product of 
human and non-human actors (Latour, 1987; 1988; Callon, 1986). The translation and 
the inscription produced by MCS introduced in the NSC are discussed, beginning 
with the earlier MCS introduced to the most recent.  
 
8.4.1 From Budgeting to Strategic Planning: a Case for Management Control 
System Change 
 
The findings of the thesis reveal that, prior to the adoption of strategic planning in 
NSC, the main control mechanism in the organisation was budgeting. Otley (1999) 
asserted that budgeting is a central plank of the control mechanisms of most 
organisations, because it is among the few techniques that have the capability of 
integrating various organisations’ activities into a single coherent summary.  
 
Strategic planning is implemented in the public sector in order to improve 
performance and accountability (Kim, 2002). As presented in section 7.3.2 and the 
above section, NSC adopted strategic planning toward preparing the organisation for 
commercialisation, and was geared towards improving its performance, profitability, 
management and accountability. NSC did not adopt this concept because of first-hand 
experience that it would work; rather it was adopted through the enrolment of various 
human and non-human actors. The strategic plan was produced as a result of the 
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relationships between the NSC top management, middle management, lower level 
staff, consultants and strategic planning texts. Latour (1992) stressed that innovation 
is developed through a network as a consequence of the enrolment of human and non-
human allies. As discussed in the above section, strategic planning was presented as 
an obligatory passage point by Arthur Anderson and Co (global actors). Seminars, 
workshops, training and meetings were conducted with the NSC top management, 
middle management and lower management in an effort to interest, enrol and mobilise 
them into the network.  
The GMD at that time noted: 
We all went back to school and in the course of the year over 200 of our top 
managers and senior staff including myself have been through the two-day 
strategic planning methodology school. The result was we all understand the 
concept and use the same planning jargons throughout the corporation. We all 
participated in several lively monthly planning workshops which brought 
together planners and line executives to exchange information on the progress 
of the process (Internal Document). 
 
The enrolment and mobilisation of various actors groups resulted in the NSC’s 
adoption of strategic planning. The NSC main strategic business areas were identified 
and integrated into the NSC budget. This finding is consistent with assertion made by 
Merchant and Van der Stede (2003) and Anthony and Govindarajan (2007) that 
strategic planning provides a framework for developing an effective annual budget, 
and serves as a powerful action control which forces managers to think about the 
future, make decisions in advance and align their interests with the organisational long 
term strategies  
 
The evidence also shows that the strategic plan and budget enable the NSC to see 
what its core areas are and what needs to be improved or changed. Strategic planning 
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and budgeting became central to change in the NSC. The GMD at that time 
highlighted this as follows: 
…mission statement emphasised commercialisation, profitability, integrity, 
funding autonomy and internationalisation in our business operations. 
Accordingly, our planning was undertaken around these “givens” at both the 
corporate [head office] as well as the SBU levels. By the time we had gone 
through all the phases of strategic planning process and evolved our strategic 
plans, the concepts behind these key words – commercialisation, profitability, 
integration and internationalisation –had become a matter of faith. We believe 
in them we were united in our resolved to actualise them in NSC (Internal 
Document).  
 
This finding is consistent with those reported by Lowe (2000) who found that 
accounting techniques together with other devices were central to the process through 
which change was made in the hospital he studied. Similarly, Anderson and Lanen 
(1999) reported that, following Indian’s economic reform in 1991, enterprises 
perceived budgeting as being more meaningful, realistic and useful, especially when 
forming strategy.  
 
The empirical findings show that other innovations, such as the changes in systems, 
processes and procedure necessary for NSC to attain its mission were not translated 
following the non commercialisation and recapitalisation of the organisation by the 
government. This was described by a manager as: 
You know there is nothing like commercialisation…all this noise about it by 
the government is just being done; we cannot set our own price and we cannot 
go out and borrow. How can you then call us a commercial entity? 
 
The above evidence is consistent with ANT explanations that networks become 
stronger and stronger only with the enrolment of allies (Latour, 1987). The 
government’s non release of its grip on the NSC contributed to the NSC not achieving 
the efficiency and effectiveness sought by the reforms hence the weakening of the 
network.  
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The practice of strategic planning and budgeting has continued up to date in the NSC. 
Each year the NSC produces a three-year plan and a yearly budget for all units and 
departments (see section 7.3.2 for the analysis of NSC’s strategic planning and 
budgeting activities). This is consistent with the four principal purposes of budget 
proposed by Anthony and Govindarajan (2007), fine-tuning the strategic plan, 
coordinating the organisation activities, assigning responsibilities to managers and 
forming the basis of evaluating managers’ performance.  
 
Strategic planning and budgeting became a black box in the NSC as they are 
recognised and widely followed in the organisation. This finding is consistent with 
Joshi’s (2001) finding in a study of 60 large and medium companies in India. He 
found that all the enterprises studied used budgeting for planning their day-to-day 
operations and cash flow. Similarly, Sulaiman et al. (2004) reported that a high use of 
budget for planning, control, and performance evaluation remains in India, Malaysia 
and Singapore.  
 
Lowe (2001) argued that accounting information may be better regarded as 
inscription. Robson (1992) explained the term inscription as material and graphic 
representation which make up accounting report. According to Lowe (2001, p. 331): 
It is the ability of accounting to represent and translate aspects of 
organisation’s environment into financial numbers which provides the key to 
the widespread use of accounting information. A consequence of the ability of 
accounting to inscribed information in this manner is to enable the “principals” 
and controllers of the system to accumulate knowledge “at the centre” and at 
the same time provide a convincing knowledge of the environment. The power 
of inscriptions is to enable “action at a distance”, which is prized by those who 
would seek to persuade, enrol, and control others.  
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As discussed in section 7.3.2, NSC’s strategic planning and budgeting involved 
examination of the business environment, identification of areas of strength and 
weaknesses, business mission development, objective settings and strategies to 
achieve them. This is similar to the six steps of strategic planning which is linked to 
the new role of budget identified by Merchant and Van der Stede (2003). The steps 
are: developing the corporate vision, mission, and objectives; understanding the 
organisation’s standing, its strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and risks; deciding 
the organisation’s diversification strategy, deciding on each of the business unit 
strategies; preparation of the strategic plan and monitoring of performance and 
updating the strategies if necessary (Merchant and Van der Stede, 2003). At the end of 
the process, the NSC’s three-year rolling plan with the next year’s budget are been 
produced.  
 
In section 7.3.2.1, it was argued that the budget enabled NSC’s top management to 
exercise control from a distance. For instance, before any SBUs or CSUs expend or 
carry out any activity, head office approval must be sought. The inscriptions provided 
by the strategic planning and budget also enabled the government to control the entire 
NSC from a distance. The government sometimes asks the NSC to work on only 25 
percent of its budget. A similar finding was reported by Preston (2006) in a case study 
of the reduction of the Navojo herds. Preston demonstrated that accounts enabled the 
government officials in Washington, DC, to take action to reduce the size of Najovo 
animals.  
 
The literature had suggested that budgetary control can ensure that the overall aims 
and objectives of the organisation are efficiently and effectively achieved (Anthony 
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and Govindarajan, 2004). However a contrary argument could be presented for the 
case of the NSC. According to Alcouffe et al. (2008), accounting innovations are used 
by actors to manufacture figures and number inscriptions which become facts, and 
they manipulate them to serve their own interests. In the case of the NSC, strategic 
planning and budgeting became blackboxed, an unquestionable technology; however, 
the inscriptions provided were manipulated by various groups of actors to serve their 
own interests. Various actors manoeuvred and manipulated the inscriptions to favour 
one interest rather than another. For instance, very often the government mandates the 
NSC to carry out duties that are not part of its day-to-day operations.  In order to carry 
out this mandate, the plan and budget had to be manipulated. A manager reflected: 
We are asked to buy military plane, buy eight (8) or so cars for three ministers, 
where are we going to source the money from? We spend what we don’t 
budget for and which has nothing to do with our operations. 
 
It was noted in section 7.3.2.2, that the top management, middle management and 
other staff also manipulate the budget to serve their interests. An extra request is 
demanded as part of a strategy to overcome budget cuts from the planners, manipulate 
operations figure to enable the day-to-day operation and other sorts of manoeuvres. 
Thus, the NSC budgeting which was supposed to be a means of control became a 
means for non-control as it was loosely coupled with day-to-day decision making. 
This finding is consistent with those reported by Chua and Mahama (2007) in a study 
of supply alliance using ANT as a theoretical lens. Chua and Mahama found that 
accounting controls were tied to a variety of actors with diverse interests, and it has 
become the means of destabilisation. Furthermore, this finding is similar to those of 
earlier studies on MCS change in developing countries (Uddin and Hopper, 2001; 
Uddin and Tsamenyi, 2005; Wickramasinghe and Hopper, 2005). For instance, Uddin 
and Hopper (2001) reported that, in a privatised soap manufacturing company in 
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Bangladesh, the control in the enterprises was secured by political intervention, often 
at the behest of trade unions, for party politics rather than commercial ends.  
 
As reported in section 7.3.2, the NSC’s budget was highly politicised as it has to be 
approved by the Minister or the President. It is unequivocal that under such a 
condition budgeting will become a political tool used to achieve vested political 
interests (Uddin and Tsamenyi, 2005; Hoque and Hopper, 1994, 1997; Covaleski and 
Dirsmith, 1986; Wickramisinghe and Hopper, 2005). 
 
8.4.2 The Translation of Total Quality Management in the NSC 
Callon (1991) argued that the nature of interaction between actors and their networks 
is never final; thus, when two translations are linked together they generate a third 
translation which may bring together other actors that would otherwise have been 
separate. TQM was an offshoot of the strategic planning actor-network (see section 
8.3.1 above). TQM can be seen as part of a much larger network outside the NSC. 
TQM caught the attention of western enterprises in the 1980s (Briers and Chua, 
2001), and during the period many allies were mobilised into its actor-network across 
space and time in different organisations. The head of the department set up in the 
NSC to implement CRC innovations (discussed in the above section) learned about 
the TQM concepts through seminars and texts, and was enrolled and mobilised into 
the global network. TQM was problematised in the NSC by CU. It was presented to 
the NSC top management as a way forward for the NSC’s inefficiencies and 
ineffectiveness. The spread of TQM into other organisations and the success stories 
interested the NSC top management actors. 
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While TQM was implemented in NSC, evidence gathered suggested that there was 
little appreciation for it outside the TQM department. According to ANT, for an 
innovation such as TQM to be successful, various actors with diverse interests within 
and outside the NSC needed to be enrolled and mobilised (Callon, 1986; Latour, 
1987). Middle managers were interessed, enrolled and mobilised into the TQM 
network through seminars and publications. However, the finding revealed that the 
enrolment and mobilisation of this group of actors can be viewed as automatic; this is 
because the non-acceptance of any initiative introduced by top management may have 
a dear consequence. The TQM was presented as a ready-made technology that could 
work. Staff were not involved in its translations. For instance, the middle managers 
viewed TQM as too technical and complex. This could however be attributed to the 
lack of negotiations with this group of actors on what exactly TQM is and how it can 
aid them in their work. Furthermore, lower level staff were not involved in the TQM 
translation; thus they do not understand the TQM concept.  
 
As the process of the implementation of the TQM continued in the NSC, other actors 
such as ISO certification were enrolled into the network and some of the SBU became 
ISO certified. CU continued conducting seminars, training and process improvement. 
The CU department was renamed Total Quality Department (hereafter, TQD). TQD 
staff became the spokespersons for TQM in Nigerian public sector organisations. The 
staffs were invited to other public sector organisation to deliver seminars on TQM. 
This is similar to the findings of Briers and Chua (2001) that local actors are not 
always local as they cross organisational boundaries and aid constitute global actors 
discourses.  
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The appointment of a new GMD who did not accept the concept of TQM caused a 
major disruption to the TQM actor-network. The TQM actor network was betrayed 
further when the head of the TQD was retired. The loss of one of the TQD’s main 
allies resulted in TQM almost being abandoned. This finding extends an earlier 
finding reported by Olowo-Okere (1999). Olowo-Okere investigated the 
government’s financial control system in Nigeria, by examining the impact of military 
rule on the changes in Nigeria’s government financial control systems and 
accountability. He found that the majority of the changes made by the military 
government were formalistic because of the political instability created by the military 
which disallowed continuity. This finding is extended to a micro level NSC, which, as 
a result of political instability, witnessed changes in its top management, which 
resulted in discontinuity or rather stagnation of the TQM which had been introduced. 
This finding can also be extended to other MCS innovations introduced in the NSC.  
 
The TQM did not become taken for granted in the NSC, nor has it disappeared. TQD 
and quality departments remain and these actors continue to pursue TQM concepts, 
albeit through a weak network. The TQM departments continue with process 
improvement but the network has become weaker and weaker (see section 7.4.3.1). 
Other allies, such as the middle managers, ISO certification and lower level staff, 
have ceased to subscribe to the TQM network. This finding confirms the arguments of 
Briers and Chua (2001) that the success or failure of accounting innovation is a fragile 
construction that turns on the strength of different ties tying jointly many 
heterogeneous elements. The failure of TQM to enrol lower staff and the lack of 
support from the new GMD and the middle managers, have led to the limited success 
of the TQM.  
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The case finding revealed that TQM remained in the NSC because of the presence of 
the TQM department. Furthermore, as presented in section 7.4.3, TQM was revived in 
2007 following the economic reforms controversy that opened up public sector 
reforms in the name of Alpha in 2004. The implementations of project Alpha 
initiative were handed over to TQD. Would the TQD this time around be able to 
implement project Alpha initiatives successfully? The case study finding was 
negative. As discussed in the above section, this is as a result of the new elected 
government’s different reform agenda. 
 
8.4.3 Sun Account Translation  
The Sun account system was introduced into the NSC in 1991 (see section 7.4.2). This 
system was adopted, not because the NSC had a prior knowledge that it would work; 
rather it was introduced through the process of problematisation, interessement, 
enrolment and mobilisation of various human and non-human actors (Callon, 1986) to 
help the NSC improve its accounting functions.  
 
By enrolling allies, the NSC was able to mobilise resources to sustain commitment for 
the Sun account (Stanforth, 2006). Allies such as the government, NSC top 
management, middle managers, lower level staff, World Bank, Peat Marwick 
Consultants, Sun account system and computers were enrolled and mobilised into the 
construction of the Sun account technology. The World Bank provided financial 
resources to the NSC to review and improve its accounting systems. Peat Marwick 
Consultants presented the Sun account system as the obligatory passage point, and 
this actor group, together with NSC staff (who were seconded to work with them), 
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adapted the global Sun account system to suit the NSC needs and implemented it 
throughout the organisation. The top management interest was aligned with the 
consultants, because as noted by a senior manager interviewed “the lack of proper 
accounting records had become an embarrassment to NSC’s management.” The Sun 
account system was enrolled and displaced from the United Kingdom to the finance 
and account department in the NSC’s subsidiaries and head office in Nigeria.  
 
Other staff were trained on its usage, and the implementation of the system in the 
accounts department enrolled and mobilised the staff in that department. However, the 
Sun account system was not fully translated; other key actors such as the internal 
auditors, marketing staff and planners were not enrolled into the network. Even in the 
Finance and Accounts department, actors that produced other accounting inscriptions 
apart from financial reports do not use the Sun account system in their day-today-
operations and in producing accounting inscription. The emphasis on the system was 
more on the production of annual financial accounts. The Sun account system became 
blackbox within the NSC actor-network (Latour, 1987) since the organisation’s 
accounting activities are posted onto the system.  
 
The case study finding shows that, although NSC had adopted the Sun account 
system, its accounting system is still weak. As discussed in section 7.4.2, the system 
was not used in producing management accounting reports, planning and budgeting 
report, nor does it hasten the production of the NSC annual financial accounts. 
According to Latour (1987), the success of a machine lies in the hands of the later 
user. The later users did not translate the Sun account system further, nor did they 
translate the other aspects of the system to other actors in the NSC.  
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8.4.4 Activity-Based Costing  
 
As discussed in section 7.3.1, NSC does not keep an adequate accounting system for 
control and accountability. This finding is contrary to the finding in other developing 
countries reported in the literature. For instance, Uddin and Hopper (2001) found in 
their case organisation that a detailed system of accounting for control and 
accountability was maintained although these systems were marginal, ritualistic, and 
de-coupled from operations. The evidence in the case of NSC showed that there was 
no specific system used in costing products and services in the organisation. Although 
ABC has been introduced, the system is not used in costing NSC products and 
services. ABC was problematised in 1997 when the Nigerian head of state, General 
Sani Abacha, ordered the NSC to provide its administration with the cost of 
processing it main product. 
 
As with the adoption of the previous innovations, NSC engaged a consultant who 
presented ABC as the way forward for the organisation’s costing problems. This is 
consistent with the assertion by various scholars that new MCS innovations such as 
ABC, are promoted to organisations by management consultants (Abrahamson, 1991, 
1996; Malmi, 1999; Jones and Dugdale, 2002). The NSC ABC was designed and 
implemented by the consultant and some internal staff. That is to say, the technology 
was constructed by various human and non-humans actors through a network of 
relationships (Latour, 1987; Lee and Hassard, 1999). The planning staff were enrolled 
and mobilised into the ABC network. Some of the staff were trained on how to input 
data into the system.  
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ABC produced inscriptions which were initially discussed quarterly by the 
subsidiaries using the system. However, the inscriptions were not used in computing 
processing fees, costing products, performance, cost reduction and pricing. This 
finding is supported by the finding reported by Van Triest and Elshahat (2007). Van 
Triest and Elshahat, in a survey of forty Egyptian private enterprises, reported that the 
traditional and advanced MCS techniques used were limited and that costing is not 
used in performance measurement, process improvement or cost reduction.  
 
ABC is not appreciated generally in the NSC. The inscriptions were produced for the 
some SBUs management and kept for record purpose only, not for decision making. 
The SBUs were not autonomous and the overall NSC operation's actor-networks have 
not fully enrolled and mobilised accounting technology. The ABC was designed for 
the production SBUs only; it was not designed for other SBUs and CSUs. Shield 
(1995) in a study of 143 firms found that top management support, linkage to 
competitive strategies, linkage to performance evaluations and compensation, training 
on ABC, ownership of non-accountants and adequate resources are all significantly 
associated with ABC success. However, in the case of the NSC’s production SBUs’ 
ABC, key actors, such as the accountants who in a typical organisation are expected 
to be in charge of costing, have not been mobilised into the ABC network. 
Furthermore, the reports are not sent to the departments in head office such as the 
Finance and Accounts Department and the Planning Development Department; nor 
are they linked with the production SBUs strategy. Also, the lack of infrastructure, 
such as a proper working system and maintenance, has resulted in the SBUs being out 
of date and un-operational in some cases for about two years. 
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A former NSC top Executive was reported in the newspaper that the NSC’s 
production SBUs were deliberately left to rot. It can be argued that this mysterious 
actor group who deliberately allowed the NSC infrastructure to decay are the root 
cause of the reported problems in NSC accounting system. This is consistent with 
ANT analysis that technologies are produced through the common enrolment of 
heterogeneous human and non-human actors and when these enrolments fail then the 
technologies are likely to disintegrate (Latour, 1987; Callon and Law, 1989 Lee and 
Hassard, 1999). Infrastructures, politicians, ABC, NSC top management, middle 
managers, lower level staff, professional staff, blackbox punctualised actors, computer 
maintenance and other actors’ interests had to be aligned for ABC innovations to be 
institutionalised. Unfortunately, this was not the case in NSC. 
8.4.5 Management Control Systems presented by Project Alpha  
The construction of Project Alpha network was discussed in sections 8.3 above. 
Project Alpha network enrolled various global MCS technologies. Technologies such 
as performance measurement systems, System Application and Products in Data 
Processing (hereafter, SAP1) and Management Information Systems (hereafter, MIS) 
were enrolled and mobilised into the project Alpha actor-network. This finding is 
similar to that of Hassan (2005), who found that in the Egyptian health sector reform, 
management accounting systems were acted upon to reform the sector.  
 
The translations of these systems in NSC are discussed below.  
 
8.4.5.1 Performance Measurement Systems and Evaluations 
 
According to Chenhall and Langfield-Smith (2007), the primary function of MCS is 
to develop performance measures which will assist managers in planning and 
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controlling their activities. However, in the case of the NSC, as discussed in section 
7.4.4, it was found that the NSC’s systems of performance measurement and 
evaluations are weak. Prior to Project Alpha, the appraisal system was the main 
performance measure used and was based on subjective judgement; it was not linked 
to the overall NSC performance. For instance, though NSC is making a loss and some 
of its operations are out of order; at the end of every year, the staff are graded ‘good’ 
in their appraisal and they are rewarded by salary increases and promotion.  
 
Performance measurements are one of the doctrines of NPM identified by Hood 
(1991; 1995), and they have been drawn upon as one of the technologies of change by 
the Project Alpha actor group. A Performance Measurement System (hereafter, PMS), 
a global MCS with Key Performance Indicators (hereafter, KPIs), was deployed into 
the NSC and presented as the obligatory passage point by the global actors, the 
consultant. Consultants are identified as diffusers of new MCS innovation (See Jones 
and Dugdale, 2002). The PMS which was top-most driven comes with KPIs. The 
KPIs were supposed to be drawn from the federal government to the last person on the 
shop floor.  
 
ANT argues that neither technology nor social characteristics determine the outcome; 
it depends on the enrolment and mobilisation of various actors (Law, 1992; Lee and 
Hassard, 1999). As discussed in the above section, the middle and lower level staff 
were interessed into the project Alpha network through seminars and publications. 
These actor groups accepted the definition presented by the focal actor (i.e. the project 
Alpha actor group) that a new PMS with KPIs is the way forward. Each 
department/units/section has its KPIs, and each person gets his share of it as tasks and 
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targets, and these are set at the beginning of each year. The tasks and targets are 
signed by the staff, his/her supervisor and countersigned by the unit manager. The 
NSC top management, middle managers and lower staff were enrolled and mobilised 
into the PMS. Most of the staff interviewed noted that the appraisal is more objective 
than the previous one. Each staff knows his tasks and targets and what is expected of 
him/her, unlike before. One interviewee commented that: “Tasks and targets are 
clearer, more specific and direct; everybody can measure his/her own performance.” 
The old appraisal system was replaced with the new PMS. The inscription produced 
by the PMS was used by middle managers and top management for appraisal leading 
to promotions and other rewards. This finding is similar to that of Wickramasinghe et 
al. (2004) in their study of a partially privatised telecommunication company in Sri 
Lanka. They reported that the new owners had introduced new management controls 
and reward systems.  
 
As discussed in chapter 7.4.4, the PMS was designed to reflect the overall NSC 
performance; this was not achieved as external actors such as the government were 
not enrolled into the network. NSC management was not given a free hand and they 
did not receive the necessary support from the government to operate as an 
independent commercial oriented enterprise. Instead the activities of the enterprises 
were highly politicised. The finding is similar to that reported by Stanforth (2006) that 
e-government implementation in Sri Lanka depended on both macro and micro 
network supports.  
 
Furthermore, the project Alpha actor designed a performance measurement for the 
entire NSC with KPIs. The new performance measurement was designed around the 
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Kaplan and Norton four perspectives balanced scorecard, and reflects the entire NSC 
activities (Kaplan and Norton, 1992, 1996a, 1996b, 1996c). As discussed earlier, the 
consultant reviewed the NSC systems, processes, procedures, and interviews were 
conducted by various staff. The BSC was designed based on the outcome of 
secondary review (still an intermediary), and its implementation was handed over to 
TQD. The TQD planned to translate it by linking it to the annual plan and budget; 
however, up to the end of the fieldwork, the BSC had not been implemented.  
 
8.4.5.2  System Application and Products in Data Processing 
 
The Alpha consultant introduced SAP1, an Enterprise Resource Planning System 
(hereafter, ERP), global technology into the NSC. Consultants are the diffusers of new 
innovations (Abrahamson, 1991, 1996; Malmi, 1999; Jones and Dugdale, 2002).  
SAP1 was presented as an obligatory passage point for the increase in efficiency in 
NSC’s processes, transparency and information integrity, and a way of aiding the 
NSC to achieve its mission and vision (Transformation document). This is consistent 
with the argument in the literature that EPR systems contribute to increase financial 
performance and enhance the competitive position of organisations (Curran et al., 
1998; Hayes et al., 2001). 
 
The consultant that designed the NSC SAP1 (see section 7.4.5) reviewed the 
processes the NSC had on the ground, and did a gap analysis; fitted those things the 
NSC wanted but SAP1 could not do, and what SAP1 does and NSC does not need, 
and came up with SAP1 for the NSC. The implementation was scheduled to be carried 
out by the consultant and NSC counterparts’ staff, who will work hand in hand. This 
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was scheduled for three years from 2007-2009; however, up to the time the researcher 
left the field (March 2008), the implementation had not yet started.  
 
There was a mixed message regarding the value of SAP1 in the NSC. A manager 
whose former organisation had implemented SAP1 noted the following: 
Unlike in the Central Bank of Nigeria, when they were planning to introduce 
SAP1, they give a guideline for that. You must have a computer on your desk 
and they provided that, except for lower cadres of staff. Everybody was 
involved, unlike here; nobody comes to me and asks me about my job, and see 
how it will fit with the new system. There the system was customised for 
Central Bank’s needs, but here it is not so. 
 
ANT argues that fact construction is a collective process (Latour, 1987). For SAP1 to 
be implemented and accepted, various human and non-human actors have to be 
enrolled in its production. Quattrone and Hopper (2005), in a study of two 
multinational corporations, reported that the configuration of SAP1 in the two 
organisations resulted in a different control relationship in the organisations. NSC 
SAP1, if implemented, may produce different control relationships, as many of the 
actors are not involved in its construction, and many do not have an understanding of 
the system.  
 
Other managers appreciate SAP1 and believe that, if fully implemented, it will 
improve efficiency, effectiveness and curtail corruption. This is consistent with 
McCausland’s (2004) assertion that ERP systems are important because they help 
organisations to capture, edit and process accounting and other related transactions. 
They enable firms to undertake comprehensive audit trails, automated inventory 
management systems, automated billing systems, and integrated payroll systems. This 
means that the political patronage that had become the norm in the NSC cannot be 
possible; hence the fear by various staff that SAP1 will never be fully implemented.  
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8.4.5.3 Management Information System  
 
Another MCS technology enrolled and mobilised by the Alpha actor is the MIS, 
introduced in the first SBU the researcher visited. The MIS was introduced with the 
essence of having a single consistent database for the whole SBU; it provides 
information that will aid the SBU management in decision making and in achieving 
the organisation’s mission and vision. The MIS was made up of two sides: the data 
capture side for data entering, and the reporting side in which management views the 
data for information for decision making. In the reporting side, some of them have a 
dashboard where, in a snapshot, management can see indicators - green for good, 
amber for something that requires attention and red where the performance is not too 
good. The dashboard was designed around four performance perspectives and KPIs 
indicators advocated by Kaplan and Norton’s Balanced Scorecard (Kaplan and 
Norton, 1992, 1996a, 1996b).  
 
There was clear evidence of non-appreciation of the MIS in the SBU. Except for the 
Information Technology staff responsible for it, the MIS technology, although capable 
of producing several inscriptions, is not utilised by other staff; it is not updated 
regularly, nor is it used in report generation or for decision making (see section 7.4.7 
for detailed discussion of MIS). The consultant did not engage other staff in designing 
and implementing the MIS. Many of the staff were not given access to the system; 
hence they were not exposed to the benefits of the MIS. Furthermore, infrastructure 
such as computers and electricity were not engaged in making the MIS work. For 
instance, many of the staff voiced their concern regarding the lack of office computers 
and training on the usage of the computer. The MIS was presented to the SBU as a 
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fixed technology with well-defined functions. The MIS actor network failed to enrol 
and mobilise other actors that would have aided its survival. Actors such as 
accountants, planners, engineers and other departments were not enrolled into the 
network. This finding is supported by that of Preston et al. (1992, p. 561) that 
emerging MCS are not “fixed technologies with a well-defined purpose, which 
reflects the pattern of responsibility but changing in constructions.” MCS initiatives 
emerged through the process of design and implementation. 
 
8.4.6 Stability of MCS Technology in the NSC   
 
In the above subsection, various MCS initiatives introduced in the NSC were analysed 
and discussed. Consistent with the finding of Hopper et al. (2009), this study has not 
found any MCS that was locally produced by the NSC. Similar to Alcouffe et al. 
(2008) and Briers and Chua (2001), it can be argued that MCS changes are not linear 
or foreseeable. Most of the changes have been introduced into the NSC by global 
actor consultants (with the exception of TQM). This finding adds up to the previous 
findings by identifying consultants as one of the forces that aid the diffusion of 
accounting systems in developing countries. Previous scholars reported that 
accounting systems and practices were imposed by developed countries through 
colonialism (Wallace, 1990; Parera, 1989; Hove, 1986) and through the operations of 
multinational corporations, professional accounting organisations and the special 
conditions of economic aid agreements (Hove, 1986).  
 
Furthermore, most of the changes are problematised following a government policy, 
directive or request. Consistent with previous MCS change studies reported by 
Lapsley and Pallot (2000) that found MCS are introduced in public sector 
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organisations for legitimacy purpose. This study found that changes in NSC though 
were sometimes presented as if they were for efficiency purposes, in reality they have 
been politically driven and therefore mainly served legitimacy purposes.  
 
The MCS introduced suffered similar consequences in terms of their proper 
implementations and usage in the day-to-day running of the organisation. Although 
their presence is evident in the NSC headquarters and some of the SBU visited (see 
chapter seven), these MCS failed to become part of the NSC routine. In other words, 
the MCS failed to be localised in the NSC. Latour (1987, p. 41) argued that: 
Fact construction is so much a collective process that an isolated person builds 
only dreams, claims and feelings, not facts… One of the main problems to 
solve is to interest someone enough to be read at all; compared to this problem 
that of being believed is, so to speak, a minor task. 
 
It can be argued that consultants brought an ideal Western MCS into the NSC with the 
view that it would work without engaging individual users of the MCS in its 
translation and adaptability. For instance, ABC and the Sun accounts systems were 
designed and implemented by the consultants. BSC, SAP1 and MIS were designed by 
the consultant. The planned implementation of SAP1 was to be done by the 
consultant. It can be argued that the failure to involve the users in negotiating and 
translating new innovations contributed to NSC’s accounting system not being 
institutionalised (Latour, 1987; Callon, 1986).  
 
Furthermore, it can be argued that the consultant actor group assumed that, by being 
enrolled into the NSC transformation network, they could introduce private sector 
practices without adapting them to the NSC culture and engaging other staff. This is 
consistent with previous findings: that developed countries’ accounting systems and 
practices were imported without consideration of the specific local environment 
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features of developing countries (Perera, 1989: Ansari and Bell, 1991; Hopper et al., 
2003). The consultant assumed that interessement, enrolment and mobilisation of 
NSC top management are enough for innovations to diffuse. Apart from seminars and 
publications, there was no interessement device by which other actors would accept 
the innovations introduced. This finding can also be extended to TQM. The TQD, like 
the consultants relied on top management support for TQM translation. Lower and 
middle management staff were not enrolled and mobilised into the TQM negotiations 
and translation. Chua (1995) reported that accounting change emerged following 
uncertain faith promoted by expert-generated inscriptions and rhetorical strategies, 
which were able to tie together shifting interests in an actor-network. In the case of 
the NSC, the consultant failed to tie together the various actors (especially the middle 
and lower level managers) into their network.  
 
There was no proper ownership of MCS in the NSC. For instance, as with the 
successes in the above section, TQM and MIS are not owned in the CSUs and SBUs. 
The Sun account system recorded relative success compare to the other MCS, because 
of its ownership by the system user. It was owned and localised by the accounts. As 
discussed in section 7.4.7, the accountants in the first SBU visited protect the Sun 
account system by not enrolling into MIS, which they view as a counter innovation.  
 
It can be argued that the majority of the NSC staff did not perceive accounting in 
general or MCS as a solution to the NSC’s inefficiency and ineffectiveness. 
Accounting is not perceived as an obligatory passage point for achieving goals. Even 
the NSC GMD acknowledges this, as follows: 
 275 
If we had genuinely embarked on the reforms, which were started with in 
1986, the NSC would have by now been in the league of the most successful 
...companies in the world. 
 
Various scholars have argued that MCS are a crucial activity for every business 
organisation (Goold and Quinn, 1990; Otley, 1994; Mia and Clarke, 1999, Merchant 
and Van der Stede, 2003; Anthony and Govindarajan, 2007). Barnard (1962) asserted 
that the fundamental task of any large organisation is to coordinate the effort of those 
working in it, and MCS provide the means for such coordination. However, the 
finding of this study shows that, despite this importance, MCS are not coupled with 
day-to-day decision making in NSC. Thus accounting and MCS systems are not used 
in decision making. Prices and cost of production are set, not based on accounting. 
Performance evaluations are not clear, nor are they based on financial targets. This 
finding is consistent with those of previous studies in developing countries (Hoque 
and Hopper, 1994; Tsamenyi et al., 2008; Wickramasinghe and Hopper, 2005). 
Hoque and Hopper (1994) in a study of a large nationalised jute mill in Bangladesh 
reported that formal controls such as budgets were employed for the purpose of 
legitimacy, but informal controls in the form of relationships and politics enable the 
managers to cope with the daily pressures of working in the mill.  
 
Similarly, in a study of an Indonesian family organisation, Tsamenyi et al. (2008) 
reported that culture and social control, rather than formal rational decision making, 
were employed by the managers. The finding, although consistent with those of these 
studies, however, differs from these studies as, in the NSC, politics is the main means 
of control, from the shop floor staff to top management and to the government. A 
manager noted: “A lot of policies are conceived on self interest not national interest.” 
The Nigerian government directs the NSC on where to buy equipment and other 
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materials needed for operations. The NSC is also directed on whom to sell its product 
to. A manager observed: 
The government will tell us to buy material to improve our product; it may be 
from Japan; meanwhile, this same material can be sourced inward…. 
Furthermore, the government determines who we sale our product to. 
 
The NSC has no power to set its own price. The NSC is used for political patronage. 
A manger commented: 
How NSC is run is all political. For example, through our SBU we owe 
another SOE close to ngn12billion. We have about 17 major customers and we 
sell product to them at a particular price. However, the SOE is getting the 
product  free because if we charge them, they are going to charge the civilians 
commercial rate for their own product; because of that, we are directed by the 
government to sit down with them and work out an agreed price they will buy 
our product. So this SOE decided on the price they want to pay us for our 
product and even that price they don’t pay us.  
 
Formal structures though sometimes exist do not serve any rational decision purpose. 
For instance, the NSC, as at the time of writing up this thesis, has no board of 
directors. The NSC board of directors was dissolved in 2007 following the election of 
a new president. Technocrats were hired to run the NSC. However, the technocrats set 
the goal of the NSC in line with the ruling government’s goals. A manager explained 
that: 
In terms of goals and policies our own [meaning NSC’s] depends on the 
government goals and policies own, for example the government 7 points 
agenda. So we shift our focus with that of the government. In an environment 
like this, it is stock driven. The government is controlling certain things; we 
cannot be commercial. 
 
Thus, from the above assertion, we argue that, MCS played minimal role in the day-
to-day decision making of NSC. Instead politics is the main means of control in the 
organisation.  
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8.5 Summary of the Chapter 
This chapter has analysed the empirical data drawing on the ANT theoretical 
framework proposed in chapter three. The analysis presented in the chapter has 
integrated the empirics, the literature and the theoretical framework.  The chapter 
began by defining the various actors identified in the study. Consistent with prior 
studies, these actors have been classified into global and local actors. The relationship 
between these actors was also discussed. 
 
The way the public sector reforms in Nigeria were constructed was discussed and 
analysed, beginning with the earliest to the most recent reforms. The NSC underwent 
two main reforms, namely the introduction of strategic planning in 1986 and Project 
Alpha in 2004. The construction of these reform actor networks was discussed and 
analysed. 
 
The findings reveal that various MCS technologies have been introduced into the 
NSC as part of the reform. These MCS are presented to the NSC by various 
international management consultants as a solution to the organisation’s endemic 
problems. While few of the MCS were successful, the majority were not. For instance, 
strategic planning enabled the NSC to identify what its core activities are and how it 
can become an effective, efficient and prudent organisation. But other techniques such 
SAP1, Balanced Scorecard, TQM, ABC, etc were either not fully implemented or 
even when they were implemented were not used. Thus these systems were decoupled 
from day-to-day decision making. There was therefore a clear lack of understanding 
of the role of MCS in the decision making process of the NSC. The analysis also 
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reveals that accounting in general and MCS in particular play a subordinate role in the 
NSC because politics are the main means of day-to-day control in the organisation.  
 
Having discussed the results in this chapter, the next chapter provides summary and 
conclusions to the thesis. 
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9 CHAPTER NINE: CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
9.1 Introduction  
 
This thesis sets out to examine how the Nigerian public sector reforms impacts on the 
Management Control Systems (hereafter, MCS) of the Nigeria State Company 
(hereafter, NSC). The empirical results were presented in chapters six and seven and 
the discussions and analyses of these results were presented in the preceding chapter. 
The objective of this chapter is to provide overall conclusion to the thesis.  
 
The chapter is organised into six sections. Following this introduction, the next part 
presents a reflection on the methodology adopted for the thesis. The subsequent 
section provides a summary of the main findings of the thesis. Section 9.4 presents the 
contribution to knowledge offered by the thesis. The study’s contribution to literature, 
methodology, theory and policy are all discussed. The next section presents the 
study’s limitation and, in the final part, areas for future research are identified.  
 
9.2 Reflection on Methodology 
 
The main aim of this study is to understand public sector reforms in Nigeria and their 
implications for MCS. To enable us attain this aim, the case study approach was 
adopted. One of the advantages of a case study is that it enables researchers gain an 
intimate, contextually sensitive knowledge of organisational phenomena (Patton, 
1987; Birnberg et al., 1990; Atkinson and Shaffir, 1998). Indeed, this approach 
enabled the researcher to become part of the NSC’s daily activities. The researcher 
spent a total of seven months in the organisation and some of its subsidiaries. Data 
were collected through interviews, documentary analysis and observations. The case 
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study approach permits the researcher to collect evidence from various sources (Yin, 
2003). Through these various sources of evidence and interactions, an in-depth 
contextual understanding of MCS in the NSC was obtained. For instance, the case 
study approach enabled the researcher to discover the various reforms that had taken 
place and the subsequent changes in MCS, as well as the implementation processes of 
the new MCS and their initial and present usage. This would not have been possible 
had a different approach such as survey been adopted as surveys would have resulted 
in data being collected from a distance.  
 
The choice of a case study was also influenced by qualitative methodology and the 
interpretive paradigm adopted for the thesis (Chua, 1986). The researcher’s 
assumptions were that public sector reforms and MCS change are socially constructed 
and can therefore be understood by relying on the subjective interpretation of the 
various organisational actors (Burchell, et al., 1980; Hopwood, 1987; Ryan et al., 
2002); thus through a case study the researcher was able to interact with various 
organisation members. From this examination, the researcher was able to understand 
how the NSC accounting systems in general and MCS in particular are intertwined 
with complex social, economic and political processes. In most cases, the researcher 
observed that formal MCS are subordinated to political control. The examination of 
this social, economic and political process would not have been possible if other 
methods such as survey had been employed.  
 
Despite its benefits, discussed in the above paragraph, the case study is not without 
problems as it is time consuming and costly (Ryan et al., 2002; Yin, 2003). In order to 
understand MCS change, the researcher had to conduct several interviews with 
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various people located in different parts of Nigeria. Thus, time was needed for 
travelling; the process of the interviews also took up lot of time. In some cases, the 
interviewees rescheduled the date and time of the interview, while in some instances 
during the interview, the interviewees received a call from their superior and were 
sent outside the organisation for an urgent assignment, thus affecting the researcher’s 
interview schedule and creating a backlog of interviews and transcriptions. In 
addition, the case study is emotionally taxing (Hoepfl, 1997). It requires listening, 
thinking, and observing at the same time, thus required lot of preparation time. For 
instance, the researcher arrived a day or two days earlier prior to an interview in order 
to prepare and approach the interview in a relaxed manner. Another problem 
encountered was the cost associated with the case study. The NSC is located in 
different parts of Nigeria, thus the researcher spent lot of money on travelling and 
accommodation while conducting the case study. On reflection therefore, despite the 
difficulties encountered during the research process identified above, the case study 
provided an apt approach in examining the public sector reforms and MCS in the 
studied organisation. It enabled the researcher to obtain rich historical and contextual 
understanding of the reforms and the MCS. In effect, the case study provided the 
opportunity for the MCS to be studied within its organisational context (Burchell et 
al., 1980; Hopper and Powell, 1985) thereby understanding its historical, political and 
social constituted nature in addition to its technical dimension. 
 
9.3 Summary of the Main Findings  
 
In this section, the summary of the thesis major findings is presented. The findings are 
discussed by revisiting the research questions presented in section 1.3. 
1. What is the role of various actors in the Nigerian public sector reforms? 
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The findings reveal that the Nigerian public sector reforms were the result of 
interactions between various heterogeneous human and non-human actors (Callon, 
1986; Latour, 1987; Lee and Hassard, 1999). Public sector reforms were introduced in 
Nigeria following a financial crisis that severely hit the Nigerian economy, leading to 
the government not being able to meet its internal and external commitments. 
Furthermore, the Nigerian general public could not secure any external funding or 
guarantee for purchase of the imported raw materials upon which the local industries 
depend, thus leading to a shortage of consumables and other goods in the country, and 
a rise in unemployment figures. The government attempted to solve the crisis through 
enacting some legislations such as price controls. However, the crisis persisted and 
the government approached the World Bank and IMF for a loan to ease the crisis. The 
World Bank and IMF presented SAP with public sector reforms as one of its main 
elements as a solution to the crisis. Previously, scholars had identified SAP as one of 
the means through which public sector reforms are encouraged or directed to 
developing countries by donor countries and the World Bank and IMF (Toye, 1994; 
Cook and Kirkpatrick, 1995; Olowu, 2002; Uddin and Hopper, 2003; Hopper et al., 
2009).  
 
As discussed above, the World Bank and IMF have played a significant role in the 
introduction of public sector reforms in Nigeria. However, the findings show that the 
World Bank and IMF SAP, with the public sector reforms, were not accepted as a 
readymade innovation; rather the Nigerian government, the general public and the 
public enterprises interpreted and reworked the reforms to suit their own interests. 
Stanforth (2006) stresses that the process of building and changing of networks is 
necessarily political in nature, as actors put forward favoured solutions and contest 
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these. SAP with public sector reforms were adopted after series of negotiations and 
manipulations amongst the Nigerian government, World Bank and IMF, external 
creditors, the general public, public enterprises and other actors. The Nigerian SAP 
recorded limited success and was abandoned after seven years (Obadan and Edo, 
2004; Umoren, 2001; Jega, 2000; Irukwo, 2005; Olukoshi, 1993a, 1993). This finding 
is consistent with those of previous studies such as that of Uddin and Tsamenyi 
(2005) and Uddin and Hopper (2001), which reported that reforms are imposed on the 
developing countries they studied by international aid agencies, such as the World 
Bank and IMF.   
 
The Actor-Network Theory (ANT) was adopted as a theoretical lens in order to 
understand the complex relationship between these various groups. From the analysis 
the role of the various actors were identified. In particular, the findings revealed that 
the public sector reforms and the MCS studied were shaped and re-shaped by the 
group of global and local actors. The overall implication of this finding is that in order 
to fully comprehend the outcome of public sector reforms we should focus on both 
global and local dichotomy. Focusing on only one group would delimit our 
understanding of the reform process and how this impacts on the MCS. 
 
2. How the Nigerian public sector reforms were translated in the NSC 
The evidence shows that, following the Nigerian government’s adoption of SAP with 
public sector reforms as one of its measures, the NSC top management embarked on 
reforming the NSC. The top management engaged international consultants to help 
with the reforms. This finding is consistent with those of Fyson (2009) and 
Christensen (2002; 2005): that international consultants play a key role in public 
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sector reforms. Indeed, the consultants introduced private sector methods into the 
NSC; these included changes in MCS such as strategic planning, performance 
management system, Activity-Based Costing, SAP1, Total Quality Management, 
decentralisation, Sun account system and the Balanced Scorecard. This is in line with 
the NPM doctrine that, in reforming the public sector, private sector practices are 
normally introduced into public sector organisations (Hood, 1991; 1995).  
 
It is evident in the NSC that the Nigerian public sector reforms resulted in changes in 
the NSC’s processes, systems and procedures. However, the reforms were not seen to 
their logical conclusion. The majority of the innovations designed during the reforms 
were abandoned half way through, or in some cases were put on the shelves without 
being implemented. This may be due to the government not been true to the reforms, 
granting the NSC full autonomy and the constant changes of the NSC’s top 
management. For instance, during strategic planning, various reforms were devised. 
However, most of them were not implemented; even the current General Managing 
Director of the NSC acknowledged that if NSC had genuinely adopted the reforms 
introduced during strategic planning, the NSC would by now be among the best 
companies in the world. Based on the evidence obtained from the study, it can be 
argued that the reforms failed because of the lack of ownership by the local actors and 
also because of the politicisation of the reform process. ANT analysis revealed that 
the majority of the local actors (mainly the middle and lower level managers in the 
organisation) were not interresed and enrolled in the reform process. Moreover NSC’s 
strategic role in the country means it is a highly politicised organisation with decisions 
being made based on political rather than economic criteria. Similar findings have 
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been reported in other developing countries (Uddin and Hopper, 2001; 2003; Uddin 
and Tsamenyi, 2005). 
 
3. What is the role of MCS in NSC reforms and how was this MCS shaped and 
reshaped in the network? 
 
This study identified MCS change as one of the major drivers of change in the NSC. 
The findings reveal that, during the first wave of the Nigerian public sector reforms, 
strategic planning was the main driver of change in the NSC. The NSC management 
and staff relied on strategic planning as a facilitator of change as it enabled the NSC 
to identify it core areas and define its mission. Furthermore, strategic planning was 
incorporated into the budget, thus linking the budget with some predetermined 
strategy. This is similar to the findings reported by Crebert (2001) which links 
strategic planning to the budgeting process. Furthermore, the finding reveals that other 
MCS, such as Total Quality Management (TQM), Sun accounts systems, Activity 
Based Costing (ABC), performance management systems, Balanced Scorecard (BSC), 
Management Information System (MIS) and System Application and Products in Data 
Processing (SAP1) have been introduced into the NSC as the drivers of change. This 
finding is consistent with findings reported by Lowe (2001a) and Chua (1995) that 
identify the role of these various management accounting techniques in organisational 
change. 
 
The study findings reveal that public sector reforms recorded limited success in the 
NSC, and this in turn affected the MCS being proposed or implemented. For instance, 
as discussed in the above section, strategic planning was the main driver of change in 
the NSC and had been incorporated into the NSC budget. However, the government, 
NSC top management and NSC staff manipulated the budget and plan to suit their 
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own interests. The BSC, PMS, SAP1, MIS, ABC, Sun account System and TQM 
were partially or not implemented. MCS are therefore decoupled from day-to-day 
decision making of the organisation and has become subordinated to political control. 
In other words, MCS are not used in decision making but rather politics dominated 
decision making. This finding is consistent with the findings of Wickramasinghe and 
Hopper, (2005), Hoque and Hopper (1994) and Tsamenyi et al. (2009) which 
identified the role of politics as the dominant means of control in large public 
enterprises in developing countries.  
 
The study identified lack of ownership, importation, and commitment as the main 
factors that contributed to the failure of reforms in the NSC in general, and in 
particular, changes in MCS. For example, the MIS was seen as a Project Alpha 
initiative, which would disappear with the project. Thus, the MIS has not been 
updated, nor is it properly used. Furthermore, the findings also reveal that most of the 
changes that have been introduced have been imported from developed countries. For 
instance, various MCS were introduced by consultants without adapting the systems 
to the NSC’s specific context. Hence, the MCS are too technical and not well 
understood by the majority of staff who are supposed to draw from them for their 
daily operations. This is similar to the assertion made by Perera, (1989), Ansari and 
Bell (1991), Hopper et al., (2003; 2009) about the importation of accounting systems 
from developed countries into developing countries without proper adaptation. The 
failure of the MCS can also be attributed to the lack of commitment to change from 
the government to the NSC. The government’s decision not to grant full autonomy to 
the NSC and constant changes of the NSC top management affected commitment to 
changes. Top managers tended to align the interest of the NSC to that of the ruling 
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government, thus affecting the continuity of reforms. In effect all these decoupled the 
MCS from the day-to-day decision making of the organisation. 
 
9.4 The Thesis Contribution to Knowledge  
 
This study makes several contributions to knowledge in terms of policy, literature, 
theory, and, methodology. These contributions are highlighted below: 
 
(i) Policy impact: - policy on management, government  
 
One of the major policy contributions of this study is that it raises awareness that 
reforms are likely to fail without proper ownership, commitment and continuity. As 
discussed in section 8.3 and 8.4 reforms failed to become taking for granted ways of 
conducting activities in NSC as a results of them not been fully owned by the systems 
users and the changes in the ruling government and their interest. These changes 
affect the NSC top management and consequently, resulted in discontinuity of the 
previous reforms. This is an important contribution from which the Nigerian 
government and international organisation should learn. In public sector reforms, the 
engagement of local actors is important. Furthermore, for reforms to be truly 
successful, the government and public enterprise top management need to be 
committed in implementing and continuing with the initial reforms.  
 
Another important finding of the thesis which contributes to policy relates to the 
design of MCS. The research findings suggest that the MCS in the case organisation 
were largely imported with minimal adaptation. This has contributed to the 
decoupling of these MCS from day-to-day decision making. As discussed in section 
8.4 imported MCS were not well understood by the managers as they were not 
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adapted to suit local need. The implication of this finding is that for MCS or other 
accounting systems to be accepted and coupled with day-to-day decision making they 
need to be either initiated locally or where they have been imported they need to be 
adapted to suit the local context. Thus organisations in developing countries should 
identify what aspects of their accounting systems need changing, and then to 
implement appropriate systems to suit them. 
 
(ii) Contribution to literature 
 
The study has made contributions to the literature relating to management control 
systems. The first contribution is in providing an understanding of how MCS operates 
in a developing country. Until relatively recently, the area of management accounting 
research in developing countries has been neglected. While in recent years, studies 
such as those of Hopper et al, (2003; 2009), Uddin and Tsamenyi (2005), Tsamenyi et 
al. (2008), Wickramasinghe and Hopper (2005), Uddin and Hopper (2001; 2003), 
Hassan (2005), Hoque and Hopper (1994) and Wickramasinghe et al., (2004) have 
made contributions from the developing country context more country-specific studies 
are needed. This is particularly important as developing countries are not homogenous 
(Wallace, 1990). Sub-Saharan Africa in general and Nigeria in particular have seen 
very few such studies. This study therefore contributes to the MCS in developing 
country literature by providing empirical evidence on MCS practices from the context 
of Nigeria.  
 
Second, the study also contributes to the literature on MCS in public sector 
organisations in which research is sparse (Broadbent and Guthrie, 1992, Broadbent, 
1999) by conducting a case study of the NSC and has highlighted the various MCS 
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introduced in reforming the NSC. In section 7.4 and 8.4, how these MCS were 
diffused, accepted/rejected was presented. By doing this the study contributes to the 
understanding of the diffusion of management accounting innovations from a 
developing country context. 
 
Third, the study contributes to the understanding of public sector reforms in 
developing countries where conflicted results were reported by showing that reforms 
and MCS change can be both successful and not successfully at the same time. As 
discussed in section 7.4 and 8.4 MCS were drawn upon in reforming the NSC. For 
instance, strategic planning was adopted in changing the NSC towards becoming a 
commercial enterprise. Strategic planning resulted in the NSC having a mission 
statement and the integration of it strategies with budget. However, the plan and the 
budget together with other MCS innovations introduced in reforming the NSC became 
subordinated to political control. This finding contributes to the literature by 
highlighting the pivotal role of politics in MCS design in a developing country 
context. 
 
(iii) Contribution to theory 
 
Theoretically the study contributes to the application of the Actor-Network Theory 
(ANT) in accounting research. The central concern of ANT is the desire to bring 
together humans and non-humans into the same analytical vein (Lee and Hassard, 
1999). However this central thesis has not been given much attention in previous 
management accounting research (Lowe, 2001). The analysis provided in the thesis 
has expanded the list of actors that influence accounting change. By categorising these 
actors as global and local and as human and non-human, the thesis has provided a 
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broader understanding of the process of actor-network creations and how these 
networks impact on MCS than provided in previous management accounting studies. 
The ANT analysis also highlighted how the actor-reform/MCS networks are created 
and sustained over time thereby broadening our understanding of how MCS are 
developed and sustained in organisations.  
 
One of the arguments in ANT is that power can be conceptualised as an effect of a 
network (Callon, 1986; Law, 1992). In other words, power is equally distributed in the 
network as no individual actor has power to influence the network on his/her own. 
This assertion has however been challenged in the thesis as the study shows that the 
Nigerian government had an authoritative power (Uddin and Tsamenyi, 2005), which 
shaped and reshaped all the actors in the reform network. Actors in the network do not 
necessarily need to have the same amount of power especially in a politically 
dominated organisation such as the NSC. This finding raises concern about how 
power is downplayed in ANT analysis and should spur further debate on how power 
can be properly theorised in ANT analysis.  
 
(iv) Contribution to methodology 
 
The study contributes to methodology through the adoption of the case study 
approach. Traditionally, management accounting research has been dominated by 
positivistic studies using large scale surveys. However, this has changed since the 
1980s when researchers began to place emphasis on studying management accounting 
in its organisational context. Scholars such as Hopper and Powell (1985), Hopwood 
(1987), Scapens (1990) and Otley and Berry (1994) have called for the use of case 
study in order to understand the organisational context of management accounting 
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systems. This study is a response to this call by adopting a case study approach to 
explore the role of MCS in its organisational context (in the NSC). The importance of 
this approach is that it enabled the researcher to explore the underlying social and 
political context within which the MCS operated. NSC MCS are embedded in 
complex social and political processes, which can only be uncovered by the adoption 
of case study.  
 
Another methodological contribution concerns the process of conducting case studies 
in developing countries. Most of the material on case studies has been written from 
the western perspective, in which assumptions are made that the process of data 
collection is straightforward (see Yin, 1989, 1994; 2003). Various issues were 
highlighted in this thesis which will contribute towards conducting a case study in an 
environment characterised by social and political relations such as Nigeria and in 
other developing countries (Hopper et al., 2009). The study shows that social 
networks are very important in selecting and gaining access to the research site. These 
social networks subsequently influence the case study research process in terms what 
types of questions to ask, how interviewees respond to questions, the flexibility of the 
interview process, etc. This is an important observation which can help future case 
study researchers in developing countries. 
 
9.5 Limitation of the Study  
 
Like any other research, this study is not without limitations. The limitations are 
highlighted in this section.  
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The first limitation of this study is that it was conducted in a single enterprise; thus the 
finding cannot be statistically generalised with other public organisations in Nigeria. 
However, it must be emphasised that the aim of the thesis is not to provide statistical 
generalisation but instead to provide an in-depth understanding of the process of the 
public sector reforms and how this impacts on the MCS. As a result, the single case 
study should not impose any limitations on the interpretations of the results. 
 
Another limitation is concerned with obtaining relevant literature on MCS change in 
the context of public sector reforms in developing countries in general and Nigeria in 
particular. The study relied on literature relating to developed countries; thus some 
issues that are particularly relevant to a developing country might be overlooked. 
Furthermore, in Nigeria documents are not properly kept; hence in most cases the 
researcher had to rely on interviewees. However, this limitation was overcome 
through putting the same questions to various informed interviewees. Yin (2003) 
asserted that a well-informed participant can provide an important insight. 
 
Another limitation of the study lay in tracing all the relevant actors in the Nigerian 
public sector reforms and interviewing them. Arranging appointments with actors 
such as the staff of the World Bank and IMF Nigeria country office was not 
successful. However, this limitation was overcome through reviewing various 
documents on public sector reforms in Nigeria. 
 
9.6 Suggestion for Future Research 
 
The study has identified some areas for future research. First, this study was 
conducted in a single enterprise – the NSC. Future studies could be conducted in other 
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public organisations in Nigeria, in order to understand the impacts of public sector 
reforms on MCS. Also cross-country studies between developing countries or 
between developed and developing countries can be conducted to enable us to gain a 
more in-depth understanding of reforms and MCS change.  
 
Second, in order to better understand the role MCS play in the management of 
Nigerian enterprises, comparative studies of the private and public sector enterprises 
could be undertaken. These studies could enrich our understanding of how MCS are 
perceived in the management of Nigerian organisations. 
 
Third, the primary data for the analysis was collected mainly from the local actors. 
While attempts were made to interview the global actors such as the World Bank and 
the IMF representatives, these were not possible. To enrich the understanding of the 
public sector reform process, future researchers are encouraged to engage these 
groups of global actors.  
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Appendix: 4.2 Nigeria’s Economic Indicators from 1960-1988 
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Appendix 5.1: Letter of Introduction from the Supervisor 
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Appendix 5.5: Interview Guide Questions 
 
1. Introduction 
Can you briefly describe your job function and educational background? 
How long have you been in the present position and previous, if relevant? 
 
2. External changes and internal influence  
 
1. What are the external (environmental) and the internal factors that affect your 
organisation? E.g. government reforms, increased competition, professional 
bodies, multinationals, consultants, internal politics etc 
2. How the change in government policies does affect your organisation? 
3. Can you explain to me the factors that brought these changes? 
4. How do the senior management, regulators, government etc influence your 
organisation? How has these influence affect NSC transformation? 
5. How has the change being promoted? Who are the promoters and drivers of 
the change i.e. both internal and external? 
6.  Who resists the change e.g. trade union, individuals, politicians etc? How did 
they do it? Who supported the change? How did they do it? 
7. How have the changes affect the management of your organisation and the 
way you carry your job? E.g. how you make decisions, planning etc. 
8. What are the challenges now facing the NSC? 
9. What types of systems were implemented to support the reforms? 
10. Overall, how has the reforms affect accounting in your organisation? What is 
your opinion on the accounting change or lack of it? 
 
3. Specific question on particular reform 
1. Why the reform (what necessitated the reform); is it for efficiency, being 
imposed by World Bank e. t. c? 
2. What was the objective of the reform? 
3. When was it launch?  
4. What was the duration of the reform? 
5. What was the strategy of execution of the reform? (How was it executed?) 
How was the reform implemented? 
6. Process of the reform? How was the reform implemented? 
7. What are the individual responses to TQM implementation 
8. How did its implementation improve NSC processes? Especially financial 
management controls and financial processes) here I am talking about 
planning, budgeting, decision making, and performance management. What 
are the factors making control to improve or not? What affect does the above 
have on budget preparation, process, compliance and monitoring? Who 
prepare the budget, pre posts and now? 
9. What are the individual response to the changes 
10. Was the reform a success? 
a. If yes, what were the key success factors? 
b. If no, what were the constraints? 
c. Who supports the change? For example government, top management. 
d. Who resist the change? How did they do it 
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11. What were the lessons learnt  
4. Planning, budgeting and decision making processes 
 Do you participate in management decisions? If yes can you explain more 
 Has this role/participation change as a result of any of the reforms? 
 How do you plan your activity? Do you use budget? 
 What is the aim of the budget? 
 Has the budgeting process change as a result of any of the reforms or any other 
reason? Can you explain to me how the change happened? How budgetary 
process operates?  
 In your opinion why did it change? 
 What factors contributes to the change? 
 Who prepares the budgets? Who allocate costs? 
 Is budget use to control company operations? 
 Is there concern on accurate and reliable budget? 
 Is compliance to budget mandatory? Do you follow up on budget issues? 
 How is the budget being implemented?  
 Are performance measure based on budget? 
 How useful is the budget information? 
 Is the budget main information use in decision making? 
 How your unit/subsidiary makes decisions in terms of what is needed for daily 
operations and capital expenditure? 
 Are the budget and other information available to all staff?  
 What are the sources of other information?  
 
5. Management style 
 Can you explain how your organisation is managed?  
 Do staffs participate in management processes before the reform? Has that 
change now? How did it occur? How is it done now? 
 How are policy, procedure and instruction formulated? 
 How do you carry your daily operations? 
 How are the board of directors and senior managers being appointed? 
 What is the relationship of your organisation with the Ministry of petroleum, 
oil multinational and other government agencies? 
 How does your organisation account to your stake holders? 
 Do you prepare any report for management? If yes had this report change? 
How many reports do you prepare prior to the reform? How many do you 
prepare now? What do you use the reports for (E.g. planning, performance 
measurement and decision making)? How have the employees perceived the 
changes in reporting?  
 Has the level of staffs’ participation in management processes increase after 
any of the changes 
 If reports have not change, the question will be, why has reporting not change 
for the past 30 years despite changes in the global business environment? 
 How is accounting organised, is it centrally organised staff function or 
decentralised? 
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4. NSC accounting systems and changes 
 What type of management accounting techniques do you use? Do you use the 
information provide by these techniques? Can you explain how you use the 
information? 
 Who prepare the accounting information report? 
 Who operates the system, i.e. accountants, IT staffs or others? 
 Are all parties satisfied with the accounting function and information? Is there 
information duplications? (Adequacy of the accounting system)? 
 Have management accounting change from incorporation act to date (How has 
accounting development over time both internal accounting, costing systems 
and responsibility accounting)? How did it occur? Can you explain more? 
Who are the engineers of such change? What factors causes the change? 
 Are staffs satisfied with the new ways of doing things introduced by 
commercialisations, Alpha and any other events?  
 What type of policy NSC introduced to promote efficiency? E.g. 
Retrenchment, cost cutting, value creation e t c is it a success or failure? 
 Do these changes (reform) brought a new way of thinking in the organisation 
i.e. financial term based on competition and profit way as well as non 
financial? 
 Do employees see the company as there own? 
 How can you access the overall benefits of such changes? Do staffs accept or 
resist the changes (observe here)? 
 What is the responsibility of accountants? How accountants/admin staffs 
relates to other professionals (operation staffs)? What is their relationships? 
 
5. Performance measurement 
 Project Alpha introduced new mission and mission and vision, how are you 
working toward achieving that?  
 In your view is it possible to achieve the new mission in such a short time? 
 Is your performance adequately monitored and evaluated for improvement? 
How is it done? Has it change as a result of any of the reforms or any other 
events? 
 Can you explain your system of promotion, reward and punishment? Is the 
organisations concern about your well being? Can you elaborate on that 
 Are their adequate communication systems in the organisation? 
 How is individual performance monitored? 
 How do you design performance measures for your processes/other units? 
 Do you used traditional indicators to measure your performance that is ROI, 
capacity utilization, customer satisfaction, market share, quality and delivery 
time e t c 
6. Specific questions with regard to SAP and MIS 
 Would you please tell me about the recent information system implemented in 
your subsidiary? Why is it introduced? How is the system being introduced? 
What type of information is produced by the new system? 
 Who uses the information? Do organisation members understand the 
information produced by the new systems? Have the new systems integrated 
with the existing system? 
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 Do staffs understand the nature and significance of new systems? Do the new 
systems fit the established way of working (thinking) in the company? Were 
you given training on how to use the new systems? What are the 
implementation problems? 
 How does the new system impacts on various functions within the subsidiary 
and headquarters? Has your working relationship change? 
 How do staffs respond to these systems? Do you think the new systems will 
work towards achieving the organisational mission and vision? How has SAP 
system influence accounting function? Has the role of accountant change? 
 What have been the major factors influencing the outcome of the new system 
implementation? 
 Is their stability, change or resistance to the SAP system? 
 
 
7. Human Resources Department 
 How has the recent changes affected your department? 
 Can you explain your recruitment process? Is career development well 
managed? Can you explain? 
 Can you explain to me how performances are measured prior to the reform and 
now? Who do the staffs’ appraisal? How are targets set? How is remuneration 
determined for organisational members; top management and board of 
directors? 
 Do you have any system of reward/ punishment? Hire and fire policy? 
 Can you explain to me your training policy? How is it implemented? Who 
fund the training and how do you identify staffed to be trained? 
 Are their minimum days of training set for staffs? 
 Has your training policy change? Yes/no explain why or how? 
 
8. Political issues/policy makers 
 What are the purposes of the government reforms?  
 Do you think Nigeria’s economic policies were the reasons for its 
underdevelopment? 
 What is your opinion on the present reforms? 
 How do you assess the present government reforms? Are the reforms good 
enough to push the economy forward? 
 What are the objectives of the government reforms? What are the objectives of 
commercialisations? Has NSC met those objectives? If yes how/if no why? 
 What is your opinion about NSC recent transformation? Is it a value process? 
Will it aid the corporation in achieving it vision?  
 What are the benefits of NSC commercialization and transformation to 
average Nigerian? 
 
9. Consultant 
 What is your role in the NSC reforms? 
 How do you go about the reforms? 
 In your opinion why is NSC not efficient and effective like other National Oil 
Companies 
 Do you think the present reform will make NSC solve it problems? 
 In your opinion what are the NSC’s main challenges 
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Appendix 5.6: Contact Summary Form 
 
Type of contact              NSC Office 
Visit  X     Contact date: 28/08/07 
Phone X     Today’s date: 31/08/07 
 
 
Main issues discussed. 
Various reforms that took place; from CRC, to TQM and Alpha 
Most of the SBUs are cost centres; they do not make any profit. 
Money is wasted, as there is no accountability. 
Conflicting role; NSC buy crude from the government at international price and sell 
the refined product at a subsidies price. 
Government interferes in their daily operations  
Recent MCS introduced. 
 
Most-important points 
NSC used to be funded 100 per cent by the government because of bureaucracy but 
that is now changing.  
NSC lacks a scientific system of performance measuring and monitoring. 
The organisation’s past and presents accounting system 
Previous reforms that took place 
Poor maintenance culture 
Little to no motivation for staff 
 
Issues suggested by the contact for further pursuance 
Identify staff that took part/are in the organisation during the previous reforms. 
Check the NSC library for documents regarding the reforms 
 
Next line of action 
Find out more about Nigerian factor 
Make appointments with employees (actors) that were in the organisation during the 
previous reforms. 
Identify new MCS introduce, implementation processes and usage. 
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Appendix 5.7: Document Summary Form 
 
                                                                                                    Site: NSC 
Documents name and description                                              Document: 5 
Alpha handbook                                                                         Date received: 30/08/07  
 
Events or contact the documents is associated with 
Project Alpha 
Aims and objectives of the project  
 
Importance of the documents 
The basis information about the recent reform 
Aim at all staff 
 
Brief summary of the content 
The document provides an overview of the recent reform. It described the aims and 
objectives of the reforms and the strategy for implementing the reforms. 
 
The document also states what is expected from every staff. 
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Appendix 5.8: List of Codes 
 
Reasons for reforms              WR 
Political motivated       WR-PLT 
Economic motivated       WR-ECO 
Socially  motivated       WR-SOC  
Voluntary         WR-VLR 
Imposed        WR-IMP 
 
 
Reforms processes        RP 
In house         RP-INHOU 
External         RP-EXT 
Participation        PR-PP 
Implementation problems       RP-IMP  
 
Management control systems/changes      MCS 
Management control systems adopted    MCS-AD 
Old management control systems      MCS-OLD  
New management control systems     MCS-NEW 
Usage of management control systems     MCS-US 
Staff understanding of MCS      MCS-SF-UN 
Application of MCS       MCS-APP 
 
Actors               ACT 
The role of NSC management    NP-MAN-ACT 
NSC staff        NP-ST-ACT 
The role of the government       GOV-ACT 
The consultant       CLT-ACT 
Management control systems technology    MCS-ACT 
World Bank/IMF        WB-IMF-ACT 
Public sector reforms        PSR-ACT 
Nigeria’s general public       NGR-ACT 
Network creation/created      NC 
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Appendix 5.9: Lists of Themes that Emerge from the Data 
1. Political interference 
2. Power 
3. External societal influence 
4. Niger Delta 
5. Ethnicity 
6. World Bank and IMF 
7. Multinationals  
8. Secrecy 
9. Corruption 
10. Mentality (Nigerian factor)  
11. Lack of commercial mind 
12. Mismanagement  
13. Incompetency/misplacement  
14. Authorisation limits/funding issues 
15. Infrastructure 
16. Maintenance 
17. Reforms 
18. Consultant 
19. Change initiatives 
20. Borrowing ideas from outside 
21. Continuity/ownership 
22. Operations 
23. CRC 
24. ALPHA 
25. TQM 
26. SAP 
27. Accounting systems 
28. Planning and Budgeting  
29. Performance management 
30. Accountability 
31. Monetisation  
32. SUN Account 
33.  MIS 
34. MIS Adoption 
35. MIS Support 
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